Narratives of this rebellion differ due to the problematic political alignments involved in the Cambodian struggle. The
Republican government wanted to portray the Cambodian revolutionary movement as largely a foreign (mainly
Vietnamese) transplant and preferred to gloss over the significance of indigenous leftist activity from 1967. Alternatively, F.U.N.K.(
National United Front of Kampuchea) wanted to demonstrate unity between Sihanouk supporters and the Khmer Rouge, understating the extent of the development of the revolutionary opposition to Sihanouk before his overthrow. Historians such as
David Chandler and
Milton Osborne understand the rebellion as primarily a localized action. According to Chandler, the revolt “sprang from local grievances against injustice and social change, corruption, and ham-fisted government behavior” and the participants “did not respond to orders from the
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) central committee”. Milton Osborne writes that the rebellion “was more an outbreak of largely spontaneous resistance to government actions than the first orchestrated challenge from the radicals”. Apart from Sihanouk's Sangkum regime, other diverging strands contributed to this rebellion. For instance, the rebellion was identified to have communist roots as it was the first part of
Pol Pot's social and political two-phased strategy executed by the CPK. Furthermore, even Sihanouk himself was ignorant of this highly internalized and localized conflict, believing it result from foreign instigation. Sihanouk's generosity towards them increasingly became a source of grievance for the local inhabitants as they found themselves displaced from their land (many of whom did not even own their land) with unfavorable economic conditions.
Political conditions Following the
September 1966 election, the
National Assembly was dominated by right wing politicians with a minority of left leaning politicians, namely,
Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and
Hu Nim, Furthermore, Sihanouk's wavering stance between the Right and Left appeared to be leaning towards the Right as he had imprisoned several
Pracheachon party members. It announced his non-endorsement for the September elections. Progressively, there appeared to be increasingly visible cracks within the political sphere as respective sides strengthened and consolidated. As the Left gradually co-ordinated its activities, holding demonstrations in the towns, attacking the government, and conducting propaganda in the countryside, the predominantly right-winged government upped its military and economic regulations.
Economic conditions While Sihanouk was away in France, Lon Nol had considerable autonomy in effecting his economic policies. This was in response to the rise of a large rice export black market that greatly affected Cambodia's economy as it was heavily dependent on its taxation of rice exports. Here, farmers illegally sold much of Cambodia's rice to the
Viet Cong (VC) across the borders as they paid more as compared to the Cambodian government. Lon Nol was seriously concerned about the sale of large proportions of the rice crop to the VC or on the Saigon black market, where clandestine sales were handled by local Chinese middlemen who had found friends and worked in conjunction with cells of former
Viet Minh sympathizers acting on behalf of the VC. This system provoked an uproar by the rural population in Battambang Province where it was first introduced as many households not only saw their earnings being severely reduced due to the low prices offered for the crops but were also forcibly made to surrender their produce at gunpoint. Furthermore, the strong intervention and presence of the army in Battambang involved forming co-operatives, forcing villagers to regroup while bearing the obligation of being a co-operative member in paying subscriptions to finance loans that fell into the hands of corrupt officials. In turn, they were given insecticides that were often mediocre quality or even false substitutes. Also, army officials could engage in illegal smuggling across the borders. Another cause of growing peasant resentment and unrest would be attributed to the severe exploitation or confiscation of villagers by landowners. For instance, in
Pailin Province, arable land was bought from the villages and converted into plantations for the expanding fruit industry, dominated by the Chinese and Burmese. The Khmer peasants had to work for them as unskilled laborers or were displaced from their homeland. In other areas like the Andoeuk Hep district, peasants faced harsh conditions due to the unsustainability and unproductivity of the cotton industry – due to the high cost of labour and materials in intensive cotton cultivation, peasants cultivated large areas of land with low yields per hectare. The situation was further exacerbated by the increasing susceptibility to encroaching weeds and insects, greatly decreasing the yields. This caused large areas of land to lose their value, many peasants had to find other jobs while facing high indebtedness and landlessness. Peasant discontent was contributed by the growing domination by the Chinese and other landowners, including Government officials. The continual buying and selling of land due to failed crops produced increasing impoverishment and a class conflict. Centered on rapidly growing fruit plantations, it was a conflict between a ‘rich and enterprising Chinese bourgeoisie which has taken possession of the land, and the alienated, indebted, and already semi-independent village communities.” According to Kiernan, it was clear that “corruption, the misuse of the military and other authority, and increasing impoverishment, in the Samlaut, Pailin and Andoeuk Hep districts, for example, created a vast reservoir of peasant unrest that lacked only a reasonably sophisticated leadership. By early 1967, that leadership had begun to take shape and it provided, as well as a sympathetic and purposeful ideology, the guidance to enable an already disaffected peasantry to carry out a serious and effective rebellion.”
Khmer Rouge rebels Vietnamese and Chinese communists played a small role in planting the seeds of rural revolt. For instance, after 1945, the Vietnamese Communists were active in their Cambodian oriented efforts, sending cadres into the country to encourage, encadred and attempt to establish Communist hegemony over the independence movement. In September 1960, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) was founded. The rebellion was not simply a result of plotting by the radical left, though small pro-communist groups had been established in Battambang for years. CPK agitators like Khieu Samphan did play a part in fanning peasant discontent. They were aided by widespread resentment at falling crop prices, bankruptcy, and military actions. Some historians, such as
Ben Kiernan, have stated that evidence points to the fact that the clandestine CPK was in fact planning an uprising across the country, citing the fact that the demonstrations rapidly spread to other, widely separated provinces. It is argued that some of the disturbances in 1967 were part of a coordinated effort by the leftists to destabilise Sihanouk's regime, though the official Khmer Rouge historiography given by Pol Pot later sought to deny this, stating its open rebellion only occurred in January 1968 and that the Samlaut incident was "premature" and surprised the communist party ==Rebellion==