South Canyon Fire

During June of 1994, Colorado experienced record highs and weather patterns of intense thunderstorms, leading to several wildfires across the state. Red flag warnings were issued for western Colorado based on forecasts for dry thunderstorms with strong and gusty winds. Western Colorado was in extreme drought, as shown on the July 9 Palmer Drought Index map. Lightning storms during the previous 2 days had resulted in more than 40 new fires, and the district had developed a priority list for initial attack. Fires threatening residences, structures, and utilities, or those highest potential to spread, were given the highest priority. == Fire origin ==

On July 2, 1994, lightning sparked a fire near the base of Storm King Mountain, west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado. Initially small and well away from private property, the fire was assigned low priority and allowed to smolder for the first two days. Due to a confusion of the location, it was named after South Canyon, which is across the river from Storm King Mountain. At 3:40 p.m., the Sopris Ranger District dispatched one Forest Service engine crew to the fire, which reported that the fire posed no threat to structures in town. Another engine, this one BLM, was sent to the fire. At 6:30 p.m., the incident commander, BLM, and USFS firefighters sized up the fire and decided to begin suppression operations on the next day, July 5 due to the darkness and steep terrain. == Incident ==

July 5 On July 5, firefighters began their approach from the west at the east end of Canyon Creek Estates, making a difficult march up the rugged terrain. Upon arrival at the top of the ridge, the combined BLM and Forest Service crews began clearing a landing zone known as Helispot 1. This helispot could serve as a safety zone. Firefighters began constructing firelines to contain the blaze. Meanwhile, at 3:20 p.m., a cold front which had been forecasted hit the fire area. Firefighters were not formally briefed on this weather event, with a couple of Prineville crewmembers aware of the upcoming winds. The cold front brought 45 mph winds directly over the fire area. Dispatchers neglected to inform lead smokejumper Mackey. At this point, water drops were deemed ineffective, and several firefighters working on the main fireline noticed the activity and began to pull back. At 4:00 p.m., the fire blew up and raced towards the fleeing firefighters. As it went up the slope, even stronger winds of 40 mph pushed it further. Beginning at 4:14 and 4:18 p.m., the fire was observed to spot back to the east side of the drainage below the crew that was walking out the fireline to the ridge. The spot fire reached the ridgeline in 2 minutes. During the run the fire's rate of speed accelerated from 3 to 11 mph. Main Prineville hotshot group Meanwhile, 11 members of Prineville IHC, including the superintendent, had been on the main ridge and were ordered to the safety zone Helispot 1. However, fire had enveloped the safety zone and forced them to move toward the Helispot 2 safety zone. These hotshots made it down the ridge and onto the interstate, surviving the fire. Western flank group On the western flank, the 9 remaining members of the Prineville Hotshot Crew joined up with jumper-in-charge Mackey. At this point, firefighters were unaware of the wall of flame growing behind them. A spot fire grew to 150 ft tall and 1/4 of a mile wide, and began rolling down the slope to the hotshots and smokejumpers.Two smokejumpers, Erickson and Haugh, ran for the ridge top first. A third jumper, Eric Hipke, joined them at the top. Hipke was seriously burned, but all three survived, escaping down the drainage to the interstate. The fire overtook the firefighters who had delayed their run, killing all of them just short of the ridge top. This group contained the other half of the Prineville Hotshot Crew and three smokejumpers. The fire was declared controlled on July 11, 1994. == Casualties ==

Twelve firefighters were unable to outrun the blaze and perished. From the Prineville Hotshots, Kathi Beck, Tamera Bickett, Scott Blecha, Levi Brinkley, Douglas Dunbar, Terri Hagen, Bonnie Holtby, Rob Johnson, and Jon Kelso were killed. This group was working with smokejumpers Don Mackey, Roger Roth, and Jim Thrash. Two more helitack firefighters were also killed as they tried to flee to the northwest: Robert Browning, Jr. and Richard Tyler. == Aftermath and investigation ==

As soon as wildland firefighters were confirmed to have been killed, the director of the BLM and the chief of the USFS designated a 10 member interagency investigation team. The team was tasked to submit a developed and factual report within 45 days. Despite several inquiries, the South Canyon Fire Investigative Report was criticized for its incomplete information and subpar data collection strategies. The lessons learned post-South Canyon changed many of the strategies wildland firefighters today. Situational awareness is encouraged, while acronyms like LCES (Lookouts, Communications, Escape Routes, Safety Zones) are emphasized. In addition, publications like the IRPG (Incident Response Pocket Guide) is issued to all federal wildland firefighters and contains a trove of knowledge about fire behavior, avoiding casualties, and identifying common indicators of disaster fires. == Memorials ==

The Storm King Mountain Memorial Trail, closely following the actual path the firefighters hiked to fight the blaze, leads visitors to the site. Plaques and memorials line the trail explaining the events and paying homage to those who fell. Crosses were installed where each person fell. The fire and ensuing casualties were the subject of John Maclean's book Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire. == References ==