Formation of the Bathtub Trust Prior to 1909, the enameled bathroom ware industry was subject to rampant price cutting. "Competition had been fierce. It had not always been either wise or honest. A badly made article may look well enough to deceive the average householder. Many such had been put on the market." Edwin L. Wayman acquired ownership of patents on tools for use in enameling unpatented bathtubs, toilets, sinks, and similar unpatented products. Three patents covered automatic "dredging" tools. The automatic dredger is a device somewhat like a kitchen flour–sifter that sprinkles enameling power (ground glass) on red–hot (1200 °F to 1500 °F) iron fixtures. It is more efficient than dredging by hand, in that it uses less powder, spreads the powder more evenly, is faster, and requires less labor. "[W]hile it is conceded that merchantable ware can be made without its use, still the advantages of using it are so great that as a commercial proposition the ware cannot be made without it." As Wayman stated the facts: The manufacturers using the process in use prior to Arrott's invention were unable to successfully compete with those using the Arrott invention, and, moreover, produced a disproportionate number of defective, unsightly, and substantially unsalable articles. The consumer was deceived and defrauded, and the use of sanitary enameled ironware lessened and its reputation depreciated by defective articles being palmed off on the consumer as not defective. Wayman formed a scheme to use the patents as a vehicle for fixing prices. "That scheme was his. Th[e] purpose was merely to make money for himself by selling to the corporate defendants indulgences to sin against the Sherman act." Wayman organized what came to be known as the "Bathtub Trust." He licensed sixteen corporations, which became defendants in this suit along with officers of the corporate defendants. The license agreements provided for a running royalty, 80% of which would be rebated in three months if the licensee obeyed the terms of the agreement; if it did not, that 80% would be forfeited. As the lower court explained: "Each corporate defendant in this manner gave security that he would keep his bargain, or be good, as one of the licensees expressed it." Each corporate defendant promised to do three things: : (1) It would not sell any "seconds" or "B's" (inferior products, such as bathtubs with defective enameling). : (2) "It would not sell any ware to any jobber who did not sign the jobber's resale agreement to be presently described." :(3) "It would not sell anybody any ware at a lower price or upon more attractive terms than those named in the agreement or in a schedule attached to it. This schedule named standard prices for each article of the ware and for each size, shape, and grade of that article." The "jobber resale agreements," which each authorized jobber was required to sign, provided: :(1) "He could not buy any ware from anyone other than the corporate defendants." :(2) "He could not sell ware to anybody at a lower price or on more attractive terms than those named in the resale price lists." "[T]he makers of nearly four-fifths of the ware and more than four out of every five dealers in it become parties to the combination." The government brought a criminal suit in Detroit and a civil action in Baltimore. After there was a hung jury in the Detroit case, the government delayed its criminal case until final resolution of the civil action.
The civil action The civil case was tried to a three-judge circuit court, which ruled for the government 2–1. The circuit court said that the case involved two important questions: :(1) Would such a combination as was attempted, and in large part brought about, have violated the Sherman act, had patents on automatic dredgers played no part in it? :(2) If it would, did the part played by those patents make lawful what otherwise would have been forbidden? The defendants argued that "eyes illumined by the light of reason will see that what the defendants did was from the standpoint of the public interests good, and not evil." Before the formation of the Bathtub Trust: "the jobbers were making little profit on the ware"; "the ware was getting a bad reputation" from all the seconds on the market; "the public gained by what was done"; the public "suffers from the greed of the maker, the jobber, or the plumber, or of two or all of them" when they sell defective ware posing as good ware, but the public "will be in no danger from that greed when no one of them can any longer make any money by selling him a bad article for the price of a good." It is in the public interest to agree to suppress the sale of seconds, be "human nature being what it is, no other effective protection can be given." On the other hand, "if a enforceable bargain can be made that no goods shall be sold below a certain fixed price, which will yield a reasonable profit on a first-class article, jobbers and plumbers can be depended upon not to pay that price for an inferior article." The defendants pointed to what happened in 1911 when the government suit forced "the price-fixing provisions of the agreement [to be] suspended." As a result, "the market was at once flooded with low-grade ware." They argue: Much of it came from some of the corporate defendants. It may be better for the public to pay a higher price for better ware. Most individuals find that it is usually cheaper in the end." The court said that those arguments could not resolve the matter because two questions still remain: :(1) "Does the law permit the additional price which the public is to pay to be fixed by a combination of dealers even if the latter do so, because they cannot in any other way keep some of their own number from selling bad ware for good?" :(2) "Has the experience of mankind led them to believe that to permit all the makers and dealers in articles of common use to combine to fix the prices and terms below which those goods may not be sold will tend in the long run to improve the quality of the goods?" The government replied that "every agreement to fix prices and to force or bribe makers or dealers to maintain them is illegal." The court said: These opposing contentions raise questions of great moment and of exceeding difficulty. To answer them wisely may require going to the very roots of our conceptions of what the relation of the state to the industrial life of its people should be. But the Supreme Court has held that " a price agreement pure and simple is always illegal," and that "is conclusive here." So, to answer the first question, whether the agreements would have violated the Sherman Act "had the dredger patents had no part in them," the agreements fixed prices and that violates the Sherman Act. " In such case they cannot be taken out of the category of the unlawful by general reasoning as to their expediency or nonexpediency or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made. The court then turned to the second question—whether the patents altered the case. The court maintained that a patentee "cannot use his patent rights to restrain trade in unpatented bath tubs." In such cases as the
Button-Fastener case, patent tie-ins were held legitimate. But that is not the question in this case. "It would have been presented in this case had Wayman bargained with the corporate [192] defendants that they should buy all their enameling powder from him." That line of case law does not apply to
price fixing based on tools to make an unpatented product: "The ownership of a patent for a tool by which old, well-known, and unpatented articles of general use can be more cheaply made gives no right to combine the makers and dealers in the unpatented articles in an agreement to make the public pay more for it.." The circuit court therefore held that Wayman and the corporate defendants entered into "agreements or licenses attempt to fix the price of unpatented ware and to monopolize the trade in it" in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. ==Ruling of Supreme Court==