Franco-German agreement French President
François Mitterrand was forced to abandon the centrepiece of his
Socialist programme in 1983, a job creating
reflation, due to speculation against the
franc. Since then, Mitterrand had been committed to drawing Germany into a currency partnership. After the
fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989, Germany sought re-unification. France, the UK, and the rest of Europe
expressed their concerns over re-unification. When
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl asked for re-unification in 1990, Mitterrand would only accept in the event Germany would abandon the
Deutsche Mark and adopt a common currency. Without consulting
Karl Otto Pöhl, President of the
Bundesbank, Kohl accepted the deal. Despite this win for France, it was widely perceived that the cost of German cooperation was German dictation of the rules for a single currency. The Bundesbank had signalled that Germany's economic success would come before being "a good european".
The ERM crises In the UK, the Maastricht rebellion drew on the experience of
Black Wednesday. On 16 September 1992 the
British government had been forced to withdraw the
pound sterling from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This was the centrepiece of the
European Monetary System (EMS), agreed in 1978 as a means of reducing the "barrier" that exchange-rate volatility presented for intra-Community commerce (and for the management of payments under the
Common Agricultural Policy). Britain had signed up to the ERM in 1990 as a token of the government's commitment to control inflation (then running at three times the rate of Germany). From the beginning of 1990, high German interest rates, set by the
Bundesbank to counteract inflationary impact of the expenditure on
German reunification, caused significant stress across the whole of the ERM. By the time of their own ratifications debates, France and Denmark also found themselves under pressure in foreign exchange markets, their currencies trading close to the bottom of their ERM bands. In Britain, the government of
John Major failed in a costly attempt to keep the pound above its mandated
exchange rate limit. While a political humiliation,
sterling's exit from the ERM was followed in the UK by economic recovery and a significant fall in employment.
The Maastricht criteria Having "resolved to achieve the strengthening and the convergence and to establish an economic and monetary union including,... a single and stable currency", the Treaty ruled that "Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern", and that the obligations assumed should be a matter for "mutual surveillance". Commonly known as the Maastricht criteria, these obligations represented the performance thresholds for member states to progress toward the third stage of European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the adoption the common currency (designated at the 1995
Madrid European Council as the
Euro). The four "convergence criteria", as detailed in attached protocols, impose control over inflation, public debt and the public deficit, exchange rate stability and domestic interest rates. With limited leeway granted in exceptional circumstances, the obligations are to maintain: 1.
inflation at a rate no more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three best performing (lowest inflation) Member States; 2. a "budgetary position" that avoids "excessive"
government deficits defined in ratios to gross domestic product (GDP) of greater than 3% for
annual deficits and 60% for gross
government debt; 3. the
exchange rate of the national currency within "the normal fluctuation margins by the
exchange-rate mechanism of the
European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years"; and 4. nominal long-term
interest rates no more than 2 percentage points higher than in the three Member States with the lowest inflation.
The European Central Bank mandate These criteria in turn dictated the mandate of the
European System of Central Banks comprising the national central banks, but to include the prospective currency-issuing
European Central Bank. As envisaged by the Treaty, the ECB replaced its shadow
European Monetary Institute on 1 June 1998, and began exercising its full powers with the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999. The Treaty dedicates the EU central banking system to price stability, and gives it "a degree of independence from elected officials" greater even "than that of its putative model, the German
Bundesbank". Whereas the Bundesbank, under article 12 of its constitution, is "bound to support the general economic policy of the [German] Federal Government", the obligation of the ECB to "support the general economic policies in the Community" is to be "without prejudice" to price stability, the Bank's "primary objective". It is further conditioned by the express understanding that "neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies, shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies from any Government of a Member State or from any other body." Seeming to further preclude any possibility of the single-currency banking system being used to regulate European financial markets in support of potentially inflationary policies, the Treaty expressly prohibits the ECB or any Member State central extending "overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility" to "Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States", or the purchase from them debt instruments.
The Maastricht economic-policy model Critics felt that, in limiting the role of the future ECB and euro in national, or Union-coordinated, reflationary policies, Maastricht affirmed what by the late 1980s was the general economic-policy orthodoxy within the Community. This has been described as a "reversed
Keynesianism": macro-economic policy not to secure a full-employment level of demand, but, through the restrictive control of monetary growth and public expenditure, to maintain price and financial market stability; micro economic policy, not to engineer income and price controls in support of fiscal expansion, but to encourage job creation by reducing barriers to lower labour costs. These constraints were to become the focus of political scrutiny and public protest in the new-century
European debt crisis. Beginning in 2009 with
Greece, the governments of several
Euro-zone countries (Portugal, Ireland, Spain and
Cyprus) declared themselves unable to repay or refinance their
government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks without assistance from third parties. The "
austerity" they had to subsequently impose as a condition of assistance from Germany and other of their trade-surplus EU partners, raised calls for new arrangements to better manage payment imbalances between member states, and ease the burden of adjustment upon wage-, and benefit-, dependent households. Greek finance minister
Yanis Varoufakis credited the Maastricht criteria with framing of a union of deflation and unemployment. Taking issue in defence of the Maastricht criteria, German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble argued that "the old way to stimulate growth will not work." There is a real "moral hazard" in allowing Member States to accumulate higher debts within the Eurozone – higher debts which, ultimately, have no relationship to higher growth. The Maastricht criteria, he insisted, were correct in placing the onus for growth on "competitiveness, structural reforms, investment, and sustainable financing". ==Foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs==