Unit cohesion is a military concept dating back to at least
Carl von Clausewitz, if not to
antiquity. Several scholars have cited the influence of
Sigmund Freud's thinking on theories of unit cohesion. A number of them noted that Freud wrote of
cohesion breakdown among
soldiers, asserting that it leads to
panic,
insubordination, self-interested rather than
cooperative reactions to threats, and "a gigantic and senseless dread". The later development of the concept is strongly informed by the work of
Morris Janowitz, who, with
Edward Shils, began writing on the topic in the late 1940s. Janowitz continued to work in this area in his
sociological work, as the disruptive policy of frequently rotating individual soldiers and
officers during the
Vietnam War came under scrutiny as a large factor behind low
morale. Following the studies of several
World War II armies, sociologists concluded that
comradely ties between small combat units is a decisive factor in providing good morale, cohesion, and organization framework. The defeat of the Western forces by the poorly equipped
Chinese People's Liberation Army in the
Korean War in 1950 further generated interest on the role of "human elements" on modern
battlefields. Although Western armies traditionally created ties between soldiers through informal means such as
teamwork or shared hardships instilled by
military discipline, the Chinese army relied on formal methods to assimilate recruits into their units. The assimilation process involved features such as
coercive persuasion,
surveillance, and
political control, while
military ranks and physical punishments were abolished to allow closer relations between officers and soldiers. The stringent assimilation methods allowed the Chinese to create high morale and cohesion compared to the Western forces. However, high casualty rates and the lack of modern equipment later resulted in a significant erosion of morale and cohesion as the Korean War dragged on. One of the worst cases of this erosion was the partial disintegration of the Chinese army during the spring offensive in May 1951. In the late 1980s, one researcher stated that, regardless of whether unit cohesion was an actual
motivator or merely a stabilizer, what mattered was that unit cohesion "enhanced fighting power", because it reduced "combat inhibitors (stress, fear, isolation)" and promoted "
esprit de corps, morale and teamwork". Other research has, however, concluded that there is value in distinguishing the components of
social cohesion and "[t]ask cohesion ... the commitment to working together on a shared goal", since some studies conclude that unit
effectiveness correlates strongly with task cohesion, not with social cohesion. One U.S. military researcher has drawn a distinction between teamwork and unit cohesion—claiming teamwork as being merely "
collaboration", while unit cohesion involves a bond that can sustain mutual commitment, not just to the mission, but to each other, and to the group as a whole. This added bond, he argued, enabled teamwork under conditions under which an organization might otherwise break down. ==New uses of unit cohesion in research==