Kyongju corridor The first KPA attack struck the UN right flank on the east coast. Although the KPA II Corps' general attack in the north and east was planned for September 2, the KPA 12th Division, now with a strength of 5,000 men, started to move forward from the mountains earlier than planned, from where it had reorganized after its defeat in the
Kigye and P'ohang-dong area. At 04:00 on August 27, a KPA attack overran one
company of the ROK 17th Regiment, Capital Division, north of Kigye. This caused the whole
regiment to buckle and retreat. Then the ROK 18th Regiment to the east fell back because of its exposed flank. The ROK 17th Regiment lost the town of Kigye in pulling back, and the entire Capital Division fell back to the south side of the Kigye valley. Walker ordered Major General Coulter to observe the ROK troops on the east. Coulter was to attack as soon as possible with
Task Force Jackson to gain the first high ground north of Kigye. The US 21st Infantry Regiment was moving to a position north of Taegu on the morning of August 27, when Walker revoked its orders and instructed it to turn around and proceed as rapidly as possible to Kyongju and report to Coulter. Coulter's plan to attack on August 28 had to be postponed.
Brigadier General Kim Hong-il, the ROK I Corps commander, told him he could not attack, that there were too many casualties and the South Koreans were exhausted. The KPA 5th Division above P'ohang-dong had begun to press south again and the ROK 3rd Division in front of it began to show signs of pulling back. On the 28th, the KMAG adviser to the ROK 3rd Division and Brigadier General Kim Suk Won clashed over whether the division should retreat or attack. At the same time, elements of the KPA 5th Division penetrated the ROK 3rd Division southwest of P'ohang-dong. Coulter directed the 21st Infantry to repel this penetration. During the day on August 29, B Company, 21st Infantry, supported by a
platoon of tanks of B Company, 73rd Medium Tank Battalion, successfully counterattacked northwest from the southern edge of P'ohang-dong for a distance of , with ROK troops following. The American units then withdrew to P'ohang-dong. That night the ROK withdrew and the next day an American infantry-tank force repeated the action of the day before. The 21st Infantry then took over from the ROK 3rd Division a sector extending north and northwest of P'ohang-dong. Also on August 29, the ROK Capital Division, with American tank and artillery support, recaptured Kigye and held it during the night against KPA counterattacks, only to lose it again at dawn. UN air attacks continued at an increased tempo in the Kigye area. The next morning, September 2 at 01:30, the KPA 12th Division, executing its part of the coordinated KPA II Corps general attack, struck the Capital Division on the high hill masses south of the Kigye valley. The 2nd Battalion had joined the regiment on August 31, but Coulter had held it in the task force's reserve at An'gang-ni. That battalion now took up a horseshoe-shaped defense position around the town, with some elements on high ground east where they protected the Kyongju to P'ohang-dong highway. The rest of the regiment closed into an assembly area north of Kyongju. At the same time, Walker started the newly activated ROK 7th Division toward the KPA penetration. Its ROK 5th Regiment closed at
Yongch'on that afternoon, and the ROK 3rd Regiment, less its 1st Battalion, closed at Kyongju in the evening. Walker also authorized Coulter to use the 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry; the 9th Infantry Regimental Tank Company; and the
15th Field Artillery Battalion as he deemed advisable. These units, held at
Yonil Airfield for its defense, had not previously been available for commitment elsewhere. During the day on September 3, Coulter and the KMAG advisers continued to clash with the ROK 3rd Division commander, who repeatedly attempted to withdraw his troops against their orders. The night of September 5/6, events reached a climax inside P'ohang-dong. The ROK division commander, Brigadier General Lee Jun Shik and several members of his senior staff claimed they became sick after their command post was hit with artillery fire. The division withdrew from P'ohang-dong, and on September 6 it was again in KPA hands. The ROK command relieved both the ROK I Corps and 3rd Division commanders. At this time new commanders were appointed for these major commands. Brigadier General Kim Paik Il took command of ROK I Corps, while Capital Division came under command of
