With the
exit of Russia from the war in 1917 (after the
October Revolution),
Austria-Hungary was now able to devote significant forces to the
Italian Front and the
German Empire was able to send reinforcements to
their allies. The Austro-Hungarian emperor
Karl reached an agreement with the Germans to undertake a new offensive against Italy, a move supported by both the chief of the general staff
Arthur Arz von Straußenburg and the commander of the
South Tyrolean Army Group Conrad von Hötzendorf. In the autumn of 1917, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians defeated the Italians at the
Battle of Caporetto. After Caporetto, the Italians fell back to the
Piave river and were reinforced by six
French infantry divisions and five
British infantry divisions as well as sizeable air contingents.
Prelude Italy's defeat at Caporetto led to General
Luigi Cadorna's dismissal and General
Armando Diaz's replacement of him as
Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. Diaz set up a strong defense line along the
Piave. Up until this point in the war, the
Italian army had been fighting alone against the
Central Powers. After the defeat at Caporetto,
France and
Britain sent reinforcements on the Italian front. These, besides accounting for less than a tenth of the Italian forces in theater, had however to be redirected for the major part to the
Western Front as soon as the
German spring offensive began on 21 March 1918. The Austro-Hungarian Army had also recently undergone a change in command, and the new Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff,
von Straußenburg, wished to finish off the Italians. After Caporetto, the Austro-Hungarian offensive put many Italian cities, including
Venice and
Verona, under the threat of the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary's army had since then longed to achieve these strategic prizes and force Italy into an armistice. Straußenburg's
army group commanders,
Conrad von Hötzendorf (the former Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff) and
Svetozar Boroević, both wished to make a decisive assault against the Italians, but could not agree on where. Conrad wanted an attack from the South Tyrolean Alps Straußenburg himself was in favour of an attack on the western part of the front (the "
Giudicarie" sector) leading to
Brescia. Conrad and Boroević disliked each other, and Straußenburg and
emperor Charles, unable to decide between these two strong personalities, divided the army equally between them, reserving only a small part of the forces for a diversionary action on the Giudicarie sector. The preparation of the offensive began in February 1918, after a meeting in
Bolzano between the Austro-Hungarian and
German high commands. It was strongly recommended by the Germans, as Ludendorff hoped that it could force the increasing American forces
in France to be diverted to the Italian front, so Straußenburg modeled the attack after
Erich Ludendorff's offensive on the
Western Front. The Austro-Hungarians, differently from their previous
success at Caporetto in November 1917 and from the subsequent attempts to break through on
Monte Grappa, did not prepare the attack as a pinpoint one, but as an all-out frontal attack, employing the entire residual strength of their army all along the front. The Austro-Hungarian formations were trained to employ
the tactics developed by the Germans on the Western Front for
Operation Michael, as Austro-Hungarian officers returning from the
Eastern Front were extensively trained alongside their German counterparts. There were also innovations on the Italian side. Analyzing the defeat of Caporetto, the staff of Armando Diaz concluded that the main tactical causes of it were the lack of mobility of Italian units, caught in a too rigid defensive scheme, the too centralized
command and control system, and the lack of
depth of Italian defences, where too many soldiers were simply stuck on the frontline. The new schemes prepared for the battle led to the abolition of the
continuous entrenchment and in the development of a highly mobile defence system, in which even the smaller units were allowed to freely move between previously recognized
strongpoints, independently decide to retreat or counterattack, or directly call the support of the artillery. Moreover, 13 divisions, equipped with 6,000 trucks, were organized in a central reserve, ready to be sent where it was needed. Conrad, who had been demoted from commander-in-chief after a series of disastrous failures in the Balkans and on the
Eastern Front, continued in Italy the same patterns of poor planning—disregarding troop strength, terrain and weather conditions. He did, however, come to the realization that he needed more men, at least 15 infantry divisions and two of cavalry. Straussenburg and other commanders in Vienna, dealing with the consequences of nearly a million casualties from Conrad's earlier campaigns, denied his requests until early June. ==Battle==