,
Burbank Airport in February 1948
Startup Kirk Kerkorian was a pilot in World War II, engaged in pilot instruction and aircraft delivery across the Atlantic, including a record-setting nonstop flight of a
deHavilland Mosquito from Canada to the UK. In January 1946, Kerkorian and his sister formed a partnership to trade aircraft. This activity attracted significant attention when, in October 1946, while Kerkorian was flying a war-surplus
Douglas DC-3 from Hawaii to the mainland, the ferry tank system malfunctioned and the engines quit. His crew issued a distress call before it was able to restore power, leading to news stories. Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS) was a separate nonscheduled airline, later known as an irregular air carrier or
supplemental air carrier. LAAS was in operation with a
C-47 as early as January 1946. In 1946, LAAS's presence was noted at
LaGuardia in March,
Chicago in April and LAAS advertised a charter flight to
Alaska from
Seattle in May. In 1947, LAAS started a scheduled DC-3 service from
Los Angeles Municipal Airport to
Big Bear, at which time its owners/operators were James Porter and Lee Taylor. Kerkorian's partnership bought LAAS in June 1948, which on 13 August 1948 was issued a Letter of Registration by the CAB as an
irregular air carrier (what the CAB then issued to such airlines in lieu of a certificate). Kerkorian incorporated Los Angeles Air Service, Inc., in California on 20 December 1948, a separate entity from the original LAAS. However, it was only on 5 April 1951 that the Letter of Registration was transferred from the LAAS partnership to the LAAS corporation, thereby making the corporate entity the airline.
Los Angeles Air Service Under Kerkorian, LAAS operated intermittently; it operated no flights at all from 3rd quarter of 1951 through 1st quarter of 1954, and had minimal operations in 1957 and 1958 (see
Table 1). In September 1957, the CAB warned LAAS to operate within the next 30 days or lose operating authority, the airline having sold all its aircraft. Kerkorian's interests were as much in aircraft trading as airline operation: when Kerkorian took a stake in a Las Vegas casino in 1955,
Variety Magazine referred to him not an airline operator but as an airplane dealer. Kerkorian made some famous deals through LAAS. For instance, in 1951, LAAS bought the wreckage of a
British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) Constellation in the UK from BOAC's insurers, shipped it to the US and had
Lockheed rebuild it, leasing it to
California Hawaiian Airlines, another irregular airline. All-told, the deal netted Kerkorian over a half-million dollars (over $5.5 million in 2025 dollars). later in the year LAAS changed the name of the corporation. Coincident with the name change, the airline entered the scheduled market from the west coast to Hawaii flying
DC-6B aircraft; its Hawaii representative was
Peter Ueberroth, later famous for running the
1984 Los Angeles Olympics. TIA's 1960 revenues reflect a far higher level of scheduled service than previously (see
Table 1). But from April 1960, the legal status of supplemental carriers was in question and when Congress settled the issue in 1962, it limited supplemental carriers to purely charter service from 1964.
Jets In 1960 the
US Air Force shifted emphasis from using its own transportation service to commercial charters, which it no longer awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Instead, the CAB set uniform (and much higher) prices for military charters, which were awarded on the basis of participation in the
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), rewarding airlines that enrolled aircraft in CRAF that the military valued, such as long-range jets and those with cargo capability, and above all convertible (able to carry passenger or cargo) aircraft. TIA was the first supplemental to fly jets, buying the
Douglas DC-8 prototype, "Ship One", which had been upgraded with then-modern
JT3D turbofan engines, in June 1962. TIA immediately landed a $6.2 million military charter contract, an amount greater than TIA's total 1961 revenue (see
Table 2). In July 1963 TIA was the first airline of any kind to fly cargo jet charters for the military, leveraging the military's preference by acquiring a convertible passenger/cargo aircraft. Kerkorian later said moving to jets "was the real breakthrough." Note the substantial difference in performance between
Table 1 and
Table 2. Apart from "Ship One", TIA would buy 12 brand new DC-8s from Douglas in the 1960s, all convertible. Military charters boomed because of the Vietnam War. TIA had much lower costs than most airlines, and that plus higher military charter rates and demand for convertible jets resulted in fast growth and high operating margins. For instance, from 1964 to 1965, TIA's revenues grew by 56% while operating margin expanded from 19.4% to 33.0%. In 1965, TIA's jets brought further benefit. The CAB provided an exemption for TIA (and
World Airways) to offer European charters that summer. The CAB wanted more jet capacity and the supplemental airlines already certificated for Europe,
Saturn and
Capitol, had no jets and a single jet respectively. Obtaining Europe access was fortunate for TIA as it became the key non-military market for supplementals. is just visible
Manchester 1974 s were operated from 1968 through 1972
Studebaker & Transamerica In October 1962,
Studebaker, attempting to diversify, bought TIA for $2.7 million in stock. By 1972, TIA had the leading market share in Europe charters, and such charters accounted for 64.6% of TIA's commercial passenger revenue, the
lowest such metric of any of the Big Five. For instance, ONA depended on Europe for 99.5% of commercial passenger revenue. The Europe market grew strongly until 1973, when demand unexpectedly plateaued, a situation that became even more challenging in the fourth quarter when fuel prices spiked as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. TIA was already more diversified, relative to Europe commercial revenue, than others in the Big Five. In offering to buy Saturn Airways in 1974, TIA bought an airline that, by the time the deal closed in 1976, had no Europe passenger charter exposure at all. For further on supplemental air carriers and US-Europe charters see:
Saturn Airways merger In April 1974, TIA tentatively agreed to buy Saturn for $15 million in Transamerica stock. As the CAB noted, Saturn was the most profitable supplemental, and complementary to TIA. In 1974, freight was 2/3 of Saturn's revenues versus 3.3% of TIA's, and military was 47% of Saturn's revenues versus 12.5% of TIA. The transaction closed in November 1976 and in the meantime Saturn's financial performance improved significantly. Saturn renegotiated and the price more than doubled to $35 million (over $190 million in 2025 terms) by closing. TIA thus gained a strong freight business, including
Lockheed L-100 Hercules and
Lockheed L-188 Electra all-cargo aircraft. In particular, Saturn had a leading position in the domestic air freight networks
Logair and
Quicktrans of the
US Air Force and
US Navy, respectively. Saturn's share of the combined Logair/Quicktrans contract was as high as 86% during the mid-1970s, based on its monopoly as an L-100 provider, a position TIA inherited.
Deregulation and a new name After the Saturn merger, TIA was by far the most dominant supplemental. As Table 3 shows, in 1978, the last year of the regulated era, TIA accounted for over 43% of all supplemental revenue. But TIA was still of modest size overall; in 1978, the largest scheduled airline by revenue was
United Airlines, with over 15 times TIA's revenue at $3.5 billion.
US airline deregulation came into effect in 1979, but by year-end 1978, the CAB had already approved TIA scheduled service to Europe. By May 1979, TIA was flying to Amsterdam from Los Angeles and New York. On October 1, the airline aligned its name with that of its parent, becoming Transamerica Airlines. At the time, the airline said it wanted to become a leading international scheduled carrier and add eight
Boeing 747s over three years. But instead, proud of its record of profitability, took a cautious stance, largely sticking to the charter business it knew, aiming, as of 1982, to generate 15% of revenues from scheduled service, with military charters another 30%. It continued to focus on international charters, where it benefitted from former players dropping out, TA's scheduled service reflected this modest ambition, with low frequency service on relatively few routes, mostly international (see
Destinations). In the end Transamerica took delivery of just three 747s. It converted 12 DC-8-61/63s to DC-8-71/73s (re-engining with
CFM56-2 high-bypass turbofans and other upgrades). Transamerica noted its 70-series DC-8s had the same number of seats as the then brand-new
Boeing 767, while having international range (not true of initial 767 models, which, pre-
ETOPS, were not intercontinental aircraft) and operating costs within 1% of the 767, at half the cost.
Labor issues, a second Trans International and end In late 1983 TA asked for wage givebacks from its pilots. The pilot union,
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), claimed this amounted to a 50% wage cut (later bumping this to 60%) In the same year, ALPA said it had provided savings of over $2 billion to airlines since deregulation through concessions.
Paris 1985 In 1984, Transamerica Corporation announced it would establish a second Trans International Airlines as a non-union sibling to TA, using the certificate of a dormant airline,
Louisville-based Central American International. It denied any intention to transfer business to the new carrier from TA, but ALPA was skeptical. ALPA offered concessions in exchange for killing the new airline, but Transamerica declined. ALPA sued to force the government to impose labor protective provisions, a routine part of airline mergers in the regulated era. The government argued this was inconsistent with the intent of airline deregulation and courts agreed, confirming the ability of a holding company to own both union and non-union airlines. In 1984, TA got a court injunction to stop a pilot
sickout. In early 1985, the pilots launched a public relations campaign against the airline. In August, TA shut its Oakland maintenance base, contracting with
World Airways, also based at Oakland. Many former TA mechanics transferred to World, but at lower rates. A few days later, TA also fired 75 white-collar workers. Layoffs reflected, in part, the sale of five DC-8s. The reduction in activity can be seen in Table 4. In January 1986, Transamerica Corporation announced it was exiting non-financial businesses, putting TA for sale along with
Budget Rent-a-Car and an industrial subsidiary. In July, an employee group formed to buy TA was shocked at the (undisclosed) asking price, and meanwhile TA's entire fleet was on the market. Finally, in August, the corporation decided to shut the airline as of September 30, timing driven by annual military contract awards. In the subsequent year, TA would sell two 747s for $126 million and 7 DC-8-73CFs for $165.5 million, a third 747 for $63 million and 11 Hercules for $86.35 million. TA received insurance proceeds for a 12th Hercules when the $7.75 million aircraft, leased to
Southern Air Transport, crashed on 4 October 1986, only days after TA shutdown. ==Destinations==