Colonel Song Yo Ch'an, and 3rd Division came under command of Colonel Lee Jong Ch'an. Opposing the 8th Division was the ROK 6th Division; in front of the 15th Division stood the ROK 8th Division. On the next road eastward above Yongch'on, the KPA 15th Division launched its attack against the ROK 8th Division on September 2. Advancing north of Yongch'on after the retreating survivors of the KPA 15th Division, the ROK 8th Division and the 5th Regiment, 7th Division encountered almost no resistance. On September 12, elements of the two ROK units were north of the town. ROK forces now also advanced east from Yongch'on and north from Kyongju to close the breach in their lines. Defending Taegu, the US 1st Cavalry Division had a frontage of approximately . The Division commander Major General
Hobart R. Gay outposted the main avenues of entry into his zone and kept his three regiments concentrated behind these outposts. Gay's initial decision upon receipt of this order was to attack north up the
Sangju road, but his staff and regimental commanders all joined in urging that the attack instead be against Hill 518 in the US
7th Cavalry Regiment zone. Only two days before, Hill 518 had been in the ROK 1st Division zone and had been considered a KPA assembly point. The 1st Cavalry Division, accordingly, prepared for an attack in the 7th Cavalry sector and for diversionary attacks by two companies of the 3rd Battalion,
8th Cavalry Regiment, on the 7th Cavalry's right flank. This left the 8th Cavalry only one infantry company in reserve. The regiment's 1st Battalion was on the hill mass to the west of the
Bowling Alley and north of Tabu-dong; its 2nd Battalion was astride the road. Situated north of the lateral Waegwan-Tabu–dong road, and about midway between the two towns, it was a critical terrain feature dominating the road between the two places. After securing Hill 518, the 7th Cavalry attack was to continue on to Hill 346. Air strikes and artillery preparations were to precede the infantry attack. On the morning of September 2 the
US Air Force delivered a 37-minute strike against Hills 518 and 346. The artillery then laid down its concentrations on the hills, and after that the planes came over again with
Napalm, leaving the heights on fire. Just after 10:00, and immediately after the final napalm strike, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, attacked up Hill 518. The next day at 12:00, the newly arrived 3rd Battalion resumed the attack against Hill 518 from the south, as did the 1st Battalion the day before, in a column of companies that resolved itself in the end into a column of squads. Again the attack failed. Other attacks failed on September 4. A KPA forward observer captured on Hill 518 said that 1,200 North Koreans were dug in on the hill and that they had large numbers of mortars and ammunition to hold out. The 7th Cavalry Regiment in the center could no longer use the Waegwan-Tabu-dong lateral supply road behind it, and was in danger of being surrounded. Heavy rains fell during the night of September 5/6 and mud slowed all wheeled and tracked vehicles in the withdrawal. The 2nd Battalion disengaged from the KPA and began its withdrawal at 03:00 on September 6. The KPA quickly discovered that the 2nd Battalion was withdrawing and attacked it. In the vicinity of Hills 464 and 380 the battalion discovered at daybreak that it was virtually surrounded by KPA. Moving by itself and completely cut off from all other units, G Company, numbering only about 80 men, was hardest hit. East of the 2nd Battalion, the KPA attacked the 1st Battalion in its new position on September 7 and overran the battalion aid station, killing four and wounding seven men. That night the 1st Battalion was attached to the 5th Cavalry Regiment. The rest of the 7th Cavalry Regiment moved to a point near Taegu in division reserve. During the night of September 7/8 the 5th Cavalry Regiment on division orders withdrew still farther below Waegwan to new defensive positions astride the main
Seoul-Taegu highway. The battalions of the 5th Cavalry Regiment were so low in strength at this time that they were not considered combat effective. This seesaw battle continued in full northwest of Taegu.
