New York trial court The Seneca brought suit in the
Circuit Court of
Erie County, New York on October 13, 1885. The Seneca requested the
ejectment of
Harrison B. Christy from 100 acres of land in the town of
Brant, New York (purchased from the
Ogden Land Company), known as the "mile strip."
New York intermediate appellate court . The General Term of the Fifth Department of the
New York Supreme Court heard the intermediate appeal. Bradley J., writing for himself and Dwight J.J., affirmed. The court considered whether the Indians had properly surrendered the land and whether the consideration had been paid. As to the first question, the court noted that, while "in view of the known habits of Indians they may not be supposed to represent their occupation or possession by improvements or inclosures of all or great portions of their lands": [I]n this case the abandonment and surrender were not only practically made, but have been characterized by such circumstances and by such recognition, not only by the Indians, but by the government, in such manner as to determine the situation, and in legal effect to sever the prior relation of the Indians to the lands from them. The quantity of land covered by the treaty of conveyance was large. The court cited
Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) for the proposition that: "[t]he title of the Indians was possessory, and embraced the right of occupancy only. And when abandoned by them the possession attached itself to the fee of the lands." As to the second question, the court noted: The suggestion that the entire amount of the purchase money was not paid, and that such fact is in the way of supporting the claim to the Indian title, is not sustained. We are not called upon to consider the effect of default in payment of any portion of the purchase money. The treaty recites the payment of it, and as no such question seems ever before to have been raised, or full payment questioned, either by government or the Indians, it must at this late day be assumed, until the contrary is quite clearly made to appear, that the contract in that respect was performed. As a result, the intermediate appellate court did not reach the question of whether the statute of limitation applies.
New York Court of Appeals State Court Chief Justice
Charles Andrews held that the conveyances were valid under the
Nonintercourse Act, and that the claim was barred by the state
statute of limitations. Chief Justice
Charles Andrews, writing for a unanimous
New York Court of Appeals, affirmed. ;Validity of the transaction After reviewing the facts, Andrews began by arguing that there were many ways to extinguish
aboriginal title. He said: "It is material to observe that there was no uniform procedure on the part of the purchasers from Massachusetts in acquiring the Indian title," and gave examples of conveyances he believed to have been implicitly ratified by the federal government. As to the Seneca argument that, after the ratification of the Constitution, only the federal government could extinguish aboriginal title, Andrews noted that: These claims challenge the title not only of every purchaser and holder of lands within the boundaries of the grant of August 31, 1826, but also the title to many millions of acres of lands in this state, held under Indian treaties made by the state of New York with the Indian tribes within its borders, or under grants made by Indians to individuals under the authority of the state, where no treaty had been made between the United States and the Indian occupants. Andrews expressed the view that the
U.S. states, not the federal government, inherited from Great Britain the sole power to extinguish aboriginal title: On the Declaration of Independence the colonies became sovereign states. They were so acknowledged by the treaty of peace of 1783, and Great Britain by that treaty ‘relinquished all claims to the government, property, and territorial rights' within the several colonies. It is the received opinion that the colonies succeeded to the title of the crown to all the ungranted lands within their respective boundaries, with the exclusive right to extinguish by purchase the Indian title, and to regulate dealings with the Indian tribes. ‘There was no territory in the United States,’ said JOHNSON, J., in
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523, ‘that was claimed in any other right than that of one of the confederated states; therefore there could be no acquisition of territory made by the United States distinct from or independent of some one of the United States.’ Andrews relied upon the argument of federal acquiescence: The practical construction given by the state of New York to the federal constitution, as shown by the numerous treaties made by it with the Indian tribes, and the recognition by the federal authority of their validity, is very strong evidence that the clause in the federal constitution prohibiting the states from entering into treaties does not preclude a state, having the preemption right to Indian lands, from dealing with the Indian tribes directly, for the extinguishment of the Indian title. ;Effect of the Nonintercourse Act As to the
Nonintercourse Act, Andrews questioned both whether it applied to purchases by a state and whether it applied to purchases within a state. However, Andrews proceed to assume that the act applied and held that it had not been violated. Andrews proceeded to argue that the treaty requirement of the Act was satisfied by state treaties: The purchase must be made at a treaty, as in other cases. This insures publicity, and affords a protection against fraud. But the proviso does not require that the treaty should be one between the United States and the tribe from whom the purchase is made, as in the cases coming under the first clause of the section. It is sufficient if the purchase is made at a treaty held ‘under the authority of the United States,’ and in the ‘presence and with the approbation of the commissioner or commissioners of the United States,’ etc. Andrews also placed reliance on the fact that later versions of the Act excluded the clause "or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption or not" and instead simply prohibited acquisitions by persons. Andrews emphasized this latter ground because of his desire to prevent any similar lands claims by Indian tribes: In view of the numerous Indian titles in this state originating in treaties by the state, or in purchases made with its sanction by individuals, we prefer to place our judgment on the broader ground, which will remove any cloud upon the validity of those titles. ==Opinion==