Eighth Army withdrawal below Pyongyang As Walker started his withdrawal from the Sukch’on-Sunch’on-Song-ch’on line on 2 December, Major general
Doyle O. Hickey, acting chief of staff of the
Far East Command and UN Command, arrived with word from MacArthur that, in effect, allowed Walker to leave behind any equipment and other materiel that he chose as long as they were destroyed. Walker, however, planned not to drop behind Pyongyang until the army and air force supply points in the city had been emptied and the port of
Chinnamp’o cleared. To provide time for the removal he ordered a half step to the rear, sending his forces south toward a semicircular line still above Pyongyang. While service troops rushed to evacuate supplies and equipment from the North Korean capital and port, line units reached the temporary line late on 3 December with no PVA interference beyond being harassed by North Korean guerrillas on the east flank. Walker meanwhile pushed reserves eastward onto Route 33, the next Pyongyang-Seoul road inland from Route 1, to protect his east flank and to guarantee an additional withdrawal route below Pyongyang. He deployed the 24th Infantry Division at Yul-li (), southeast of Pyongyang, and the partially restored ROK
II Corps at
Sin’gye in the
Yesong River valley another to the southeast. South and east of Sin’gye, units of the ROK
2nd and
5th Infantry Divisions previously had occupied Sibyon-ni () and
Yonch’on on Route 33,
P’och’on on Route 3, and
Ch’unch’on on Route 17 in the
Pukhan River valley during anti-guerrilla operations. Route 33 thus was protected at important road junctions, and Walker at least had the semblance of an east flank screen all the way from Pyongyang to Seoul. Walker moved the damaged US 2nd Infantry Division from
Chunghwa into army reserve at
Munsan-ni on the
Imjin River north of Seoul, where General
Laurence B. Keiser, with priority on replacements, was to rebuild his unit. But while Keiser's immediate and main task was to revive the 2nd Division, Walker wanted him also to reconnoiter as far as
Hwach’on, more than east of Munsan-ni, in case it became necessary to employ 2nd Division troops in those areas guarded by ROK units of doubtful ability. Walker attached the Turkish Brigade to the 2nd Division. Hurt less by casualties than by disorganization and equipment losses, the Turks had collected bit by bit at several locations, mostly at Pyongyang. On 2 December, after General
Yazıcı had recovered some 3500 of his original 5000 men, Walker ordered the brigade to
Kaesong, north of Munsan-ni, to complete refurbishing under Keiser's supervision as more of its members were located and returned. Walker held the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and its attachments in the Pyongyang area to protect his supply routes and installations. In preparation for the coming withdrawal south of the city, the airborne troops also were to keep civilians from moving over four pontoon bridges spanning the
Taedong River, two inside Pyongyang and another pair east of the city, and to take whatever other precautions were necessary to insure an uninterrupted flow of military traffic over the crossings. On 3 December, after receiving more reports of sizable PVA movements and concentrations east and northeast of the Eighth Army position, Walker anticipated not only a westward PVA push into Pyongyang but also a deeper thrust southwest through the Yesong valley and across the Eighth Army withdrawal routes in the vicinity of Sin’gye. Induced to haste by this possibility, he ordered his line units to drop behind Pyongyang beginning on the morning of the 4th, to a line curving eastward from
Kyomip’o on the lower bank of the Taedong to a point short of
Koksan in a subsidiary valley of the upper Yesong River. Walker warned them to be ready to withdraw another on the west and on the east to a line running from
Haeju on the coast north-eastward through Sin'gye, then eastward through
Ich'on in the Imjin River valley. The latter withdrawal would set Walker's rightmost units along the Yesong valley in fair position to delay a PVA strike through it and would eliminate concern for the Eighth Army's left flank, which, after the initial withdrawal below Pyongyang, would open on the large
Hwanghae peninsula southwest of Kyomip’o. In withdrawing south of Pyongyang, US
IX Corps, now with the US 24th Infantry Division attached, was to move on Route 33, occupy the right sector of the new army front, and reinforce the weak ROK II Corps in protecting the army east flank in the Yesong valley. US
I Corps was to withdraw to the west sector of the new line over Route 1 and, while passing through Pyongyang, destroy any abandoned materiel found within the city. I Corps’ demolition assignment was likely to be sizable. Aside from organizational and individual equipment lost by the line units, the only notable materiel losses since the PVA opened their offensive had been 1,400 tons of ammunition stored at
Sinanju and 500 tons at
Kunu-ri. But now Walker's forces were about to give up the locale of the Eighth Army's main forward stockpiles, and although the smaller stores at Chinnamp’o might be evacuated, it was less likely that the larger quantities brought into Pyongyang over the past several weeks could be completely removed on such short notice. The improbability of clearing the Pyongyang stocks was increased by the necessity to give priority on locomotives to trains carrying casualties and service units, by heavy demands on trucks for troop movements as well as for hauling materiel from supply point to railroad yard, and by the problems of loading and switching trains in congested yards that earlier had been severely damaged by UN air bombardment. With almost no PVA contact, Walker's forces moved south of Pyongyang within 24 hours. Much of the city was on fire by 07:30 on 5 December when the rearguards destroyed the last bridges over the Taedong and set off final demolitions in the section of Pyongyang below the river. Colonel Stebbins, Walker's G-4 who supervised the removal of materiel from Chinnamp’o and Pyongyang, would have preferred a slower move by 72 or even 48 hours. Given that additional time, Stebbins believed, the service troops could have removed most of the 8–10,000 tons of supplies and equipment that now lay abandoned and broken up or burning inside Pyongyang. More time also could have prevented such oversights as leaving at least 15 operable
M46 Patton tanks on flatcars in the railroad yards in the southwestern part of the city.
Fifth Air Force planes struck these overlooked tanks on 6 December, but differing pilot claims left obscure the amount of damage done. Although Chinnamp’o was exposed after early morning of the 5th, evacuation of the port continued until evening without harassment from PVA forces. Pressed only by time and the wide range of the
Yellow Sea tides, the port troops from 2 through 5 December loaded LSTs, transports of the Japanese merchant marine, a squadron of U.S. Navy troop and cargo transports, and at least 100 Korean sailboats. Aboard these craft went casualties, prisoners, and materiel sent from Pyongyang; the supplies and equipment on the ground around the port; the port service units themselves; and some thirty thousand refugees (most of them on the sailboats). Four American destroyers took station off Chinnamp’o, and aircraft from the British carrier appeared overhead on the 5th to protect the final outloading. That morning the port commander received word from Colonel Stebbins to get the last ships under way on the favorable tide at 17:00. The last three ships pulled away from the docks near that hour. Demolition crews set off their last explosives, and shortly afterward the last men ashore drove an amphibious truck out to a waiting ship. Some 2,000 tons of supplies and a few items of port equipment had had to be destroyed for lack of time to remove them. The men and materiel sea-lifted from Chinnamp’o were landed either at
Inchon (port personnel, rations, and petroleum products) or Pusan (patients, prisoners, and remaining supplies). Most of the stock evacuated from Pyongyang was shipped to depots at Kaesong and around Seoul. Some was kept forward aboard the railcars on which it had been loaded to institute a mobile system of meeting day-to-day requirements of the line units. These daily needs, mostly rations and petroleum products, were to be issued from the cars at railheads whose locations could be changed as rapidly as the line units withdrew. This system would reduce the likelihood of further materiel losses. The trace of the new army position vaguely resembled a question mark. I and IX Corps defenses between Kyomip'o and Yul-li formed the upper arc, IX Corps positions on the east flank from Yul-li southeastward to Sin'gye shaped the shank, and clumps of army reserves below Sin'gye supplied several dots. The figure traced was appropriate since Walker now had been out of meaningful contact with PVA forces for five days, had no clear idea of the location or movement of the main PVA body, and could only speculate on what the PVA commander could or intended to do next. In an attempt to fill the intelligence gap deriving from the withdrawals and the PVA slowness to follow, Walker on the 5th ordered I Corps commander General
Frank W. Milburn and IX Corps commander General
John B. Coulter to send strong reconnaissance patrols, including tanks, north as far as the Taedong River. But only the 1st Cavalry Division reported any noteworthy deep patrolling, on 6 December when two battalions sortied northeast up the Yesong valley and into
Kokson, where they fought a minor skirmish with KPA troops, and on 7 December when two companies made another, but uneventful, visit to the town. Most of Walker's information continued to come from agents and aerial observers. The latter reported on the 6th that PVA troops were moving into Chinnamp’o and south across the Taedong estuary by ferry to the Hwanghae peninsula. Agents on the same day verified the presence of PVA troops in Pyongyang and reported that KPA regulars were joining North Korean guerrillas to the east and right rear of the Eighth Army. To escape the trouble these reports portended, Walker instructed his forward units to withdraw on 8 December to the Haeju-Sin’gye-Ich’on line and to extend that line east to
Kumhwa. The west flank would again be anchored on the sea, and Walker's forces would be able to present a front instead of a flank to the KPA units reported gathering on the east. What now worried Walker most were the whereabouts and intentions of the PVA he previously had suspected were maneuvering into attack position just beyond his east flank. Because his forces at no time since 30 November had captured or even sighted a PVA soldier during the sporadic encounters along the army right, he was beginning to believe that all enemy troops immediately east of him were KPA. PVA forces, then, possibly were moving south, not into position for a close-in envelopment but around the Eighth Army some distance to the east through the X Corps’ rear area. Since Almond's forces were concentrating at Hamhung and Hungnam far to the northeast, any such march by the PVA would be unopposed, and if the PVA moved through the open area in strength, they possibly could occupy all of South Korea with little or no difficulty. Walker anyway granted the PVA this capability and against the possibility of such a sweep took steps on 6 December to deploy troops across the entire peninsula. He planned no static defense. His concept of fighting a delaying action without becoming heavily engaged remained unchanged except that he now would delay from pre-selected lines stretching coast to coast. As a preliminary, Walker obtained MacArthur's agreement to erase the southern segment of the Eighth Army-X Corps boundary so the peninsula below the
39th Parallel, more generally south of a line between Pyongyang and Wonsan. He also arranged air and naval surveillance of the east coast south of X Corps’ position to detect enemy coastal movements while he was extending his line. He chose coast-to-coast positions running from the mouth of the Yesong River, almost behind Haeju, northeastward through Sibyon-ni, southeast through
Ch'orwon and
Hwach'on, then eastward to
Yangyang on the
Sea of Japan. This line, later designated
Line A, was roughly long and at its most northerly point reached just above the 38th Parallel. Walker ordered five ROK Divisions, the two of ROK II Corps and three others then in central and southern Korea to occupy the eastern half of the line and to start moving into position immediately. I and IX Corps, scheduled eventually to man the western portion of
Line A, remained for the time being under orders to withdraw only as far as the Haeju-Kumhwa line.
UN Command Order Number 5 The apprehensions evident in Walker's appraisals and plans were apparent in Tokyo as well. MacArthur, although his main intention may have been to coax reinforcement, already had notified the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that the UN Command was too weak to make a successful stand when he informed them on 28 November that he was passing to the defensive. The Joint Chiefs fully approved MacArthur's adoption of defensive tactics, but were not convinced that a successful static defense was impossible. They suggested that MacArthur place the Eighth Army in a continuous line across Korea between Pyongyang and Wonsan. MacArthur objected, claiming such a line was too long for the forces available and that the logistical problems posed by the high, road-poor mountains then separating Eighth Army and X Corps were too great. By concentrating the X Corps in the Hamhung area, MacArthur countered, he was creating a "geographic threat" to enemy lines of communication that made it tactically unsound for PVA forces to move south through the opening between those units. In any event, he predicted, the Chinese already arrayed against the Eighth Army would compel it to take a series of steps to the rear. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed that X Corps’ concentration at Hamhung would produce the effect MacArthur anticipated. In their judgment, the Chinese already had demonstrated a proficiency for moving strong forces through difficult mountains, and the concentration of the X Corps on the east coast combined with the predicted further withdrawals of the Eighth Army would only widen the opening through which the Chinese could move. They again urged MacArthur to consolidate Eighth Army and X Corps sufficiently to prevent large enemy forces from passing between the two commands or outflanking either of them. But MacArthur defended his view of a Pyongyang-Wonsan line, pointing out that he and Walker already had agreed that Pyongyang could not be held and that the Eighth Army probably would be forced south at least as far as Seoul. Turning his reasoning in support of a request for ground reinforcements "of the greatest magnitude," he emphasized on 3 December that his present strength would allow him at most to prolong his resistance to the PVA by making successive withdrawals or by taking up "beachhead bastion positions" and that a failure to receive reinforcements portended the eventual destruction of his command. The response to MacArthur's estimate was as gloomy as his predictions. Prompted by earlier dismal reports to visit the Far East for a firsthand appraisal, Army Chief of Staff General
J. Lawton Collins informed MacArthur on 4 December that no reinforcement in strength, at least in the near future, was possible. The remaining Joint Chiefs meanwhile replied from Washington that preservation of the UN Command was now the guiding consideration and that they concurred in the consolidation of MacArthur's forces into beachheads. Beachhead sites that in varying degrees could facilitate a withdrawal from Korea were Hungnam and Wonsan for X Corps and Inchon and Pusan for the Eighth Army. Collins, while touring Korea between 4 and 6 December, heard Walker and Almond on the best beachheads and on how best to handle their respective commands. Almond believed that he could hold Hungnam indefinitely and wanted to stay there out of certainty that by doing so he could divert substantial Chinese strength from the Eighth Army front. Walker, on the other hand, believed the preservation of the Eighth Army required a deep withdrawal. Walker attempted to forestall any order to defend Seoul, insisting that tying his forces to the city would only allow the PVA to encircle Eighth Army and force a slow, costly evacuation through Inchon. He favored pulling back to Pusan, where once before he had broken the KPA offensive and where now, if reinforced by X Corps, Eighth Army might hold out indefinitely. MacArthur's G-3, General Wright, meanwhile recommended Pusan as the best beachhead for both the Eighth Army and X Corps on that grounds that should UN forces be compelled to leave Korea, they should leave the distinct impression of having delayed the enemy as long and as well as possible. Wright also pointed out that defending successive lines into the southeastern tip of the peninsula would afford UN air forces the greatest opportunity to hurt the PVA; further, if a withdrawal from Korea became necessary during the remaining winter months, MacArthur's command could escape extreme weather conditions at Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time could be effected faster through the Pusan facilities than through any other port. To permit the longest delaying action possible and to enable an evacuation from the best port, Wright recommended that X Corps be sea lifted from Hungnam as soon as possible and landed in southeastern Korea, that X Corps then join the Eighth Army and pass to Walker's command, and thereafter that the UN Command withdraw through successive positions, if necessary to the Pusan area. On 7 December in Tokyo, Generals MacArthur, Collins and
George Stratemeyer, Admirals
C. Turner Joy and
Arthur Dewey Struble and Lt. Gen.
Lemuel C. Shepherd, the commander of all United States Marine Corps forces in the Pacific, considered the various views generated during the week past and agreed on plans that embodied most of the recommendations of General Wright. MacArthur set these plans in effect on the 8th in CINCUNC (Commander in Chief, United Nations Command) Order Number 5. He listed nine lines to be defended by the Eighth Army, the southernmost based on the
Naktong River in the general area of the old
Pusan Perimeter. But he insisted that Walker not surrender Seoul until and unless an enemy maneuver unquestionably was about to block the Eighth Army's further withdrawal to the south. Related to this stipulation, four lines lay above Seoul, the last of which, resting on the Imjin River in the west and extending eastward to the coast, was MacArthur's first delineation of positions across the entire peninsula. Here the peninsula was somewhat narrower than in the Pyongyang-Wonsan region and offered a road net that could accommodate supply movements. Earlier pessimistic reports to Washington notwithstanding, MacArthur apparently believed that the Eighth Army and X Corps combined could man this line; indeed, he expected Walker to make an ardent effort to hold it. Through correspondence and interviews, MacArthur meanwhile had responded publicly to charges appearing in a substantial segment of the press that he was responsible for the reverse his forces were suffering at the hands of the Chinese. In defense of his strategy and tactics, he insisted that his command could not have fought more efficiently given the restrictions placed upon it by the policy of limiting hostilities to Korea. This criticism of administration policy rankled President
Harry Truman, particularly because MacArthur voiced it publicly and frequently enough to lead "many people abroad to believe that our government would change its policy." Truman issued instructions on 5 December by which he intended to insure that information made public by an executive branch official was "accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government." Specifically applicable to MacArthur, "Officials overseas, including military commanders, were to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States." The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the president's instructions to MacArthur on 6 December.
Eighth Army withdrawal to Line B On 7 December MacArthur had radioed a warning to both Walker and Almond of the next day's order for successive withdrawals, the defense of Seoul short of becoming entrapped, and the assignment of X Corps to the Eighth Army. So guided, Walker on the 8th laid out
Line B, which duplicated
Line A eastward from Hwach’on but in the opposite direction fell off to the southwest to trace the lower bank of the Imjin and
Han Rivers, some behind the Yesong River. This line was at least shorter than
Line A and matched the northernmost coast-to-coast line designated by MacArthur, and now became the line toward which Walker began to move his forces for the defense of Seoul. On 11 December MacArthur made his first visit to Korea since he had watched the start of the
Home by Christmas Offensive on 24 November. He was now on the peninsula for a firsthand view of the Eighth Army and X Corps after their setbacks at the hands of the PVA and for personal conferences with Walker and Almond on the steps the two line commanders had taken or planned to take in carrying out the maneuvers and command change he had ordered three days before. When MacArthur reached Walker's headquarters (having first stopped in northeastern Korea to confer with Almond), he was able to see not only the Eighth Army plan for withdrawing to
Line B but also Walker's plans in case the Eighth Army again was squeezed into the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Reviving an unused plan developed by the Eighth Army staff in September, Walker reestablished not only the Naktong River defenses but also three lines between the old perimeter and Pusan, each arching between the south coast and east coast around the port. Nearer Pusan, the
Davidson Line curved northeastward from a south coast anchor at
Masan; next southeast, the
Raider Line stretched from the south coast resort town of
Chinhae; and just outside the port, the
Pusan Line arched from the mouth of the Naktong. Walker instructed
2nd Logistical Command commander General Garvin to fortify these lines using Korean labor and all other means and manpower available within his command. On the day following MacArthur's visit Walker established two more lettered lines.
Line C followed the lower bank of the Han River just below Seoul, curved northeast to
Hongch’on, below Hwach’on, then reached almost due east to the coast at
Wonpo-ri, behind Yangyang. Line D, next south, ran from a west coast anchor below Seoul northeast through the towns of
Pyongtaek,
Ansong,
Changhowon-ni and
Wonju to Wonpo-ri. These lines were to be occupied if and when enemy pressure forced the Eighth Army to give up Seoul, but before any deep withdrawal as far as the Naktong was required. Amid this contingency planning and through 22 December Walker gradually pulled his forward units south and pushed ROK forces north into positions generally along
Line B. US I and IX Corps, withdrawing over Routes 1 and 33, bounded in three-day intervals through the Haeju-Kumhwa line and
Line A toward sectors along the western third of
Line B. The withdrawal was uncontested except for minor encounters with KPA troops on IX Corps’ east flank, but thousands of refugees moving with and trailing the two Corps had to be turned off the main roads lest they block the withdrawal routes. By 23 December both Corps occupied stable positions in their new sectors. I Corps, with two divisions and a brigade, stood along Route 1 along the lower banks of the Han and the Imjin; IX Corps, with two divisions, blocked Routes 33 and 3 right at the 38th Parallel. Spreading ROK forces along the remainder of the line proved more frustrating. Transportation requirements exceeded available trucks: resistance from KPA troops in the central region slowed the ROK; and general confusion among the sketchily trained ROK units caused further delay. But by 23 December Walker managed to get ROK
III Corps up from southern Korea and, with three divisions, emplaced in a central sector adjoining IX Corps on the east. The ROK front lay below
Line B, almost exactly on the 38th Parallel, with its center located about north of Ch’unch’on. In more rugged ground next east, ROK II Corps occupied a narrow one division front astride Route 24, which passed southwestward through the
Hongch’on River valley. II Corps thus blocked what otherwise could provide PVA/KPA forces easy access south through central Korea over Route 29 and to lateral routes leading west to the Seoul area. By 20 December ROK I Corps had been sea lifted in increments out of northeastern Korea, landed at Pusan and near
Samch’ok close to the east coast anchor of
Line B, and transferred to Eighth Army control. Walker immediately committed ROK I Corps to defend the eastern end of the army line. By the 23rd ROK I Corps, with two divisions, occupied scattered positions blocking several mountain tracks and the east coast road. Regardless of his success in stretching forces across the peninsula, Walker lacked confidence in the line he had built. His defenses were shallow and there were gaps. He mainly mistrusted the ROK forces along the eastern two-thirds of the line. He doubted that they would hold longer than momentarily against a strong PVA/KPA attack, and, should they give way, his forces above Seoul in the west would be forced to follow suit. It was to meet this particular contingency that he had established
Lines C and
D on 12 December. On the 15th he extended his effort by dispatching the 1st Cavalry Division out along the connected Routes 2-18-17 northeast of Seoul as added protection against any strike at the capital city from the direction of Ch’unch’on. The same day, he began moving his army headquarters less a small group to remain in Seoul, south to
Taegu. He already had directed the removal of major supply stores located in or above Seoul to safer positions below the Han River and had ordered the reduction of stocks held in the Inchon port complex. On the 18th he assigned Corps' boundaries along
Line C and described the deployment of army reserve units to cover a withdrawal to this first line below Seoul. Two days later he ordered the still-weak US 2nd Infantry Division, which by then had stepped back from Munsan-ni to Yongdungp’o, a suburb of Seoul just below the Han, to move to the town of
Ch’ungju, some southeast of Seoul. From there the division was to be ready to move against any PVA/KPA force breaking through ROK lines in central or eastern Korea and was to protect the flank of Walker's western forces in any withdrawal prompted by such a thrust. Keiser in the meantime had been evacuated because of illness, and Major general
Robert B. McClure now commanded the 2nd Infantry Division. To MacArthur, the elaborate preparations for a withdrawal below Seoul indicated that Walker had decided against a determined defense of the city. When MacArthur raised the question, Walker assured him that he would hold Seoul as long as he could. But, Walker pointed out, sudden collapses of ROK forces twice before had placed the Eighth Army in jeopardy. Nor had the ROK shown any increased stability even after strenuous efforts to improve it. If, as he suspected, the ROK units now along the eastern two-thirds of
Line B failed to stand against an attack, his positions north of Seoul could not be held and the then necessary withdrawal would have to be made over an obstacle, the Han River. In Walker's mind these two dangers, of another sudden ROK collapse and of making a river crossing in a withdrawal, made his extensive preparations a matter of "reasonable prudence." Walker also was convinced that the PVA/KPA were now capable of opening an offensive at any time. He still had no solid contact with PVA/KPA forces, but by pressing intelligence sources over the previous two weeks he had obtained sufficient evidence to predict an imminent attack and to forecast the strength, paths, objective, and even possible date of the next blow. Between 8 and 14 December Walker caught a southeastward shift of the KPA
II Corps, the bulk of which previously had been concentrated in and operating as a guerrilla force out of the mountains between Koksan and Inchon. Apparently having retaken regular status, the Corps paralleled the Eighth Army's southeastern withdrawals below Pyongyang. As Walker's forces spread out along
Line B, the KPA Corps followed suit, occupying positions just above the 38th Parallel in the central sector, principally between Yonch’on in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor and Hwach’on, due north of Ch’unch’on. It also seemed that earlier reports of reconstituted KPA units joining the II Corps were correct. Several renewed KPA divisions apparently had assembled immediately behind the II Corps to make a total strength of 65,000 plausible for the KPA troops directly opposite the Eighth Army's central sector as of 23 December. As late as 17 December Walker was still completely out of contact with PVA forces and by the 23rd had encountered only a few, these in the I and IX Corps sectors in the west. General Partridge, who had shifted the emphasis of Fifth Air Force operations to armed reconnaissance and interdiction about the time Walker had given up Pyongyang, was able to verify that PVA forces had moved south in strength from the Ch'ongch'on battlefields, but not how far. Until mid-December his fighter pilots and light bomber crews discovered and attacked large troop columns moving openly in daylight over main and secondary roads between the Ch’ongch’on and Pyongyang. But then, to escape Partridge's punishing attacks, the PVA reverted to their strict practices of concealment and camouflage and halted virtually all daytime movement. Walker, consequently, had no clear evidence that the main body of the PVA XIII Army Group had moved any farther south than Pyongyang. But on the basis of repeated reports from agents and air observers that PVA troops and supplies were moving southeastward from Pyongyang, by the 23rd he considered it possible that three or four Chinese armies with about 150,000 troops were bunched within a day's march of the Eighth Army's central front. This possibility brought the estimate of enemy strength above Walker's central positions to 180,000. Furthermore, Walker judged, these troops could be reinforced by any units of the PVA XIII Army Group remaining in the Pyongyang area within four to eight days and by the PVA/KPA units currently operating in the X Corps sector within six to ten days. To Walker, the apparent concentration and disposition of PVA/KPA forces opposite his central front clearly suggested offensive preparations in which KPA II Corps was screening the assembly of assault forces and supplies. Small KPA attacks below Yonch’on and from Hwach’on toward Ch’unch’on seemed designed to search out weaknesses in the Eighth Army line in those areas and indicated the possibility of a converging attack on Seoul south along Route 33 and southwest over the road from Ch’unch’on. A likely date for opening such an attack, because of a possible psychological advantage to the attackers, was Christmas Day. Walker's largest hope of holding Seoul for any length of time in these circumstances rested on the arrival of the remainder of X Corps from northeastern Korea. Once he had Almond's forces in hand, Walker planned to insert them in the Ch’unch’on sector now held by the untried ROK III Corps. This move would place American units along the Ch’unch’on-Seoul axis, one of the more likely PVA/KPA approaches in an attack to seize Seoul. Whether X Corps would be available soon enough depended first on how closely Walker had estimated the opening date of the threatening PVA/KPA offensive and second on how long it would take Almond to get his forces out of northeastern Korea and to refurbish them for employment under the Eighth Army.
Withdrawal of X Corps from northeast Korea Following the earlier decision to concentrate X Corps forces at Hungnam, the evacuation of Wonsan had begun on 3 December. In a week's time, without interference from PVA/KPA forces, the US 3rd Infantry Division task force and a Marine Corps shore party group totaling some 3,800 troops loaded themselves, 1,100 vehicles, 10,000 tons of other cargo, and 7,000 refugees aboard transport ships and
LSTs provided by Admiral Doyle's
Task Force 90. One LST sailed north on the 9th to Hungnam, where its Marine shore party passengers were to take part in the forthcoming sealift. The remaining ships steamed for Pusan on the 9th and 10th. On 8 December 1950 Almond received MacArthur's order to evacuate X Corps through Hungnam. The Task Force 90 ships dispatched to Songjin on 5 December to pick up the tail-end troops of ROK I Corps meanwhile had reached their destination and by noon on 9 December had taken aboard the ROK 3rd Infantry Division (less the 26th Regiment, which withdrew to Hungnam as rearguard for the ROK 7th Infantry Division; the division headquarters, division artillery and 18th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division; and some 4,300 refugees. On 10 and 11 December the convoy from Songjin anchored at Hungnam only long enough to unload the Capital Division's headquarters and artillery for employment in the perimeter and to take aboard an advance party of the ROK I Corps headquarters before proceeding to its new destination. On 9 December, Almond alerted his forces for a "withdrawal by water and air without delay from Hungnam area to Pusan-
Pohang-dong area." The larger exodus was to be by sea, with the Hungnam defenses contracting as Corps' forces were loaded, but airlift was to be employed for as long as Yonpo Airfield remained within the shrinking perimeter. The evacuation began on 12 December with the 1st Marine Division boarding ships and sailing for Pusan on 15 December, they assembled at Masan on 18 December and passed to Eighth Army control. The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment was evacuated by air from Yonpo Airfield on 15 December. The US 7th Infantry Division began loading on 14 December and most of the Division was on board by 16 December. On 17 December ROK I Corps was embarked and it landed at
Samch'ok on 20 December passing to Eighth Army command. Also on 17 December an X Corps advance headquarters opened at
Kyongju and Yonpo Airfield was abandoned as the perimeter shrank. From 18 to 20 December the US 3rd Division relieved the remaining 7th Division units on the perimeter and Almond moved his command post aboard
USS Mount McKinley. By 23 December the US 3rd Division withdrew to their last phase lines and the next day the evacuation was completed and the port facilities of Hungnam destroyed. In addition to the UN forces, over 98,100 Korean civilians had been evacuated from Hungnam, Wonsan and Songjin. ==Aftermath==