Ka-san General Gay, alerted all of his division's front-line units to be prepared for the attack in the Ka-san sector as well. The attack caught the 8th Cavalry Regiment unprepared at Sangju. The division was poorly deployed along the road to that town, lacking a reserve force to counterattack effectively. The KPA struck the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, the night of September 2/3 on Hill 448 west of the
Bowling Alley and north of Tabu-dong, and overran it. On September 3, therefore, the UN command lost both Tabu-dong and Hill 902, locally called Ka-san, the dominant mountain-top north of Taegu. Eighth Army countered the KPA advance down the Tabu-dong road by ordering the 1st Cavalry Division to recapture and defend Hill 902. commanding the 8th Cavalry Regiment was ordered to retake the mountain with the help of several support units. The next morning, September 4, the force moved to Ka-san Less than up the trail, the company came under machine gun fire twice. As several squads left the hill on a patrol, the KPA attacked the main company position behind it. The platoon dropped down off the ridge into a gully on the left. Some of the men in the advanced squad made their way back to US lines, but the KPA captured most near the bottom of Ka-san on September 10 as they were trying to make their way through the KPA lines. At dawn on September 5 the KPA attacked. At 13:30 Gay ordered the 8th Cavalry Regiment to withdraw its men off Ka-san. Gay believed he had insufficient forces to secure and hold it and that the KPA had insufficient ammunition to exploit its possession as an observation point for directing artillery and mortar fire. Soldiers of the ROK 1st Division captured a North Korean near Ka-san on September 4 who said that about 800 KPA soldiers were on Ka-san with three more battalions following them from the north. The engineer company had succeeded only in establishing a perimeter briefly within the KPA-held area. Now, with Ka-san firmly in their possession, the KPA 13th and 1st Divisions made ready to press on downhill into Taegu they set up a roadblock which was repulsed the next day. In the midst of this drive on Taegu, an ammunition shortage became critical for the UN forces. Its 2nd Regiment, with 1,200 men, advanced eastward from the vicinity of Hill 902 to the towering mountain of
P'algong-san. It reached the top of P'algong-san about daylight on September 10, and a little later new replacements made a charge toward the ROK positions. The ROK repulsed the charge, killing or wounding about two-thirds of the attacking force. The fighting north of Taegu on September 11 in the vicinity of Hills 660 and 314 was heavy and confused. The rifle companies of the division were now very low in strength. Lieutenant Colonel James H. Lynch's 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, numbered 535 men on the eve of its attack against Hill 314, less its rear echelons. The KPA soldiers on Hill 314 wore US uniforms, helmets, and
combat boots. Many of them had
M1 rifles and carbines. After the capture of Hill 314 on September 12, the situation north of Taegu improved. On September 14 the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, attacked and, supported by fire from Hill 314, gained part of Hill 570 from the KPA 19th Regiment, 13th Division.
Naktong Bulge Second Naktong Bulge During the KPA September 1 offensive, the US
35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division was heavily engaged in the
Battle of Nam River north of
Masan. On the 35th Regiment's right flank, just north of the confluence of the
Nam River and the
Naktong River, was the US
9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. During the last week of August, US troops on these hills could see minor KPA activity across the river, which they thought were North Koreans organizing the high ground on the west side of the Naktong against a possible US attack. It also caught most of the D and H Company, 9th Infantry men at the base of Hill 209, from the crossing site. The KPA killed or captured many of the troops there. The first heavy weapons carrying party was on its way up the hill when the KPA attack engulfed the men below. It hurried on to the top where the advance group waited and there all hastily dug in on a small perimeter. This group was not attacked during the night. At 03:00, 1 September, the 9th Infantry Regiment ordered its only reserve, E Company, to move west along the Yongsan-Naktong River road and take a blocking position at the pass between Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, from the river and from Yongsan. It took over a front on the Naktong River without its 3rd Battalion which had been attached to the US 1st Cavalry Division to the north. At 21:00 the first shells of what proved to be a two-hour KPA artillery and mortar preparation against the US river positions of 2nd Platoon. When word of the disaster that had overtaken 1st Battalion reached regimental headquarters, G and F Companies from 2nd Division reserve were sent to help 1st Battalion and the latter on the southern road toward Pugong-ni and C Company. Accordingly, he placed the division artillery commander, Brigadier General
