Inspection of the aircraft at Yuma revealed a section of fuselage skin had fractured and flapped open, causing the rapid decompression. The opening was approximately long and wide. Southwest grounded 80 of its Boeing 737-300s for inspection following the incident. The grounded aircraft were those that had not had the skin on their fuselage replaced. The aircraft were to be repaired and returned to service. The AD refers to a range of airframes, line numbers 2553 – 3132 inclusive, totaling 580 aircraft. Of the total of 580 aircraft, only 175 met the 30,000 cycle requirement at the time of the AD issuance, with 80 of those operating in the United States. The FAA AD is effective to only the portion of those that are registered in the United States, since the FAA can only mandate such changes in the United States. Countries with reciprocity airworthiness agreements will also follow the AD, but other nations are not required to adhere to the ruling. As a result of the incident, the FAA investigated Boeing's manufacturing techniques to discover whether or not they had any bearing on the cause of the failure. The incident aircraft was not considered to have a high number of cycles. Boeing co-operated with the FAA in the investigation.
Air New Zealand inspected all fifteen of their 737-300s and
Qantas inspected four of their 21 737-400s. Several of the thirty-seven 737-400s operated by
Malaysia Airlines were also to be inspected. Post-incident interviews showed the injured flight attendant had seriously overestimated his
time of useful consciousness, and the NTSB renewed its criticism of the FAA's overly-optimistic time of useful consciousness tables and training requirements. == Investigation ==