By his own admission, Kamenev was not well versed in the political situation, which he saw "as if in a fog." An important role in Kamenev's political development was played by a member of the RVS of the Eastern Front,
S.I. Gusev. In July 1919, as a result of the scandalous "affair" of the Field Headquarters of the Republic's
Revolutionary Military Council, which became a manifestation of the political struggle of the groups in the Bolshevik elite, commander-in-chief Vatsetis was deposed and arrested along with his closest associates. Kamenev became the new commander in chief of all armed forces. It was the Bolsheviks Sergey Gusev and
Ivar Smilga, Kamenev's comrades from the RVS of the Eastern Front, that influenced Lenin to take this decision. As a result, Kamenev was on the post of commander in chief – the highest position in Soviet Russia on which a non-party military officer could count.
Pavel Pavlovich Lebedev, a former Tsarist general and talented General Staff Officer, became the closest ally of Kamenev in the Civil War, being his
chief-of-staff both on the Eastern Front and as commander in chief. Kamenev led the fight against the forces of General
Anton Denikin, then advancing on
Moscow. Already when he was on the Eastern Front, he had drafted a plan to fight Denikin, which included actions to prevent his formation with Kolchak's armies. By the time Kamenev was appointed commander-in-chief, such a plan was already outdated, since Kolchak was defeated, and his connection with the White armies of southern Russia already seemed unlikely. Nevertheless, Kamenev showed great stubbornness in defending his plan, which provided for an offensive through the
Don region, where the Reds were most fiercely resisted by the anti-Bolshevik-minded
Cossacks. Kamenev's plan was opposed by
Leon Trotsky, but supported by
Vladimir Lenin, who had little understanding of strategic issues. As a result, the Reds failed the
August offensive of the Southern Front, and the Whites reached the distant approaches to Moscow (reached
Orel and
Mtsensk, which threatened the main Soviet arsenal –
Tula), putting the existence of Soviet Russia at risk. Plans had to be urgently changed and the situation was saved through coordinated actions of the fronts, as a result of which a turning point was reached. As commander in chief, Kamenev led the struggle on other fronts – against General
Yudenich near
Petrograd, against the
Poles during the
Soviet-Polish war (Kamenev developed the plans for an attack on Poland), against General Wrangel in the South (in the latter case, Kamenev personally participated in the planning of the
Perekop-Chongarskoy operation). After the end of the large-scale civil war in November 1920, Kamenev led operations to eliminate banditry, peasant insurrections, to suppress the
uprising in Karelia (went personally to the theater of military operations). He was sent to Bukhara to purge the Bukhara Party, military, and militia of
Pan-Turkist and
Pan-Islamist elements, and to direct operations against
Enver Pasha himself. A squadron of four aircraft, two
Nieuport fighters and two 1½-Strutters was sent to southern Bukhara to provide support against Basmachis. While stationed in Turkestan, he led operations against the
Basmachi movement. During the campaign, Enver Pasha, who attempted to rally resistance under Pan-Islamic slogans was defeated and killed. ==Assessment==