Antecedents In March 1949, during the
First Indochina War, Emperor
Bảo Đại (
abdicated in 1945 but temporarily resumed the position until general elections) officially
requested that the French help set up a Vietnamese military air arm. Pressure was maintained with the assistance of
Vietnamese National Army Lt. Col.
Nguyễn Văn Hinh, who had flown the
Martin B-26 Marauder with the
French Air Force during the
Second World War. In late 1951, the French Air Force established the Vietnamese 312th Special Mission Squadron at
Tan Son Nhat Airfield equipped with
Morane 500 Criquet liaison aircraft. In March 1952, a training school was set up at
Nha Trang Air Base, and the following year two army co-operation squadrons began missions flying the Morane 500 Criquet. In 1954, the French allocated a number of
Dassault MD.315 Flamant armed light transports to the inventory of this Vietnamese air arm. Vietnamese pilot trainees began to be sent to France for more advanced training.
1955–1960 In January 1955, planning for the VNAF began, building on the Vietnamese air force that the French had established in 1951. As of January 1955, the VNAF consisted of 3,434 men, with plans to organize them into two liaison squadrons and one air transport squadron. France retained a contract to train the VNAF until 1957. On 1 June 1955,
Bien Hoa Air Base became the VNAF's logistics support base when the French evacuated their main depot at
Hanoi. In May 1956, by agreement with the South Vietnamese government, the USAF assumed some training and administrative roles of the VNAF. Teams from
Clark Air Force Base began in 1957 to organize the VNAF into a model of the USAF when the French training contracts expired. On 1 June 1956, the VNAF's 1st Fighter Squadron (redesignated the 514th Fighter Squadron in January 1963) was formed at Bien Hoa Air Base with 25 F8F Bearcats. In September 1963, the USAF opened a training center at Nha Trang AB equipped with L-19s. VNAF flight crews would undergo one month of preflight training followed by three months of primary flight training with a total of 80 flying hours. On 14 March the VNAF led by Kỳ participated in attacks on barracks on Hòn Gió island. In December, the 217th Helicopter Squadron moved from Tan Son Nhut AB to Binh Thuy AB. The VNAF 2311th Air Group, later to become an Air Wing, and the 311th Air Division were also stationed at Bien Hoa AB and the base supported the greatest number of air combat units than any other in South Vietnam. Following the final withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam in February 1973, Bien Hoa remained a major VNAF base hosting the headquarters of the VNAF 3rd Air Division and the Air Logistics Command. The overall damage was moderate and casualties were light, with less than one percent of the VNAF personnel lost, including deserters. 18 aircraft were destroyed, 11 in ground attacks. On 8 June 1969, Presidents
Richard Nixon and
Nguyễn Văn Thiệu met on
Midway Island and discussed both the withdrawal of US forces and the arming and training of South Vietnamese to take over a greater share of the fighting. Although amenable to the idea of
Vietnamization, Thiệu had ideas of his own about the kind of weapons his armed forces required, he offered a plan of his own for modernizing the military services, asking for what the Joint Chiefs of Staff termed appreciable quantities of sophisticated and costly equipment, including
F–4 Phantom fighters and
C–130 Hercules transports. If South Vietnam received these aircraft and the other weapons he sought, the nation would have the means to play a more nearly decisive role in the struggle against the combined forces of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. However the Joint Chiefs did not believe it could be attained as rapidly or as easily as Thiệu seemed to think, and certainly not by merely handing the South Vietnamese deadlier but far more complex aircraft and other weapons. Compared to their American counterparts, the VNAF lacked the technical skills necessary to make effective use of the weaponry Thiệu desired. Nor did the phase II plan, now to be accelerated, envision the South Vietnamese promptly taking on the aggregate strength of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. However desirable this might be as an ultimate goal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not believe that mere weapons could, in view of such problems as leadership and desertion, enable South Vietnam to take over major fighting responsibility against the current threat. A review of the Thiệu proposal by MACV resulted in a recommendation that the United States turn down almost every request. The VNAF would have to do without F–4s and C–130s, additional VC–47 transports for high-ranking officials, coastal surveillance aircraft, and a search and rescue organization like that operated by the USAF. Thiệu's ambitious plan did, however, generate an additional $160 million in US military aid to improve logistics support and also produced a decision to speedup previously authorized recruiting, adding some 4,000 men to the VNAF by June 1970. The VNAF established the 72nd Tactical Wing at Pleiku AB with the 530th Fighter Squadron equipped with A-1 Skyraiders, along with two UH-1H helicopter assault squadrons (229th, 235th) and the 118th Liaison Squadron, with O-1 and
U-17 forward air controller/light reconnaissance aircraft. On 31 March, a USAF mobile training team arrived in South Vietnam to begin teaching, in collaboration with Army aviators, the tactical use of the UH–1 fitted out as a gunship. On 29 May 29, before the second class of 32 students had graduated, the VNAF mounted its first helicopter assault. Eight troop-carrying UH–1s, another serving as a command post, and three others equipped as gunships successfully landed a small force near
