The results of the revised final (Thirteen Demands) version of the Twenty-One Demands were far more negative for Japan than positive. Without "Group 5", the new treaty gave Japan little more than it already had in China. On the other hand, the United States expressed strongly negative reactions to Japan's rejection of the
Open Door Policy. In the Bryan Note issued by Secretary of State
William Jennings Bryan on 13 March 1915, the U.S., while affirming Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria, Mongolia and Shandong, expressed concern over further encroachments to Chinese sovereignty. Great Britain,
Japan's closest ally, expressed concern over what was perceived as Japan's overbearing, bullying approach to diplomacy, and the British Foreign Office in particular was unhappy with Japanese attempts to establish what would effectively be a Japanese
protectorate over all of China. Afterwards, Japan and the United States looked for a compromise; as a result, the
Lansing–Ishii Agreement was concluded in 1917. It was approved by the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Japan continued to push for outright control over Shandong Province and won European diplomatic recognition for their claim at the
Treaty of Versailles (despite the refusal of the Chinese delegation to sign the treaty). This, in turn, provoked ill-will from the United States government, as well as widespread hostility within China; a large-scale boycott against Japanese goods was just one effect. In 1922, the U.S. brokered a solution: China was awarded nominal sovereignty over all of Shandong, while in practice Japan's economic dominance continued. In China, the overall political impact of Japan's actions was highly negative, creating a considerable amount of public
ill-will towards Japan, contributing to the
May Fourth Movement, and a significant upsurge in
nationalism. == See also ==