Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, the president of the
Council of the Realm, placed
Adolfo Suárez on a list of three candidates for King Juan Carlos to choose to become the new head of government, replacing Arias Navarro. The king chose Suárez because he felt he could meet the challenge of the difficult political process that lay ahead: persuading the Cortes, which was composed of appointed Francoist politicians, to dismantle Franco's system. In this manner, he would formally act within the Francoist legal system and thus avoid the prospect of military intervention in the political process. Suárez was appointed as the 138th Prime Minister of Spain by Juan Carlos on 3 July 1976, a move that, given his Francoist past, was opposed by leftists and some centrists. As Prime Minister, Suárez quickly presented a clear political program based on two points: • The development of a political reform bill, which, once approved by the Cortes and the Spanish public in a referendum, would open the constituent process for creating a liberal democracy in Spain. • Democratic elections to be held in June 1977 to elect a Cortes charged with drawing up a new democratic constitution This program was clear and unequivocal, but its realization tested the political capacity of Suárez. He had to convince both the opposition to participate in his plan and the army to allow the process to run uninterrupted, and at the same time needed to bring the situation in the
Basque Country under control. Despite these challenges, Suárez's project was carried out without delay between July 1976 and June 1977. He had to act on many fronts during this short period of time in order to achieve his aims. speaking at the meeting of the
CNT in Barcelona in 1977, after 36 years of exile The draft of the
Political Reform Act () was written by Torcuato Fernández-Miranda, speaker of the Cortes, who handed it over to the Suárez government in July 1976. The project was approved by the Suárez Government in September 1976. To open the door to parliamentary democracy in Spain, this legislation could not simply create a new political system by eliminating the obstacles put in place by the Franco regime against democracy: it had to liquidate the Francoist system through the Francoist Cortes itself. The Cortes, under the presidency of Fernández-Miranda, debated this bill throughout the month of November; it ultimately approved it, with 425 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions. The Suárez government sought to gain further legitimacy for the changes through a
popular referendum. On 15 December 1976, with a 77.72% participation rate, 94% of voters indicated their support for the changes. From this moment, it was possible to begin the electoral process (the second part of the Suárez program), which would serve to elect the members of the
Constituent Cortes, the body that was to be responsible for creating a democratic constitution. With this part of his plan fulfilled, Suárez had to resolve another issue: should he include the opposition groups who had not participated at the beginning of the transition? Suárez also had to deal with a third problem: coming to terms with the anti-Francoist opposition.
Relations of the Suárez government with the opposition Suárez adopted a series of measured policies to add credibility to his project. He issued a partial
political amnesty in July 1976, freeing 400 prisoners; he then extended this in March 1977, and finally granted a blanket amnesty in May of the same year. In December 1976, the (TOP), a sort of Francoist
secret police, was dissolved. The right to
strike was legalized in March 1977, with the right to
unionize being granted the following month. Also in March, a new electoral system act () introduced the necessary framework for Spain's electoral system to be brought into accord with those of other countries that were
liberal parliamentary democracies. Through these and other measures of government, Suárez complied with the conditions that the opposition groups first demanded in 1974. These opposition forces met in November 1976 to create an association of democratic organizations called the
Democratic Convergence Platform. Suárez had initiated political contact with the opposition by meeting with
Felipe González,
secretary general of the
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), in August 1976. The positive attitude of the socialist leader gave further support for Suárez to carry forward his reforms, but everyone clearly perceived that the big problem for the political normalization of the country would be the legalization of the Communist Party (PCE), which at the time had more activists and was more organized than any other group in the political opposition. However, in a meeting between Suárez and the most important military leaders in September, the officers strongly declared opposition to the legalization of the PCE. The PCE, for its part, acted ever more publicly to express its opinions. According to the Communists, the Political Reform Act was anti-democratic and the elections for the Constituent Cortes should be called by a provisional government including members from the opposition. The Communists particularly, and the opposition more broadly, did not show any enthusiasm for the Political Reform Act. Suárez had to risk even more to involve the opposition forces in his plan. In December 1976, the PSOE celebrated its 27th Congress in
Madrid, and began to disassociate itself from the demands of the PCE, affirming that it would participate in the next call for elections for the Constituent Cortes. At the beginning of 1977, the year of the elections, Suárez confronted the problem of legalizing the PCE. After the public indignation against anti-reformists aroused by the
Massacre of Atocha in January 1977, when far-right terrorists murdered labor leaders aligned with the PCE, Suárez opened negotiations with Communist leader
Santiago Carrillo in February. Carrillo's willingness to cooperate without prior demands and his offer of a "social pact" for the period after the elections pushed Suárez to take the riskiest step of the transition: the legalization of the PCE in April 1977. However, throughout this critical period the government began a strategy of providing greater institutional space to the (UGT) union, more moderate and linked to the Socialists, in comparison to the Communist-oriented
CCOO. The manner in which a unified trade union was strategically countered is an important feature of the Spanish transition, as it limited radical opposition and created the basis for a fractured industrial relations system.
Relations of the Suárez government with the Spanish army Adolfo Suárez knew well that the —a group of hard-line Francoists led by
José Antonio Girón and
Blas Piñar, using the newspapers and as their mouthpieces—had close contacts with officials in the army and exercised influence over important sectors of the military. The ever-present threat of a coup d’etat from the hardliners required careful navigation. To resolve the issue, Suárez intended to support himself with a liberal group within the military, centered on General
Díez Alegría. Suárez gave the members of this group the positions of authority with the most responsibility. The most notable personality of this faction within the army was General
Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado. However, in July 1976, the Vice President for Defense Affairs was General
Fernando de Santiago, a member of a hardline group within the army. De Santiago had shown his restlessness before, during the first amnesty in July 1976. He had opposed the law granting the right to unionize. Suárez dismissed Fernando de Santiago, nominating Gutiérrez Mellado instead. This confrontation with General de Santiago caused a large part of the army to oppose Suárez, opposition that further intensified when the PCE was legalized. Meanwhile, Gutiérrez Mellado promoted officials who supported political reform and removed those commanders of the security forces (the and the ) who seemed to support preserving the Francoist regime. Suárez wanted to demonstrate to the army that the political normalization of the country meant neither
anarchy nor revolution. In this, he counted on the cooperation of Santiago Carrillo, but he could in no way count on the cooperation of terrorist groups.
Resurgence of terrorist activity The Basque Country remained, for the better part of this period, in a state of political turbulence. Suárez granted a multi-stage amnesty for numerous Basque political prisoners, but the confrontations continued between local police and protesters. The separatist group
ETA, which in the middle of 1976 had seemed open to a limited truce after Franco's death, resumed armed confrontation again in October. The time from 1978 to 1980 would be ETA's three deadliest years ever. However, it was between December 1976 and January 1977 that a series of attacks brought about a situation of high tension in Spain. The Maoist
GRAPO () began its armed struggle by bombing public locations, and then continued with the kidnapping of two important figures of the regime: the President of the Council of the State
José María de Oriol, and General Villaescusa, President of the Superior Council of the Military Justice. From the right, during these kidnappings, members of the neo-fascist conducted the Atocha massacre, three of them labor lawyers, in an office on Atocha Street in Madrid, in January 1977. In the midst of these provocations, Suárez convened his first meeting with a significant number of opposition leaders, who published a condemnation of terrorism and gave their support to Suárez's actions. During this turbulent time, the capitalized on the instability and declared that the country was on the brink of chaos. Despite the increased violence by the ETA and GRAPO,
elections for the Constituent Cortes were carried out in June 1977. == First elections and the draft of the Constitution ==