s were held in a 3 x 6 meter trailer. The captive sat with his hands cuffed and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. Initially, the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the
Geneva Conventions to captives from
the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct
competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of
prisoner of war status. Subsequently, the
Department of Defense instituted the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were
lawful combatants—rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an
enemy combatant.
Summary of Evidence memo A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Sahib Rohullah Wakil's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 25 October 2004. The memo listed the following allegations against him:
Transcript Wakil chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. On March 3, 2006, in response to a
court order from
Jed Rakoff the
Department of Defense published a summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
Administrative Review Board Detainees whose
Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual
Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee might pose if released or transferred, and whether there were other factors that warranted his continued detention. Wakil chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.
The following primary factors favor continued detention The following primary factors favor release or transfer Testimony ==Repatriation==