. The scale of mobilisation for war is best measured by the proportion of GDP devoted to the war effort, which was 7.4% in 1938, 15.3% in 1939, 43.8% in 1940, 52.7% in 1941, 55.3% in 1943 (peaked figure) and 53.4% in 1944. The wartime net losses in British national wealth amounted to 18.6% (£4.595 billion) of the pre-war wealth (£24.68 billion), at 1938 prices.
Finance In six years of war, there was a net inflow of £10 billion. Of this £1.1 billion came from the sale of investments; £3.5 billion was made up of new borrowing, of which £2.7 billion was contributed by the Empire's Sterling Area. Canada
made C$3 billion in gifts and loans on easy terms. Above all came the American money, and loans and Lend Lease grants of £5.4 billion. This funded heavy purchases of munitions, food, oil, machinery and raw materials. There was no charge for Lend Lease supplies delivered during the war. There was a charge for supplies delivered after September 2, 1945. Britain's borrowing from India and other countries measured by "sterling balances" amounted to £3.4 billion in 1945. Britain treated this as a long-term loan with no interest and no specified repayment date. The British treasury was nearly empty by 1945. When the war began Britain imposed
exchange controls. The British Government used its
gold reserves and dollar reserves to pay for munitions, oil, raw materials and machinery, mostly from the U.S. By the third quarter of 1940 the volume of British exports was down 37% compared to 1935. Although the British Government had committed itself to nearly $10,000 million of orders from America, Britain's gold and dollar reserves were near exhaustion. The Roosevelt Administration was committed to large-scale economic support of Britain and in March 1941 began
Lend-Lease, whereby America would give Britain supplies totalling $31.4 billion which did not have to be repaid. The government and the public opinion in the early months were preoccupied with inflationary dangers.
Industry When war broke out in 1939, Great Britain, as an island nation, was dependent on goods imported by sea for many of its supplies. The days of significant air cargo traffic had yet to arrive but would have been equally vulnerable to enemy attack. Although the term was not used in those days, there was an immediate recourse to recycling to conserve scarce resources. Garden railings were removed for their scrap metal and aluminium kitchen saucepans were collected for their potential in the aircraft industry. Whilst there may have been undue optimism of some of the benefits, nevertheless, the whole population was involved in a practical way in contributing to the war effort. David Edgerton has emphasised the success story in producing munitions at home and using the
Empire and the U.S. to build a very large high quality stock of weapons. Industrial production was reoriented toward munitions, and output soared. In steel, for example, the Materials Committee of the government tried to balance the needs of civilian departments and the War Department, but strategic considerations received precedence over any other need. Highest priority went to aircraft production as the RAF was under continuous heavy German pressure. The government decided to concentrate on only five types of aircraft in order to optimise output. They received extraordinary priority. Covering the supply of materials and equipment and even made it possible to divert from other types the necessary parts, equipment, materials and manufacturing resources. Labour was moved from other aircraft work to factories engaged on the specified types. Cost was not an object. The delivery of new fighters rose from 256 in April to 467 in September 1940—more than enough to cover the losses—and Fighter Command emerged triumphantly from the Battle of Britain in October with more aircraft than it had possessed at the beginning. Starting in 1941 the U.S. provided munitions through Lend lease that totalled $15.5 billion promoted English agriculture and the "
Dig for Victory" campaign
Rural economies Before the war Britain imported 70% of its food. Home agricultural production increased 35% during the war. In terms of calories, domestic output nearly doubled. Together with imports and rationing, this meant the British were well-fed, they ate less meat (down 36% by 1943) and more wheat (up 81%) and potatoes (up 96%). Farmers increased the area under cultivation from , and the farm labour force was expanded by a fifth, thanks especially to the
Women's Land Army. Farm women had expanded duties, with the young men absent at war. They were helped by prisoners of war from Italy and Germany. The Women's Land Army recruited tens of thousands of young women from urban areas for paid labour on farms that needed them, at about 30 shillings a week. Wages for available male farmworkers trebled during the war to £3 a week. One new speciality was harvesting timber, for which the government set up the
Women's Timber Corps, a branch of the Women's Land Army that operated 1942-46. For city and urban residents, the government promoted
Victory Gardens that grew vegetables, fruits, and herbs. About 1.4 million allotments were made; they took some of the pressure off the food rationing system and boosted civilian morale. Franklin Ginn peels away complex layers of meaning beyond growing some food. Participants were not randomly digging; they were promoting self-sufficiency, imposing control over the domestic sphere, and exhibiting patriotism in working for the common good of winning the war. There were sharply different gender roles and class experiences; gardening had been a favourite elite hobby and the upper-class women helping out knew what they were doing. The much touted statistics of additional food production were designed to foster general confidence in the progress of the war, not just the progress of plants.
Rationing Rationing was designed to provide minimum standards of essential consumption for the entire population, to reduce waste, to reduce trans-Atlantic shipping usage (and so free up shipping for war material), and to make possible the production of more war supplies with less variety. The theme of equality of sacrifice was paramount. Just before the war began Britain was importing 20,000,000 long tons of food per year, including about 70% of its cheese and sugar, nearly 80% of fruits and about 70% of cereals and fats. The UK also imported more than half of its meat, and relied on imported feed to support its domestic meat production. The civilian population of the country was about 50 million. It was one of the principal strategies of the Germans in the
Battle of the Atlantic to attack shipping bound for Britain, restricting British industry and potentially starving the nation into submission. To deal with sometimes extreme shortages, the
Ministry of Food instituted a system of
rationing. To buy most rationed items, each person had to register at chosen shops, and was provided with a ration book containing coupons that were only valid at that shop. The shopkeeper was provided with enough food for registered customers. Purchasers had to take ration books with them when shopping, so that the relevant coupon or coupons could be cancelled.
Trade unions Unions became well represented in the war cabinet after
Winston Churchill came to power in May 1940. He appointed
Ernest Bevin, the general secretary of the
Transport and General Workers' Union, as the
Minister of Labour and National Service Furthermore other Labour Party leaders shared power equally with Conservatives. Trade unions gave strong cooperation to the war effort and at first strikes were minimized. Union membership grew by a third from 1938, to 8.2 million in 1943. According to historian
Margaret Gowing, the mobilization of Britain's workforce to meet enormous wartime demands in munitions production came in three distinct phases. In the initial phase leading up to May 1940, efforts to mobilize manpower were largely ineffective and fell short of meeting the nation's escalating labour demands. The second phase (spring 1940 - mid-1943) witnessed a remarkably efficient organization and deployment of both men and women into essential roles across key industries and vital government services. This period marked the pinnacle of Britain's manpower mobilization capabilities.. With victory in sight, from mid-1943 onward, Britain's capacity to sustain its war effort became increasingly constrained by the shortage of additional manpower reserves to draw upon. Strike activity now became a major concern. Although illegal, there were 1,800 strikes in 1943, costing 1.8 million working days. Coal strikes accounted for much of the inaction. With millions of men in uniform, Britain had reached the limits of its available civilian workforce. Overall, the government grappled with the immense challenge of effectively marshaling its human resources to meet the unprecedented labour requirements imposed by a total war. ==Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland==