Origin of the national armed forces Uganda's post-independence military originated as cadres of the
King's African Rifles (KAR), a
British Colonial Auxiliary Forces regiment which was organized to secure the
East Africa Protectorate. The British preferred to draw the KAR's recruits from specific ethnic groups in the region, regarding them as "
martial races", which had the effect of intensifying ethnic rivalries. He was also forced to leave several British officers in place for the time being, with one of them, J.M.A. Tillet, serving as first head of the Uganda Army.
Increasing involvement in internal and foreign conflicts Following independence, Obote's government embarked on a programme of military expansion. At the same time, Obote tried to ensure that the army's enlargement benefitted the northerners, most importantly his own
Langi compatriots. Uganda also continued to cooperate with the United Kingdom in military matters, and most of the early Ugandan officers were trained in the United Kingdom, while equipment was also of British origin. The UA soon began operations against local tribal resistance and banditry, particularly targeting the
Karamojong people. In January 1963,
Tanganyikan President
Julius Nyerere proposed to combine
his country's military with the Uganda Army to improve the strength of both countries. Even though Obote initially considered the idea, it was strongly opposed by a British UA commander, W.W. Cheyne. The latter argued that the Tanganyikan military was inferior, and that the morale of his soldiers would suffer if they were forced to work with the Tanganyikans. Obote was convinced by his arguments, and rejected the proposal. Researcher Timothy Parsons stated that Cheyne's claims were based on bias instead of facts, and that the Uganda Army was actually the "least stable" ex-KAR formation in East Africa. By July 1963, the army had grown to 1,500 personnel. Considering various security threats, posed by local militant resistance groups such as the
Rwenzururu movement, and potential threats from the Congo and Sudan, the country's military was further expanded through the establishment of a 2nd Battalion. By this point, Uganda also enlisted Israeli help in training and arming its forces. On 27 December 1963, an army company killed and captured some Rwandan rebels at Kizinga after they had been
repulsed by Rwandan forces over the border.
APCs,
Ferret armoured cars, and jeeps in the late 1960s On 23 January 1964, the 1st Battalion mutinied following similar mutinies in Kenya and Tanzania. The soldiers were upset about the conditions of their service, and the slow progress of Africanisation in the officer corps. When Minister for Defence
Felix Onama met with the mutineers to discuss their demands, they manhandled him and locked him up until he agreed to support their demands in the cabinet. The Ugandan government was only able to put down the mutineers with British assistance in the form of the
Scots Guards and
Staffordshire Regiment. Regardless, the government agreed to meet the soldiers' demands, including an increase in pay as well as the Africanisation of the officer corps. As a result of the latter agreement,
Idi Amin was appointed commander of the 1st Battalion, while
Shaban Opolot was made Army Commander. The mutiny also strongly impacted national politics, as Obote's government increasingly viewed the military as a potential threat as well as asset. In April 1964, the
General Service Unit (GSU) was set up as a militarised intelligence agency and bodyguards to protect the government from civilian and military threats. The GSU was almost entirely composed of Langi. In addition, Obote decided to not only africanize the officer corps, but also reduce cooperation with the British military in general so that the latter had less leverage in Uganda. In late July 1964, the
British Army completely withdrew from the country, while cooperation with Israel was increased to set up armoured forces well as an air force for the Uganda Army. The
de facto success of the mutinies also proved very harmful to the UA soldiers' future discipline. While these internal developments affected the military, Uganda was drawn into the
Simba rebellion of the Congo. Prime Minister Obote's government supported the Simba rebels, and Uganda Army soldiers occasionally fought alongside the Congolese insurgents against the Congo's
Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC). Uganda Army troops also provided weaponry in
exchange for gold to the rebels. Border clashes between the Uganda and Congo took place in 1964, and the Congolese launched air attacks on two Ugandan villages. Obote responded by further expanding in Uganda Army, as the 3rd Battalion was set up in February and the 4th Battalion in March 1965. There were also reports about Ugandan troops crossing the border in a raid targeting
Mahagi and
Bunia in retaliation for the Congolese air attacks. Around 15 March 1965, Uganda Army soldiers attacked ANC forces led by
Mike Hoare which were in the process of retaking
Mahagi from Simba rebels during
Operation White Giant. By July 1965, the Uganda Army counted 4,500 troops and organized its 1st Brigade. In 1966, political tensions between Prime Minister Obote and President
Mutesa II of Buganda led to the
Mengo Crisis, culminating in Obote deposing Mutesa in a violent coup. Uganda Army troops under Amin assaulted Mutesa's palace, overpowering and killing his guards, resulting in his flight into exile. Obote consequently assumed the presidency, and increased the military budget, acquiring more heavy equipment and deepening military ties with the
Eastern Bloc. He rewarded soldiers who remained loyal to him during the crisis, and used the expanded budget to disburse
patronage to increase his following in the army. At this point, the army had established itself in "an indispensable position" in Uganda's politics.
The Obote-Amin rivalry The military continued to grow in the following years: The Military Police, the Paratrooper Battalion, the Border Guard Unit, the 5th Mechanised Regiment, and the 2nd Brigade were organized, and the entire Uganda Army consisted of about 9,800 soldiers by 1968, of which only 200 were officers. Northerners remained dominant at about 61%, whereas 22% were from the eastern and 12% from the western parts of Uganda. Indiscipline worsened in the military, and drunken Uganda Army troops became notorious for abusing
Makerere University students who had grown increasingly anti-military as well as anti-Obote. Unrest and infighting also significantly worsened among the military, as Obote and Amin had become rivals and attempted to dominate the Uganda Army by recruiting partisans supportive of their political factions. Although these factions did not completely correspond to ethnicities, Amin found most of his support among troops from the West Nile Region and migrants from Sudan as well as
Zaire, whereas Obote was mainly aided by
Acholi and Langi soldiers. This development resulted in growing ethnic tensions within the army. Although Obote initially succeeded in maintaining control of the military by placing important positions in the hands of Langi, his policies alienated members of other ethnicities. The West Nile troops felt especially underprivileged, and even the Acholi soldiers felt that the President was unduly favoring Langi in regard to promotions. In January 1970, someone attempted to murder Obote, while UA deputy commander Pierino Yere Okoya, a rival of Amin, was assassinated. It was suspected that Amin had plotted both the unsuccessful attack on Obote as well as Okoya's murder. Amin replaced the purged troops by mass recruiting people regarded as loyal to his regime, mostly West Nile tribesmen. After his loyalists in the Uganda Army had been mostly killed, Obote attempted to organize a guerrilla force to regain power using the troops who had managed to flee Uganda. Obote's rebels were initially provided with bases in Sudan and Tanzania, although the former expelled them in May 1972. The anti-Amin rebels launched an
invasion of Uganda in late 1972, but were defeated by the Uganda Army. The Ugandan government consequently intensified purges of internal opponents, including those in the military. These purges alongside mass recruitment of new troops and the patronage system which Amin implemented to keep the army loyal resulted in growing unrest and corruption within the Uganda Army. Elements in the military repeatedly attempted to overthrow the President, while exile factions including Obote's attempted to facilitate coups or rebellions by organizing guerilla attacks and mobilizing discontented soldiers. The Tanzania-based militant group loyal to Obote was eventually named
Kikosi Maalum ("Special Force"); most of its members were ex-Uganda Army officers by 1978. == Organization ==