Overhead reconnaissance During Duckett’s tenure as Director of the DS&T, overhead reconnaissance for gathering intelligence was a major activity. The U-2 spy planes were still active, particularly in flights over China operating from
Taiwan. China’s first
nuclear fusion (hydrogen) bomb had been detonated on June 17, 1967, and the test site was thoroughly photographed just days earlier. The planes, cameras, and
signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment were continually improved. A typical flight carrying a payload of 3,000 pounds could last seven or more hours, mainly at an altitude of over . The last U-2 flights were in mid-1974, surveying the results of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even before the
1960 U-2 incident involving a plane shot down over Russia and ending such photoreconnaissance of that country, the CIA was having developed a successor aircraft, the A-12
Oxcart. With greater "sprint" speed (Mach 3.1), reduced
radar cross-section, and capable of higher altitude (about 84,000 feet), the A-12 become operational in May 1967; at that time reconnaissance flights over
North Vietnam were conducted out of
Okinawa Island. Early the next year, flights were also made in support of the
Pueblo Crisis with
North Korea. Another reconnaissance aircraft had been developed for the Air Force; the R-12, later designated the
Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird. With operational characteristics similar to those of the A-12, the SR-71 had an advantage in also carrying infrared detectors, side-looking radar, and ELINT gear. The CIA adopted the SR-71 in 1968, and this remained the standard high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft until 1998, without a single loss to enemy action. Filming through CORONA missions was still important, and a new satellite system was placed into development. Commonly called "Big Bird" but officially designated
KH-9 HEXAGON, each satellite involved a 30,000-pound cylinder long and in diameter, carrying four
reentry capsules. There were two KH-9 cameras capable of independent operation and with a resolution of two feet. In addition, each HEXAGON carried SIGNIT electronics, collecting Soviet transmissions and also relaying messages sent by cover agents. The first HEXAGON satellite was launched by a Titan 3D in June 1971. Duckett considered the Big Bird one of his most important accomplishments. The time lag involved in overhead-photography imaging systems and the advances being made in electro-optical imaging devices led to a detailed examination of real-time reconnaissance technologies starting in 1969. Duckett tasked
Leslie C. Dirks, one of his most capable researchers, with assessing the present and projected technologies, and, with
Edwin H. Land (inventor of the
Polaroid Instant Camera and senior advisor to the CIA), preparing a plan for the replacement of CORONA. The resulting plan was strongly opposed by the Air Force, but, after personally hearing arguments from both sides in 1971, President Richard Nixon approved Duckett’s approach. After the President’s approval, the
KH-11 KENNEN Program was started, with Lockheed selected as the prime contractor and Perkin-Elmer grinding the very important collecting mirror. Likely the most secret of all CIA reconnaissance systems, each KH-11 had a
charge-coupled device (CCD)
electro-optical sensor and an collecting mirror. The digital images were transmitted as real-time signals via a relay satellite to a ground station at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The first KENNAN launch, by a Titan 3D rocket, took place in 1976, shortly after Dirks had replaced Duckett as the DS&T Director.
Electronic intelligence With an early background in radio and radar, Duckett had a great personal interest in CIA activities in these fields. Also, Duckett’s FMASC depended strongly on information gained through electronic intelligence (ELINT). As previously noted, the CIA had a receiving station in Iran to intercept telemetry signals coming from the Tyuratam test range. In 1965, this was augmented by two stations operated by the DS&T in the high mountains of northeastern Iran and nearer to Tyuratam; at their peak, these stations (designated TACKSMAN I and II ) provided the bulk of information on Soviet ICBM development. The CIA also funded ELINT operations in
Norway, both at a ground station in the far northeast near
Kirkenes and on a converted whaling boat in the
Barents Sea; these monitored Soviet radio communications and telemetry originating in northwest USSR. Direct reception of radar signals is limited to line-of-sight distances – approximately to the horizon. However, by operating in the high-frequency (HF) band (3-30 MHz), the signals can be "bounced" along a path between the ionosphere and ground, allowing an "
over-the-horizon" (OTH) operation. In early 1961, an OTH radar facility, designated EARTHLING, was set up in Pakistan to track missile and spacecraft launches from the Tyuratam test range. Through 1965, when the facility was closed by Pakistan, over 80 percent of the missile launches had been detected. EARTHLING also provided information on the Soviet's nuclear tests at high altitudes. An OTH radar, designated CHECKROTE, was opened on Taiwan in 1966; this was primarily to monitor missile launches from the Shuangchengzi test range in China. Greatly upgraded in 1969, CHECKROTE was a highly successful project. A very important intelligence item in the 1960-70s was the characteristics of Soviet radars, particularly those systems associated with their defense systems against bombers and ballistic missiles. U-2 and A-12 aircraft flew special missions to gather this information. The most novel collection means was through signals from Soviet radars reflected by the moon; a facility for such collection was set up by the CIA at Stanford University in 1966. Shortly after he became the Director of the DS&T, Wheelon had proposed using a
geosynchronous satellite to relay very-high and ultra-high frequency (VHF and UHF) telemetry signals from Soviet test sites to CIA control stations. (VHF and UHF signals cannot be directly received beyond the horizon because they are passed through, not reflected by, the ionosphere.) At the start of 1966, development of such a monitoring system, designated RHYOLITE, got underway. In a few months, Duckett took over the DS&T and implementation of the RHYOLITE program. A receiving/control site was selected near
Alice Springs in the Australian
Outback, safe from eavesdropping and signal interference by Soviet spy ships. The first RHYOLITE satellite was launched into its high,
geostationary orbit by an Atlas-Agena D rocket in June 1969. The primary mission was to monitor Soviet missile tests, but it was also capable of intercepting VHF and UHF communications; it found great usefulness in the
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and later in the
Vietnam War and subsequent conflicts.
