Three days after the attack of
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese occupied the
Gilbert Islands, and built a seaplane base on
Makin that provided a token defense of
Tarawa. They left a small number of Japanese Coastwatchers on
Apamama, along with a few other atolls, to observe Allied forces in the
South Pacific. Aerial photography, submarine periscope photography and hydrographic reconnaissance by recon Marines and Navy UDT teams became part of the array of intelligence assets that were worked into the operation plan for the invasion. At the time, periscope photography was still new. Only a few ship captains had made single shots of sinkings, but Admiral Turner and General Smith were in need of more detailed and definitively located photographs of the beaches arranged in precise panoramic sequence. These would show enemy machine-gun and anti-boat gun emplacements as well as the locations of topographic features. Aerial photographs would be used in conjunction to provide a detailed
photo interpretation. Undoubtedly the most significant employment of reconnaissance in World War II occurred at Tinian. Far more important than the reputations which hung in the balance among the very top planners, were the thousands of lives undoubtedly saved as a direct result of reconnaissance efforts. Pre-D-Day reconnaissance was limited because of Vice Admiral Turner. He was cautious about acknowledging Saipan as the main initial target. Also, he had also declined all pre-D-Day amphibious reconnaissance at Tarawa, which in hindsight, led to the controversial topic of whether his lack of prepared pre-D-day amphibious reconnaissance contributed to the high casualty rate of Marines. The seizure of the
Ogasawara archipelago and the
Volcano Islands were outlined in the
OCTAGON Conference in September 1944 between U.S. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill and the
Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff. Due to
General Douglas MacArthur's landing on
Leyte, it made modifications to the Combined JCS initial directive for General MacArthur to further seize
Luzon on the targeted date of December 1944 and
Admiral Chester Nimitz to provide cover and naval support by seizing the
Bonin Islands, or the lesser
Volcano Islands, on or about January 20, 1945 and
Okinawa in the
Ryukyu Islands on or about March 1, 1945. Admiral Nimitz chose
Iwo Jima instead of
ChiChi Jima for seizure, the largest islet in the
Volcano Islands. He acknowledged that it would provide airfields for the
P-51 Mustangs, to escort the
B-29 Bombers for bombing
Tokyo on
mainland Japan, traveling north from the newly acquired airbases on the islands of
Saipan and
Tinian. The operation of Iwo Jima, codenamed DETACHMENT, was given to Admiral Spruance and
RAdm Hill by Admiral Nimitz. Iwo Jima was going to be the only major battle for 5th Marine Division, Task Force 56 (Expeditionary Troops) as a division-in-whole during World War II; however, half of the new 5th Division was formed by the enlisted Marines from prior engagements from other units. Iwo Jima was the most heavily fortified island in the Japanese defenses, making it the bloodiest and costliest campaign in Marine Corps history. With news that the United States was delayed in the Iwo Jima operation, due to the support of Luzon and the campaigns in the
Marianas, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity in reinforcing their strength by attaching the
109th Infantry Division and adding heavier beach-defense weapons, artillery and tanks.
Emperor Hirohito himself selected
Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, a brilliant battle-hardened cavalry officer, as its commander. The
US Navy lost on average of one-and-a-half ships daily, also making it the costliest naval involvement in the history of sea warfare. Night offensive action by the amphib recon Marines, not the normal practice during the earlier actions of World War II, was emphasized during the Okinawan campaign as the Marines conducted 21 night patrols and attacks, 13 of which were by the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion.
