According to the introduction to the anthology
The New Wittgenstein (): Wittgenstein's primary aim in philosophy is – to use a word he himself employs in characterizing his later philosophical procedures – a
therapeutic one. These papers have in common an understanding of Wittgenstein as aspiring, not to advance metaphysical theories, but rather to help us work ourselves out of confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing. While many philosophers have suggested variants of such ideas in readings of the work of
later Wittgenstein, namely the author of
Philosophical Investigations, a notable aspect of the New Wittgenstein interpretation is a view that the work of
early Wittgenstein, exemplified by the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the
Investigations, are actually more deeply connected, and in less opposition, to each other than usually understood. This view is in direct conflict with the long-standing, if somewhat old-fashioned, interpretation of the
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus advocated by the
logical positivists associated with the
Vienna Circle. The
therapeutic approach of the New Wittgenstein scholars is not without critics:
Hans-Johann Glock argues that the "plain nonsense" reading of the
Tractatus "is at odds with the external evidence, writings and conversations in which Wittgenstein states that the
Tractatus is committed to the idea of ineffable insight". There is no unitary "New Wittgenstein" interpretation, and proponents differ deeply among themselves. Philosophers often associated with the interpretation include some who are influential, mostly associated with (although sometimes antagonistic to) the traditions of
analytic philosophy, including
Stanley Cavell,
James F. Conant,
John McDowell, Matthew B. Ostrow, Thomas Ricketts,
Warren Goldfarb,
Hilary Putnam,
Stephen Mulhall,
Alice Crary, and
Cora Diamond. Explicit critics of the "New Wittgenstein" interpretation include
P. M. S. Hacker, Ian Proops and Genia Schönbaumsfeld. == References ==