Von Neumann's original theorem was motivated by game theory and applies to the case where • X and Y are
standard simplexes: X = \{ (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [0,1]^n : \sum_{i = 1}^n x_i = 1 \} and Y = \{ (y_1, \dots, y_m) \in [0,1]^m : \sum_{j = 1}^m y_j = 1 \}, and • f(x,y) is a linear function in both of its arguments (that is, f is
bilinear) and therefore can be written f(x,y) = x^\mathsf{T} A y for a finite matrix A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}, or equivalently as f(x,y) = \sum_{i=1}^n\sum_{j=1}^m A_{ij}x_iy_j. Under these assumptions, von Neumann proved that : \max_{x \in X} \min_{y \in Y} x^\mathsf{T} A y = \min_{y \in Y}\max_{x \in X} x^\mathsf{T} A y. In the context of two-player
zero-sum games, the sets X and Y correspond to the strategy sets of the first and second player, respectively, which consist of lotteries over their actions (so-called
mixed strategies), and their payoffs are defined by the
payoff matrix A. The function f(x,y) encodes the
expected value of the payoff to the first player when the first player plays the strategy x and the second player plays the strategy y. == Concave-convex functions ==