Prey Veng, Cambodia. In November 1970, Sóc Trăng Airfield was handed over to the VNAF by the US Army. The armed forces of South Vietnam would have to conduct interdiction on the ground. The first squadron of C–123s, organized in April, received its aircraft in May. The delay reflected the extensive maintenance the transports required after heavy usage flying men and cargo to staging areas for Operation Lam Son 719. A second squadron commenced operation in July, and the third, scheduled for December, took shape in January 1972. The last of 24 AC–119Gs joined the VNAF in September 1971, and in December the USAF Chief of Staff, authorized the transfer of modified AC–119Ks to replace a squadron of AC–47s. At year's end, the VNAF had 1,041 aircraft on hand, 762 of them (roughly 70 percent) ready for combat. Organized into 41 squadrons, it included three squadrons of A–1s, five of A–37s, one of F–5s, one of AC–47s (which the AC–119Ks would eventually replace), one of AC–119Gs, 16 of helicopters (mostly UH–1s) and seven squadrons of liaison craft for FACs. It also had one reconnaissance squadron with a mix of U–6s, RF–5s and variants of the C–47. The transports units totalled one squadron of C–47s, one of C–119s, and two (soon to be three) of C–123s. A special air mission squadron that carried high-ranking passengers and a school squadron to conduct training rounded out the force. At the start of the
Easter Offensive, the VNAF strength was 1,285 aircraft organized into 44 squadrons. Nine squadrons flew A–1s, A–37s, or F–5s, a total of 119 aircraft classified as combat-ready fighter-bombers; two squadrons operated AC–47 or AC–119G gunships, 28 of the aircraft ready for action; 17 helicopter squadrons had 367 helicopters combat-ready out of a total of 620; seven FAC squadrons flew O–1 or U–17 light aircraft, 247 operationally ready out of 303, and the remaining units carried out training, transport and reconnaissance duties. Serious problems soon surfaced within the VNAF, mostly because of the frenzied expansion. The VNAF now totaled 65,000 officers and enlisted men, but half of them were undergoing some form of training to qualify them for new assignments. Nevertheless, the VNAF flew over 81,000 sorties during September 1973; helicopters accounted for 62,000 of these and training craft for 1,100. Fighter-bombers or attack planes flew most of the others, but all too often they attacked from or higher out of respect for PAVN antiaircraft weapons. Strikes from this altitude, in the opinion of General Murray, not only "failed to contribute to productive destruction" but caused inaccuracy that actually harmed "interservice relationships." The VNAF could not yet maintain the mixed fleet of aircraft, many of them cast-offs, they had inherited. For example, maintenance on the force of UH–1s fell behind schedule throughout 1973, even though
Air Vietnam, the national airline, lent its civilian mechanics to help with inspections. Similar delays affected maintenance of the EC–47, largely because crews failed to report equipment failures, and of the C–7, handicapped by a shortage of spare parts and trained mechanics. Almost every aircraft suffered from corrosion, the inevitable result of service in a tropical climate. During 1973, Lear Siegler launched an ambitious program of maintenance training. The instructors concentrated on the lagging UH–1 program, but teams of specialists also taught the South Vietnamese to repair corrosion and battle damage to the F–5 and A–37. Unfortunately, a shortage of spare parts hampered the training effort. By November 1974, VNAF flying hours had been reduced from 672,000 to 345,500. Following the defeat of ARVN forces in the
Central Highlands in March 1975, PAVN forces pursued the ARVN to the coast, capturing
Nha Trang and Nha Trang AB on 2 April, however most of the flyable aircraft of the VNAF 2nd Air Division had already moved south to Phan Rang AB. At dawn on 29 April the VNAF began to haphazardly depart Tan Son Nhut Air Base as A-37s, F-5s, C-7s, C-119s and C-130s departed for Thailand while UH-1s took off in search of the ships of the US Navy
Task Force 76 offshore. At 08:00 Lieutenant General
Trần Văn Minh, commander of the VNAF, and 30 of his staff arrived at the DAO Compound, demanding evacuation. This signified the complete loss of command and control of the VNAF. Some VNAF aircraft did stay to continue to fight the advancing PAVN however. One AC-119K gunship from the 821st Attack Squadron had spent the night of 28/29 April dropping flares and firing on the approaching PAVN. At dawn on 29 April two A-1 Skyraiders began patrolling the perimeter of Tan Son Nhut at until Maj. Trương Phùng, one of the two Skyraider pilots was shot down, presumably by an SA-7. At 07:00 the AC-119K "Tinh Long" flew by Lt. Trang van Thanh was firing on PAVN to the east of Tan Son Nhut when it was hit by a SA-7 missile, and fell in flames to the ground. Despite sporadic artillery and rocket fire, Binh Thuy AB remained operational throughout 29 April and on the morning of 30 April 1975 Binh Thuy-based A-37s carried out the last known air strike of the war destroying two
T-54 tanks of the PAVN 10th Division as they attempted to attack Tan Son Nhut AB. After the announcement of the surrender of South Vietnam by
President Minh on the 30th, the pilots flew their stripped down aircraft to
U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand, often carrying three or even four people. ==Commanders==