Following the war, Jalili began working as a university lecturer at his alma mater. In 1989 he started working at the ministry of foreign affairs in addition to his teaching post. In 2001, he was appointed senior director of policy planning in the office of the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. On 20 October 2007, Jalili replaced
Ali Larijani as secretary of the council and became responsible for international negotiations over Iran's
nuclear program. However, he was described as uncompromising even among Iranian representatives, and was considered "impossible" by European officials. A nuclear deal was struck only after Jalili was dismissed as secretary of the council on 10 September 2013, and
Ali Shamkhani was appointed to replace him. Immediately after being dismissed from the office, Jalili was appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to the
Expediency Discernment Council of the System as a member.
Activities and views Jalili is a leading figure of the hardline "
Iranian neo-Principalist" group in the Iranian political scene, and a protégé of
Mojtaba Khamenei.
The New York Times reported that an Iranian analyst described him in 2013 as "the perfect follower of [Ali] Khamenei" who "doesn’t care about
foreign relations, the
economy or anything," and that his speeches reflect the worldview "of an Iran engaged in a multifaceted battle with the West", maintained by Iran's Supreme Leader. Jalili describes himself as a strong believer in the doctrine of "
velayat-e faqih", the central principle of Iran’s political system, which holds that a senior righteous Islamic
Shi'i jurist should as the Supreme Leader have the highest authority in both political and religious matters. Jalili was known for his loyalty to Ali Khamenei. He strongly advocates women being required to wear the
mandatory hijab, and believes that the Iranian government should not hesitate to enforce the
hijab law. Jalili says that Iranian women should focus their lives on home and family, instead of pursuing careers, and that the state must regulate Iran's cultural and social life so as to ensure that it remains “pure.” While Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Jalili coordinated Iran's regional policies, and engaged with
the Islamic Republic's proxies. He met with and expressed support for the leadership of
Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad, and senior
Hamas officials whom he hosted in Tehran as part of Iran's broad regional outreach. In 2014 Jalili participated in an international gathering of
Holocaust deniers in Tehran, hosted by the regime. During his tenure as chief negotiator for Iran on its nuclear program, he elicited the following views: {{blockquote Then he started giving a 40-minute long meandering speech and weaving unnecessary philosophy about the Iranian culture and history, as well as the constructive role it can play in the region. Jalili shockingly blurts out words when he wants to avoid a direct answer, and this was exactly one of those moments. He even mentioned that he still teaches part-time at Tehran University. But, I was not at all jealous of his students. {{blockquote
Mohammad Marandi, a professor at
Tehran University closely linked to the Iranian government, described him as a tough negotiator who "believes strongly in Iran's nuclear program and its sovereign rights. He's not the sort of person to give major concessions." During presidential campaign debates in 2024, Jalili declared that he would "make the enemy regret" the
sanctions on Iran, and stated that he had a plan of action to do so once he became president.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jalili worked for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the age of 26, when he was named head of the Inspection Department, rigorously screening applicants for ideological nonconformity and perceived lack of religious devotion.
Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and chief nuclear negotiator (2007-2013) In 2007, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei chose Jalili as his representative and the secretary of the
Supreme National Security Council. The peak of Jalili's activity in the Supreme National Security Council was his
heading of the negotiations concerning Iran's development of nuclear technology. His hardline negotiations did not yield any positive results, and multilateral sanctions were imposed on Iran by the
United Nations Security Council during his tenure.
Ali Akbar Velayati said, "Diplomacy does not equal delivering a sermon to the counterpart … Diplomacy is not a philosophy class … Being principled does not equal inflexibility … Diplomacy does not mean hawkishness but is an active and transactional engagement … The art of diplomacy is to safeguard our nuclear rights and reduce sanctions, not increase those sanctions!"
Member of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System As the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Jalili was a legal member of the
Expediency Discernment Council of the System. After Jalili was dismissed by Rouhani, Ali Khamenei appointed him again as a member of the council in September 2013.
Member of the Foreign Relations Strategic Council Khamenei appointed Jalili as a member of the Strategic Council of Foreign Relations in 2014. He is currently the head of this council.
2013 presidential candidacy Jalili was a candidate in the
2013 presidential elections, announcing his candidacy on 22 March 2013. He was supported by the
Front of Islamic Revolution Stability and also by
Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, the party's main candidate who declined his candidacy in favour of Jalili. His campaign slogans were "No compromise. No submission. Only Jalili." and "A Pleasant Life". He opposed “détente a hundred percent”, and promised that he would not agree to any compromise “whatsoever” with the West over Iran’s nuclear program and Iran's involvement in Syria. He received 4,168,946 votes (11%) and came in third, behind president-elect
Hassan Rouhani and runner-up
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.
Shadow Cabinet In 2013, after he was defeated in the presidential election, Jalili proposed a plan of a
Shadow Cabinet that would include other hardliners with connections to Khamenei and the IRGC, ostensibly to help the
Hassan Rouhani government and compensate for its shortcomings. He held several meetings to criticise the government and offer a solution, and opposed any new nuclear negotiations by Iran with the West. In early 2021, he met 19 members of parliament and discussed his suggestions to reform the budget structure. They also took a
petrochemical refinery development plan to the
Larijani parliament (right-wing political opposition) and approved it, and the plan was communicated to the Rouhani government (left-wing political opposition) for implementation. Jalili said that the Shadow Cabinet was neither a party nor an organisation, but a discourse and it meant that everyone must follow the process of developments, shadow by shadow to have a positive impact on the path of the Islamic Revolution, and that media must be marshaled to win the war that Iran is in.
2021 presidential candidacy Before the last day of registration for the presidential election, he was considered one of the most likely candidates. Although Jalili had said he would not register if
Ebrahim Raisi entered the election, with the flood of members and supporters of the
established government such as
Jahangiri,
Larijani,
Shariatmadari,
Akhundi and
Hemmati, it is conflict that he registered in the election individually or to support Raisi.
2024 presidential candidacy Jalili ran for president in the
2024 presidential election. On 29 June, he secured 40% of the votes during the first round of the election, taking second place behind
reformist candidate
Masoud Pezeshkian, and thus qualifying for a runoff, which he then lost. Jalili received support from unsuccessful candidate
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who placed third, as well as from politicians
Alireza Zakani and
Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh, who had both previously dropped out. ==Electoral history==