Loyal M. Haynes, in command of the northern group. Southward, in the Yongsan area, Keiser placed Brigadier General
Joseph S. Bradley, Assistant Division Commander, in charge of the 9th Infantry Regiment, the
2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, most of the 72nd Tank Battalion, and other miscellaneous units of the division. This southern grouping was known as
Task Force Bradley. The massive KPA attack had made deep penetrations everywhere in the division sector except in the north in the zone of the 38th Infantry. Walker decided that the situation was most critical in the Naktong Bulge area of the US 2nd Division sector. The Marines made ready to depart for the Naktong Bulge at 13:30. North of the US 9th Infantry and the battles in the Naktong Bulge and around Yongsan, the US 23rd Infantry Regiment after daylight of September 1 was in a very precarious position. Still farther northward in the zone of the US 38th Infantry the KPA were also active. This fight continued until September 5. On that day F Company captured Hill 284 killing 150 KPA. On the morning of September 1, 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry moved in an attack westward from the 23rd Regiment command post near
Mosan-ni to open the road to the 1st Battalion. On the second day of the fighting at the pass, the relief force broke through the roadblock with the help of air strikes and artillery and tank fire. The advanced elements of the battalion joined 1st Battalion at 17:00 on September 2. That evening, KPA strongly attacked the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, on Hill 209 north of the road and opposite 1st Battalion, driving one company from its position. On September 4, Haynes changed the boundary between the 38th and 23rd Infantry Regiments, giving the northern part of the 23rd's sector to the 38th Infantry, thus releasing 1st Battalion for movement southward to help the 2nd Battalion defend the southern approach to Changnyong. This heavy night and day battle cost the KPA 2nd Division most of its remaining offensive strength. The 3rd Regiment had been left at
Inch'on, but division commander Major General Pak Kyo Sam felt the chances of capturing Yongsan were strong. As the KPA 9th Division approached Yongsan, its 1st Regiment was on the north and its 2nd Regiment on the south. On the morning of September 1, with only the shattered remnants of E Company at hand, the US 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division had virtually no troops to defend Yongsan. Disorganized US forces were ordered to pull back to Yongsan. That night KPA soldiers crossed the low ground around Yongsan and entered the town from the south. US troops attempted to rally and fend off the KPA attack, but were too disorganized to mount effective resistance. By evening the KPA had been driven into the hills westward. In this time, the desperately undermanned US units began to be reinforced with
Korean Augmentees (KATUSAs) However, the cultural divide between the KATUSAs and the US troops caused tensions. At 09:35 on September 2, while the KPA were attempting to destroy the engineer troops at the southern edge of Yongsan and clear the road to Miryang, The
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines assembled north of Yongsan, the
1st Battalion, 5th Marines south of it. The
3rd Battalion, 5th Marines established security positions southwest of Yongsan along the approaches into the regimental sector from that direction. The Marine attack started at 08:55 on September 3, across the rice paddy land toward KPA-held high ground westward. Air strikes, artillery concentrations, and machine gun and rifle fire of the 1st Battalion now caught KPA reinforcements in open rice paddies moving up from the second ridge and killed most of them. By nightfall the counterattack had gained another . It had begun to rain again and the attack came in the midst of a downpour. US artillery fire concentrated in front of the 9th Infantry helped greatly in repelling the KPA in this night and day battle. That morning, September 5, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the US troops moved out in their third day of counterattack. As the attack progressed, the Marines approached Obong-ni Ridge and the 9th Infantry neared Cloverleaf Hill where they had fought tenaciously during the First Battle of Naktong Bulge the month before. The US counteroffensive of September 3–5 west of Yongsan, according to prisoner statements, resulted in one of the bloodiest debacles of the war for a KPA division. Even though remnants of the KPA 9th Division, supported by the low strength KPA 4th Division, still held Obong-ni Ridge, Cloverleaf Hill, and the intervening ground back to the Naktong on September 6, the division's offensive strength had been spent at the end of the US counterattack. Late in the afternoon of August 31, observers with G Company, 24th Infantry, noticed activity in front of