Generals' Junta (early March – late April) On March 8 a group of generals – later to be named
Junta de Generales by some historians - met in Madrid and formed the first nucleus of the conspiracy. According to the official ministerial list, the most senior officer was 1)
Rodriguez del Barrio, followed by 2)
Villegas, 3)
Saliquet, 4)
González Carrasco, 5)
Franco, 6)
Fanjul (division generals), 7)
Orgaz, and 8)
Mola (brigadiers). Some generals (especially
Goded, after del Barrio, the second highest-ranking conspirator and by some historians considered "el principal inspirador de la conspiración militar") were absent, though aware and supportive. Among those present only Franco and Mola commanded troops (or rather were appointed to command, yet to assume their new duties); the remaining ones held administrative roles or remained at ministerial disposal. The generals did not initially plan to stage a coup; instead, they agreed to watch political developments closely and get ready for intervention in case of total breakdown of public order, dissolution of
Guardia Civil, release of all conscripts, or armed rising on part of the Left. They also agreed that the leading role should be entrusted to general Sanjurjo, at the time on exile in Portugal, with del Barrio acting as his representative. Soon afterwards Franco left for
Canary Islands and Mola for
Navarre, while other participants remained in Madrid. Unión Militar Española structures were taken advantage of as communication channels, especially that colonel
Galarza, the co-founder of UME, also took part in the meeting. Some time in mid-March, Sanjurjo, who was in touch with conspirators by means of emissaries and encrypted postal correspondence, accepted the leadership role, with del Barrio as the one "quien me gusta más" and
Varela as "la mejor cabeza y el único intelligente". Development of the conspiracy network is unclear; it was mostly a Madrid-based enterprise and sketchy plans, in place by late March, were also centered on Madrid. At the time the plotters did not consider the situation in Spain detrimental enough to warrant a coup and preferred to simply wait in standby. This irritated Sanjurjo, who from his Portuguese exile pushed for immediate action; he developed doubts about what he considered an indecisive stand of the Madrid conspirators and as a measure of encouragement pledged to move to Spain the same moment the coup is declared. A review, performed by the plotters and dated early April, listed
Morocco,
Valladolid,
Burgos,
Pamplona,
Vitoria and
Zaragoza garrisons as firmly adhering to conspiracy, with Madrid unclear and
Barcelona highly doubtful; first personal suggestions, later largely to be changed, were offered. In early April the president
Alcalá-Zamora was deposed. Some conspirators thought it a first step towards revolutionaries taking over power; Galarza asked Alcalá not to step down and offered military support, but it is not clear whether he represented other plotters. Others remained skeptical, e.g. on April 12 Franco sent a dilatory note. On April 14 celebrations of the anniversary of the Republic turned into riots and a respected right-wing Guardia Civil commander was killed; his funeral two days later turned into a large anti-governmental demonstration. This has probably prompted the conspirators to act. On April 17 Rodríguez del Barrio, González Carrasco,
Varela and Orgaz set April 20 as the date of the rising. Its details remain rather obscure, apart that Varela was to seize the Ministry of War and Orgaz to lead sub-units taking control of Capitania General. However, at least some of those involved had second thoughts, as they were well aware of rather sketchy and improvised nature of the scheme. On April 18 del Barrio claimed health problems – at the time his cancer was well advanced – and withdrew. The coup was cancelled in the last minute.
Realignment (late April – late May) Preparations to the April 20 coup exposed some of the conspirators, as state services were able at least to identify key suspects, e.g. security got hold of a list with members of the future governing
Junta. Many were either (like Orgaz) transferred to minor peripheral positions or (like Saliquet) moved to the "disponibles forzosos" category, in service but with no assignement. The transfers weakened the plot, especially in Madrid, yet neither a disciplinary nor legal action has been taken. Cancellation of the April 20 coup produced much frustration among some mid-level officers, disillusioned about dithering and wavering on part of key plotters. In late April some Madrid conspirators informed Sanujro that "all is lost". At the time the conspiracy appeared to have been at its lowest point. Sanjurjo estimated that Varela, under constant surveillance in
Cádiz, had no means to act, while Mola in Pamplona did have room for maneuvering, but remained vacillating. On April 19, following cancellation of the coup, mid-rank UME officers from some garrisons of the
VI. Military Region (Burgos, Pamplona,
Logroño) staged a meeting. Disappointment as to indecision of the Madrid conspirators was running high, and these present decided that an alternative path should be taken. They focused on Mola, who for some 5 weeks had been cautiously tying the knots of local conspiracy in Pamplona; the officers suggested that he takes the initiative, which he apparently agreed to do. Few days later, on April 25, Mola issued and sent to fellow conspirators a document named
Instrucción reservada no. 1; it laid out basic rules for organisation of the coup on the local level. It is not clear whether the document was a proposal or rather an instruction, as at the time the author was merely one of a few senior generals behind the plot and by no means an agreed leader, which he would become few weeks later. The Madrid conspirators unexpectedly devised another scheme. On May 8 Fanjul,
García de la Herrán, Carrasco, Orgaz, Ponte, Saliquet and Villegas decided to act 3 days later. The newly elected president,
Manuel Azaña, was to take the oath in the
Cortes; a presidential battalion, supposedly controlled by rebels, was to detain all Popular Front politicians during the ceremony, while an artillery detachment was to serve as backup with some civilians from
Falange and
Comunión Tradicionalista also taking part. Little is known of this plan, including to what extent the scheme went beyond a mere idea and what preparations have been actually taken; eventually on May 11 nothing happened. It seems that the episode has furtherly compromised conspirators from
Junta de Generales. A manuscript note found in Sanjurjo's papers and dated May 15 claimed that the unique option left was "elementos civiles de Navarra, y Mola". In the second half of May the correspondence between Mola and Sanjurjo was in full swing and some sort of agreement between the two was being forged. On May 25 Mola issued two more documents,
Instrucción Reservada No. 2, and
El objetivo, los medios y los itinerarios; for the first time they outlined a plan of rebel units converging upon Madrid. On May 29 Sanjurjo declared that his representative in Spain would be Mola, who hence replaced Rodríguez del Barrio at this role. By that time to most conspirators it became clear that the coup was not – as originally agreed in early March – an option, to be acted upon or not depending on developments, but a firm objective.
Plan sealed (late May – late June) Since mid-May the centre of gravity of the conspiracy clearly moved from Madrid to Pamplona, and "a broader network of conspiracy began to form". On May 31 Mola issued
Directiva para la V División and
Directiva para la VII División, fairly detailed instructions for Zaragoza and Valladolid military regions. It seems that at the time he was already the key brain behind the conspiracy, acting on behalf of Sanjurjo and de facto assuming the role of the rebel chief of staff. His documents demonstrate that he reversed the centrifugal plan, produced by
Junta de Generales, and kept developing details of a centripetal scheme. Thanks to a warning from conspirators in state security structures Mola managed to outsmart director general de
Seguridad, who on June 3 showed up in Pamplona but found no compromising evidence. On June 5 Mola issued further documents and instructions,
Instrucción Reservada No. 4 (
Instrucción Reservada No. 3 – if issued – has never been found), and
El Directorio y su obra inicial; the latter referred to political, not military issues, and provided outline for governance scheme after the successful coup. On June 8 he reached sort of understanding with
Miguel Cabanellas, the highest-ranking general who would get involved in the plot and the only one who commanded one of Spain's 8 military regions. Throughout June the military conspirators reached out to politicians, though with the intention to keep them at arms' length and to avoid any political commitments on part of the army.
Gil-Robles and
Calvo Sotelo were merely provided vague information about the unfolding plot. Most detailed talks took place with the Carlists: in mid-June Mola twice met their men, including the party leader
Fal Conde, but talks about military co-operation were wrecked by political differences. Loose negotiations were held with the Falangists, which only by the end of the month would produce conditional and restricted adhesion on part of
Primo de Rivera. Until mid-June numerous military issues remained far from solved; the Pamplona-based Mola complained that even in the neighboring
San Sebastián "there are conspirators, but there is no conspiracy" with no command layer appointed. Franco remained undecided and on June 23 he sent a highly ambiguous letter to the prime minister
Casares. Only in the second decade of June it was agreed with
Queipo de Llano that he would lead the coup in
II. Región Militar (Seville), while appointments in the
VIII. Región (La Coruña) remained pending until the actual coup commenced.
Instrucción Reservada No. 5 and
Instrucciones sobre Bases Navales were issued on June 20. The plan was getting increasingly complex.
Directiva para Marruecos (June 24) and
Instrucciones para el desarrollo de la Directiva relativa a Marruecos (June 30) specified the role of the African troops, which under provisional command, perhaps this of
Yagüe (who during one-to-one meeting of June 12 assured Casares of his loyalty) were for the first time instructed to cross the
Strait of Gibraltar, disembark in
Andalusia and proceed towards Madrid. Sanjurjo might not have been aware of all details of the scheme, yet he had full trust in Mola and his plan.
Final decisions (late June – mid-July) On July 1 a
Renovación Española politician
Sainz Rodríguez signed a contract with an Italian company; it featured purchase of 40 aircraft, fuel, machine guns and ammunition. One historian speculates that the deal was possibly inspired by military conspirators. According to some scholars probably some time in early July Mola set the date of the coup at July 10, yet for unclear reasons reportedly the rising has been called off. In early July Mola kept issuing further
directivas; he also made last-minute changes to command posts, e.g. González Carrasco was re-appointed from Barcelona to
Valencia. Though on July 11 a specially arranged plane supposed to take Franco from Canary Islands to Morocco took off from London, on basis of Franco's skeptical statements Mola did not assign him any role in the coup. At that point he still harbored grave doubts, and intransigence of the Carlists brought him close to desperation; he reportedly considered even abandoning the conspiracy altogether. On July 12 no date for a rising has been set; it is unclear whether a decision to rise has been taken at all, though some authors claim it was firmly planned for the second half of July. Some men in conspiracy command, especially Sanjurjo, Mola and Goded, were determined to act and from their perspective, the rising was a matter of time. This opinion was shared by many mid-range and junior officers. However, probably much larger sections of military men aware or marginally involved still harbored doubts. It was so either because they were concerned about insufficiently developed conspiracy, or because they did not consider the situation in the country bad enough and hoped for radical left-wing fervour to fizzle out, or because they retained a sense of loyalty to the regime, or simply because they feared consequences of failure, especially in terms of their personal lot and this of their families. Estimates as to the number of determined conspirators differ widely; to some it was "no more than 1,000", or not more than 12% of all officers, to others "less than 200"; conspiracy existed at least in 44 of 51 army garrisons. Early on July 13, Calvo Sotelo was shot; the killing sent shock-waves across the country. It had also crucial impact in case of numerous officers, who so far remained ambiguous. Many concluded that revolution was now under way and that not joining became more dangerous than joining the conspiracy. On July 13 Franco wired his access to Mola and was immediately nominated head of the troops supposed to rise in Morocco. On July 14 Mola sent his last instructions. The same day he eventually closed the deal with the Carlists, who on basis of vague assurances from Sanjurjo committed their
requeté militia. On July 14-15 Mola issued the orders to rise; most peninsular garrisons were to commence rebellion on July 19, Andalusia and Morocco 24-48 hours earlier. On July 16 Madrid-based officers supposed to lead the coup elsewhere departed to their destinations. An aircraft was arranged to fly from France to Portugal on July 17 and to bring Sanjurjo to Burgos two days later. ==Governmental response==