The concept of supermodularity is used in the social sciences to analyze how one
agent's decision affects the incentives of others. Consider a
symmetric game with a smooth payoff function \,f defined over actions \,z_i of two or more players i \in {1,2,\dots,N}. Suppose the action space is continuous; for simplicity, suppose each action is chosen from an interval: z_i \in [a,b]. In this context, supermodularity of \,f implies that an increase in player \,i's choice \,z_i increases the marginal payoff df/dz_j of action \,z_j for all other players \,j. That is, if any player \,i chooses a higher \,z_i, all other players \,j have an incentive to raise their choices \,z_j too. Following the terminology of Bulow,
Geanakoplos, and
Klemperer (1985), economists call this situation
strategic complementarity, because players' strategies are complements to each other. This is the basic property underlying examples of
multiple equilibria in
coordination games. The opposite case of supermodularity of \,f, called submodularity, corresponds to the situation of
strategic substitutability. An increase in \,z_i lowers the marginal payoff to all other player's choices \,z_j, so strategies are substitutes. That is, if \,i chooses a higher \,z_i, other players have an incentive to pick a
lower \,z_j. For example, Bulow et al. consider the interactions of many
imperfectly competitive firms. When an increase in output by one firm raises the marginal revenues of the other firms, production decisions are strategic complements. When an increase in output by one firm lowers the marginal revenues of the other firms, production decisions are strategic substitutes. A supermodular
utility function is often related to
complementary goods. However, this view is disputed. ==Supermodular set functions==