Missile intelligence and Safeguard In March 1969, newly elected President
Richard Nixon announced to the public that he was authorizing the implementation of an
anti-ballistic missile system, called
Safeguard, to counter a potentially devastating Soviet threat. At that time, there was a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union based on
Mutual Assured Destruction; this assumed that a
first strike could not eliminate the capability for retaliation. Some studies had shown that Soviet ICBMs carrying
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) – several nuclear warheads aimed at different targets – could destroy a large part of U.S. ICBMs then emplaced in silos. In the fall of 1968, tests of SS-9 Mod 4 ICBMs had been monitored in which three warheads were dispensed, each supposedly capable of carrying up to five megaton-size nuclear bombs. The data, however, were not sufficient for the FMSAC to firmly determine if these were MIRVs or simply three warheads reentering in a row; this difference would have a major impact on their threat to the U.S. defense. This was a subject of great debate for several months, and critical for Congress to reach a decision on President Nixon’s authorization for Safeguard. Although he had personally concluded that the Soviets did not have MIRV capability, Duckett prepared a paper objectively presenting both sides of the technical debate. On July 17, 1969, with only senators present, Duckett’s paper was read to the Senate. In the final vote on August 6, Vice President
Spiro Agnew broke an even split in Congress by favoring the program. Although the effort was still shrouded in top secrecy, there were sufficient "leaks" to allow the news media to call attention to the role of the CIA in such matters.
Submarine espionage In March 1968, a Soviet
Golf class submarine imploded – generally believed to be while on the surface recharging its batteries – and sank in about of ocean some northwest of
Hawaii. The Soviet Fleet immediately started a major effort to locate the sub, but gave up in a few weeks, The U.S. Navy’s
Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) – a network of
hydrophone arrays – had initially tracked the sub, and
triangulation had been used to identify the general location where the accident occurred. The
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) then arranged for a spy submarine, the
USS Halibut, to search for the missing sub. During the summer of 1968, long cables lowered lights and cameras, and in August found the sub broken into several large pieces. The forward section contained the sub’s three missile launch tubes, one with an apparently intact nuclear-tipped missile. There was great interest in attempting a recovery of items such as cipher machines, code manuals, communications equipment, and possibly a torpedo or even a nuclear warhead. Both the Navy and the CIA started plans for a major salvage effort. The Navy proposed cutting into the sub’s hull and recovering whatever items could be reached. In a joint meeting, the Navy presented its recommended plan. They were staggered, however, when Duckett and the CIA team recommended a gigantic effort to recover an entire intact section, raising it the three miles (5 km) to the surface. After an intense debate at all levels, Duckett’s proposal was eventually approved by President Richard Nixon.
Howard Hughes agreed for his firm,
Summa Corporation, to build a long ship (the
Glomar Explorer, ostensibly a deep-water, manganese-mining vessel). This had a companion football-field-sized barge (the
Hughes Marine Barge-1) that was carried below the ship and thus hidden from overhead observation. Eight giant claws operating from the barge would lift the intact section of the Golf sub from the ocean floor and into an opening on the bottom of the ship. The activity was code-name
Project AZORIAN (sometimes JENNIFER), and publicly justified as a means of rescuing or recovering future U.S. vessels. It was July 1974 before the
Glomar and the
Barge began the raising attempt. When the section was lifted about off the seabed, one of the claws broke, followed by a collapse and shattering of the entire section. All but a small portion – some 10 percent of the original sub – fell back to the ocean floor. The lost portions included the items most desired by the intelligence community. Six bodies were in the recovered section, and were given a formal burial at sea.
Parapsychology intelligence In the early 1970s, two laser scientists at the
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) began research in
parapsychology. In a meeting with representatives of the DS&T, they claimed to have found witnesses of Soviet successes in psychokinetics – use of the mind for moving physical objects – and had themselves conducted positive research in mentally viewing remote objects and scenes –
astral projection. The CIA had long conducted research in the area of behavioral control. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, there was extensive testing of the effects of hypnosis and drugs, particularly
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) on human subjects. The bulk of these activities were conducted by the Technical Services Staff, forerunner of the Technical Services Department (TSD). Thus, when the SRI scientists presented their information on mind control, Duckett assigned this to the TSD. In October 1972, the TSD initiated the Biofield Measurements Program, to be conducted jointly with SRI, to determine whether participants (the viewers or percipients) could reliably identify and accurately describe salient features of remote locations or targets. This was in part justified by attempts to find what progress the Soviets were making in parapsychology and how it might be used against the United States. Two test subjects (persons claiming paranormal abilities) were provided by the SRI. Early in the following year, reported successes in "remote viewing" by the percipients were such that other units of the DS&T joined in the effort. A management review of the program was made in the summer of 1973, and both Duckett and the CIA Executive Director
William Colby allowed the activity to continue. A carefully planned experiment was conducted in July 1974. Duckett asked that this center on a description made by remote viewing of a target area in the Soviet Union that had been recently imaged by a satellite and suspected to be a nuclear test site. In sessions over a four-day period, the test subjects gave mentally derived descriptions of the site; these descriptions were then independently evaluated by a scientist from the
Los Alamos National Laboratory The overall judgement of the evaluator was that the remote viewing appeared to be a failure; nevertheless, continued low-level research in parapsychology intelligence was allowed by Duckett until he retired in June 1976. ==Controversy at the CIA==