Networked digital feedback Peter Joseph argues for a transition from fragmented economic data relay to fully integrated, sensor-based digital systems, or an
Internet of things. Using an internet of sensory instruments to measure, track and feed back information, this can unify numerous disparate elements and systems, greatly advancing awareness and efficiency potentials. In an economic context, this approach could relay and connect data regarding how best to manage resources, production processes, distribution, consumption, recycling, waste disposal behavior, consumer demand and so on. Such a process of networked economic feedback would work on the same principle as modern systems of inventory and distribution found in major commercial warehouses. Many companies today use a range of sensors and sophisticated tracking means to understand rates of demands, exactly what they have, where it is or where it may be moving and when it is gone. It is ultimately an issue of detail and scalability to extend this kind of awareness to all sectors of the economy, macro and micro. Not only is price no longer needed to gain critical economic feedback, but the information price communicates is long delayed and incomplete in terms of economic measures required to dramatically increase efficiency. Mechanisms related networked digital feedback systems make it possible to efficiently monitor shifting consumer preference, demand, supply and labor value, virtually in real time. Moreover, it can also be used to observe other technical processes price cannot, such as shifts in production protocols, allocation, recycling means, and so on. As of February 2018, it is now possible to track trillions of economic interactions related to the supply chain and consumer behavior by way of sensors and digital relay as seen with the advent of
Amazon Go.
Cybernetic coordination Paul Cockshott, Allin Cottrell, and Andy Pollack have proposed new forms of coordination based on modern information technology for non-market socialism. They argue that economic planning in terms of physical units without any reference to money or prices is computationally tractable given the high-performance computers available for particle physics and weather forecasting. Cybernetic planning would involve an
a priori simulation of the equilibration process that idealized markets are intended to achieve.
Participatory economics Proposals for decentralized economic planning emerged in the late 20th century in the form of
participatory economics and negotiated coordination.
Decentralized pricing without markets David McMullen argues that social ownership of the means of production and the absence of markets for them is fully compatible with a decentralized price system. In a
post-capitalist society, transactions between enterprises would entail transfers of social property between custodians rather than an exchange of ownership. Individuals would be motivated by the satisfaction from work and the desire to contribute to good economic outcomes rather than material reward. Bids and offer prices would aim to minimize costs and ensure that output is guided by expected final demand for private and
collective consumption. Enterprises and startups would receive their investment funding from project assessment agencies. The required change in human behavior would take a number of generations and would have to overcome considerable resistance. However, McMullen believes that economic and cultural development increasingly favors the transition.
Market socialism James Yunker argues that public ownership of the means of production can be achieved the same way private ownership is achieved in modern capitalism through the
shareholder system that separates management from ownership. Yunker posits that social ownership can be achieved by having a public body, designated the Bureau of Public Ownership (BPO), owning the shares of publicly listed firms without affecting market-based allocation of capital inputs. Yunker termed this model pragmatic market socialism and argued that it would be at least as efficient as modern-day capitalism while providing superior social outcomes as public ownership of large and established enterprises would enable profits to be distributed among the entire population rather than going largely to a class of inheriting
rentiers.
Mechanism design Beginning in the 1970s, new insights into the socialist calculation debate emerged from
mechanism design theory. According to mechanism design theorists, the debate between Hayek and Lange became a stalemate that lasted for forty years because neither side was speaking the same language as the other, partially because the appropriate language for discussing socialist calculation had not yet been invented. According to these theorists, what was needed was a better understanding of the informational problems that prevent coordination between people. By fusing
game theory with
information economics, mechanism design provided the language and framework in which both socialists and advocates of capitalism could compare the merits of their arguments. As Palda (2013) writes in his summary of the contributions of mechanism design to the socialist calculation debate, "[i]t seemed that socialism and capitalism were good at different things. Socialism suffered from cheating, or '
moral hazard', more than capitalism because it did not allow company managers to own shares in their own companies. [...] The flip side of the cheating problem in socialism is the lying or '
adverse selection' problem in capitalism. If potential firm managers are either good or bad, but telling them apart is difficult, bad prospects will lie to become a part of the firm". == Relation to neoclassical economics ==