their positions. They called in two air strikes that hit this area at dusk. US artillery sent a large concentration of fire into the area, but the effect of this fire was not known. All US units on the line were alerted for a possible KPA attack. That night the KPA launched their coordinated offensive against the entire UN force. The KPA 6th Division advanced first, hitting F Company on the north side of the pass on the Chungam-ni-Haman road. The ROK troops in the pass left their positions and fell back on G Company south of the pass. South of the pass, at dawn, First Lieutenant Houston M. McMurray found that only 15 out of 69 men assigned to his platoon remained with him, a mix of US and ROK troops. The KPA attacked this position at dawn. They came through an opening in the
barbed wire perimeter which was supposed to be covered by a man with a
M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, but he had fled. Throwing grenades and spraying the area with sub-machine gun fire, the KPA quickly overran the position. The KPA passed through the crumbling US lines quickly and overran the 2nd Battalion command post, killing several men there and destroying much of the battalion's equipment. With the 2nd Battalion broken, Haman was open to direct KPA attack. As the KPA encircled Haman, Roberts, the 2nd Battalion commander, ordered an officer to take remnants of the battalion and establish a roadblock at the south edge of the town. Although the officer directed a large group of men to accompany him, only eight did so. The 2nd Battalion was no longer an effective fighting force. Pockets of its soldiers remained in place and fought fiercely, but the majority fled upon attack, and the KPA were able to move around the uneven resistance. They surrounded Haman as the 2nd Battalion crumbled in disarray. When the KPA attack broke through the 2nd Battalion, Regimental commander Colonel Arthur S. Champney ordered the 1st Battalion, about south of Haman on the Chindong-ni road, to counterattack and restore the line. Roberts assembled all the 40 men of the disorganized 2nd Battalion he could find to join in this counterattack, which got under way at 07:30. Upon contact with the KPA, the 1st Battalion broke and fled to the rear. The KPA attacked Haman daily for the next week. Following the repelling of KPA infiltration on September 7, the attack on Haman ground to a halt. The KPA, racked by logistical and manpower shortages, focused more heavily on their attacks against 24th Infantry positions on Battle Mountain, as well as 35th Infantry positions at the Nam River. 24th Infantry troops at Haman encountered only probing attacks until September 18.
Nam River Meanwhile, the KPA 7th Division troops committed all of their effort into attacking the US 35th Infantry line. Other KPA soldiers crossed the Nam on an underwater bridge in front of the paddy ground north of Komam-ni and near the boundary between the 2nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Wilkins, Jr., holding the river front and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard G. Teeter's 1st Battalion holding the hill line that stretched from the Nam River to Sibidang-san and the Chinju-Masan highway. The 35th Infantry, facing shortages of equipment and reinforcements, was under-equipped but nonetheless prepared for an attack. In the low ground between these two battalions at the river ferry crossing site, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Fisher had placed 300 ROK National Police, expecting them to hold there long enough to serve as a warning for the rest of the forces. During the morning hours of September 1, when the KPA 7th Division troops had attacked, the first US unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry, at the north shoulder of the gap. Battalions, companies, and platoons, cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except for airdrops which supplied many of them. Airdrops also supplied relief forces trying to reach the front-line units. Tanks and
armored cars drove to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition and carried back critically wounded on the return trips. In general, the 35th Infantry fought in its original battle line positions, while at first one battalion, and later two battalions, of the 27th Infantry fought toward it through the estimated 3,000 KPA operating in its rear areas. Although the 25th Division generally was under much less pressure after 5 September, there were still severe local attacks. Heavy rains caused the Nam and Naktong Rivers to rise on 8 and 9 September, reducing the danger of new crossings. However, KPA attacks against 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry occurred nightly. The approaches to the Namji-ri bridge, one of their key targets to protect were mined. At one time there were about 100 KPA dead lying in that area. From September 9 to 16, there were limited attacks on the 35th Infantry's front but most of the KPA's momentum had been broken and they could not muster strong attacks against the regiment again. == Aftermath ==