Shortly after the Grenfell fire, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) established the
Building Safety Programme. In the short term, this scheme sought to identify and remediate buildings with unsafe cladding. The problems that it variously exposed, compounded, and remedied constitute the cladding crisis. The programme is, longer-term, leading to a new regulatory framework for building safety, a Building Safety Bill, and a new Building Safety Regulator. In June 2020, the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee estimated that thoroughly remediating fire safety defects in UK buildings over 18 metres alone might cost around £15 billion.
ACM cladding attends a false alarm at
Greenhouse (Leeds), a building with a waking watch from August 2020 to February 2021. The type of cladding that first drew attention was the specific kind used on Grenfell Tower,
aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding. Scottish building regulations and planning law had prevented the extensive use of ACM cladding. While Welsh and Northern Irish law was similar to English, Wales had relatively few examples of ACM-clad high-rises, and by December 2018 had arranged remediation of them all, at the expense of the developers or building owners rather than leaseholders. In England, however, the Government had by 30 November 2019 identified 446 residential and publicly owned buildings over 18 metres in height 'with ACM cladding systems unlikely to meet Building Regulations' of the kind used on Grenfell Tower. At that time, 127 had completed remediation works, mostly social-sector and student accommodation blocks. It was estimated at that time that the remaining buildings comprised up to 23,600 flats and were inhabited by around 56,000 people. As of January 2021, the Government had identified 461 residential and publicly owned buildings in the same category; by that time, 329 had at least removed the cladding, including 231 that had completed remediation works, mostly social-sector and student accommodation blocks. Although reporting focused on residential buildings, other types were also affected, such as the 52-bed trauma unit at the
John Radcliffe Hospital,
Oxford, which closed temporarily due to concerns over flammable cladding on the building and other "serious and embedded" fire safety issues. It was also immediately apparent that some buildings had fire-safety issues other than cladding. For example, in August 2017, four 13-storey tower blocks built in 1968 to 1970, containing 242 flats, on the Ledbury estate in Peckham had their gas supplies cut off as a precaution: in the event of a gas explosion, they could be at risk of collapse, since they used the same "large panel system" as
Ronan Point that had partly collapsed in May 1968 after a small gas explosion in a flat knocked out a
load-bearing exterior wall.
Wider problems , found similar problems in seven other buildings. Investigations in the wake of the Grenfell Tower inferno, the
Barking Riverside fire in June 2019, and the Bolton Cube fire in November 2019 (which enveloped a building under 18 metres tall, which used combustible materials other than ACM cladding) led to the realisation that far more UK buildings than the ACM-clad ones were not fire-safe, partly due to materials being marketed as meeting regulations which in fact did not, and partly due to builders' failures to comply with regulations in design and construction. Problems included the combustibility of other cladding materials such as
high-pressure laminate, combustible balconies, lack of
firebreaks in the cavities between walls and insulation, non-regulation-compliant firedoors, and a wide range of other problems. In June 2020, the UK government offered what the trade magazine
Inside Housing characterised as 'a very loose estimate of 1,700 buildings' in England alone which were over 18 metres and high-risk, requiring urgent remediation, despite the ACM-remediation works that had taken place up to that time. The Parliamentary Housing Committee noted that a further 9,600 buildings were likely to have combustible cladding. The scheme has drawn criticism for failing to address those living in buildings under 11 meters. ==Short-term responses==