For example, if an emitter is known as the radio transmitter of a certain unit, and by using
direction finding (DF) tools, the position of the emitter is locatable, the change of locations from one point to another can be deduced, without listening to any orders or reports. If one unit reports back to a command on a certain pattern, and another unit reports on the same pattern to the same command, the two units are probably related. That conclusion is based on the
metadata of the two units' transmissions, not on the content of their transmissions. Using all or as much of the metadata available is commonly used to build up an
Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) by mapping different entities in the battlefield and their connections. Of course, the EOB could be built by tapping all the conversations and trying to understand, which unit is where, but using the metadata with an automatic analysis tool enables a much faster and accurate EOB build-up, which, alongside tapping, builds a much better and complete picture.
World War I • British analysts during
World War I noticed that the
call sign of German Vice Admiral
Reinhard Scheer, commanding the hostile fleet, had been transferred to a land station.
Admiral of the Fleet Beatty, ignorant of Scheer's practice of changing call signs upon leaving harbour, dismissed its importance and disregarded
Room 40 analysts' attempts to make the point. The German fleet sortied, and the British were late in meeting them at the
Battle of Jutland. If traffic analysis had been taken more seriously, the British might have done better than a "draw". • French military intelligence, shaped by
Auguste Kerckhoffs's legacy, had erected a network of intercept stations at the Western Front in pre-war times. When the Germans crossed the frontier, the French worked out crude means for direction-finding based on intercepted signal intensity. The recording of call signs and of traffic volumes further enabled the French to identify German combat groups and to distinguish fast-moving cavalry from slower infantry. • During the planning and rehearsal for the
attack on Pearl Harbor, very little traffic was passed by radio, subject to interception. The ships, units, and commands involved were all in Japan and in touch by phone, courier, signal lamp, or even flag. None of that traffic was intercepted, and could not be analyzed. however, the volume of diplomatic traffic to and from certain
consular stations might have indicated places of interest to Japan, which might thus have suggested locations to concentrate traffic analysis and decryption efforts. •
Admiral Nagumo's Pearl Harbor Attack Force sailed under radio silence, with its radios physically locked down. It is unclear if that deceived the US since Pacific Fleet intelligence had been unable to locate the Japanese carriers in the days immediately preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor. •
Operation Quicksilver, part of the British deception plan for the
Invasion of Normandy during World War II fed German intelligence a combination of true and false information about troop deployments in Britain, which caused the Germans to deduce an order of battle that suggested an invasion at the
Pas-de-Calais, instead of Normandy. The fictitious divisions that were created for the deception were supplied with real radio units, which maintained a flow of messages that was consistent with the deception. == In commercial relationships ==