The Gilbert Islands On September 13, 1943, when Jones arrived to VAC in Hawaii, he was handed further orders stamped CONFIDENTIAL to report to the large, mine-laying
submarine for temporary duty on September 15, 1943: :"Pursuant to authority which may not be quoted herein, you will stand detached from Marine Barracks, Camp Elliott... on September 10, 1943... reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, for permanent duty beyond the seas."' —Orders from Rear Echelon to James L. Jones Jones and
Army Captain D. L. Newman reported to the commanding officer of the submarine ,
Commander William D. Irwin, on September 16, 1943, at the submarine base in
Pearl Harbor during their
Sixth War Patrol—Charles Momsen, letter to Chief of Naval Personnel On October 16, 1943, USS
Nautilus returned to Pearl Harbor after eighteen days of periscope photography and briefings were begun to prepare the company for their first mission in the
Apamama Atoll (codename BOXCLOTH),
General Holland M. Smith conceived the concept of operations, reasoning that it would be best to land scouts on the main island of the Apamama Atoll by submarine to reconnoiter enemy positions before committing any sizable force. According to the Marines on board the submarine, they clarified that it was a six-inch shell after examining it while they were back at Pearl Harbor. Thus it had to be from the main battery of the
Santa Fe. Nonetheless, water deluged down into the
conning tower hatch, the
gyroscope ceased to function, the main induction was flooded, and only immediate application of efficient damage control averted serious trouble. The submarine dove to 300 feet to make necessary repairs, although there was no place itself to hide from the averted dangers from the two ships' friendly fire. It didn't severely hinder the submarine;
Nautilus continued southbound through the night en route to
Apamama, the company's first combat reconnaissance mission. Apamama became perhaps the only atoll in history to be captured from a submarine. Codenames were given by the planners for the seizure of Apamama, each a word for the six islets. STEVE for main Apamama Island, forming the northern and most northeastern part of the atoll, and going clockwise; OSCAR, OTTO, ORSON, JOHN, and lastly JOE, which was adjacent to the mouth of the lagoon where Entrance Island is located. Their orders were to scout out the islands by using the cover of darkness; to determine the strength of the defending Japanese forces and select potential beaches for a planned landing for an occupying American force which was following in a few days. Each man was handed three
K-rations, one
D-ration, and two
fragmentation grenades. There were 45 rounds for each
M1 carbine, 48 rounds for each
M1 Garand rifle, 260 rounds for the
M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (or BAR), and 2000 rounds for each
M1919 Browning machine gun as well as eight
511 SCR radio sets, two TBX-8 radio sets (that were similarly used by the
Navajo Code Talkers), two blinder guns, six sets of
semaphore flags and four 14" x 26" panels. Only able to start four outboard motors out of the six, they cruised towards JOHN. About halfway, two more outboard motors had quit and the Marines ended up towing and paddling the others to shore. Running into
squalls and fierce currents, two boats of Marines disappeared into the darkness while Marines on the others frantically paddled to avoid the razor sharp coral reef. The wind subsided about an hour later and the two missing boats joined the column as they rendezvoused 400 yards off the reef. At 0330 they landed; by then the men were already exhausted and torn up by the coral. While the beachhead was being secured and coded panels emplaced to communicate to the submarine, Captain Jones immediately sent three platoons out at 0530 as a reconnaissance-in-force around the west end of JOE Island. Lieutenant Corey went north to the lagoon shore with his 4th Platoon. Lt. Minnear took his 2nd Platoon west towards the western end of the small island. The two natives informed Hand that the Japanese were entrenched in force around a radio station on OTTO, one islet away. They described the Japanese defenses as being reinforced positions using coconut logs and reported that their weapons included two light machine guns, one heavy machine gun, rifles, bayonets, pistols and hand grenades. Also, there were twenty-five
Japanese Marines, fewer than the number of the United States Marines, but were well dug in and "had plenty of ammunition". Also, they also informed Lt. Hand that the Japanese knew they [Americans] were on the island and were in preparation. They remained in the vicinity of the boat to keep it under surveillance; the patrol divided, the second and third platoons moving south along the reef passage to the southeast tip of JOE Island. Shinn returned to the CP and reported his findings. Jones dispatched 1st Lt. Russell Corey's 3rd Platoon at noon to put the Japanese barge out of commission without permanently disabling it by removing the spark plugs from the engine and made accelerator adjustments. The barge was the only means for the Japanese to escape to the north. The Marines moved out along the road to the boat in a staggered squad column with point and flankers. About two hundred yards away, a Japanese patrol of three men were encountered who were already at the barge. Under fire, Corey's BAR man, Pvt Homer J. Powers, killed one with an offhand shot while the other two escaped into a nearby grove. Back at the command post (CP), a new word came in from the natives that the Japanese had gathered all their weapons and were moving rapidly to the barge site. At 1300, Captain Jones with all available Marines, First and Second Platoons, moved out to join Lt. Corey and the light machine gun section (who had just put the boat out of commission) at the road junction just west of Kabangak Village, to interdict the Japanese at the barge. Corey's 3rd Platoon joined Jones with the 1st and 2nd Platoons at 1400. The Japanese obviously passed through Kabangak village on JOHN, learned of Jones's presence, turned around and returned to OTTO to reoccupy their prepared defensive positions. Captain Jones began a reconnaissance-in-force, moving across ORSON, the island just south of OTTO, occupied by the Japanese. While en route contact was made with large numbers of natives leaving their villages for the groves. A Catholic Mission was reached by 1550 and the five white missionaries, three French Roman Catholic priests and two Australian nuns, verified the natives' information concerning the Japanese positions and strength. The Apamama natives informed Jones of a sandspit at the tip of OTTO opposite the mission, running northwest from ORSON, from which the Marines would be able to observe the lagoon (western) flank of the Japanese defenders, and to avoid crossing the bridge that connected the two islands, OTTO and ORSON. As Jones moved his entire company of Marines across the reef to the tip of the sandspit on ORSON, Japanese rose from higher terrain to the north of the advancing Marines and opened fire with light machine guns. One Marine killed one of the defenders at one hundred yards. When the lead elements of the company had advanced 250 yards up the sandspit, the company came under a barrage of fire from a nest of light machine guns emplaced from their eastern (right) flank, the coconut log positions on the south end of OTTO. The Marines found themselves in an unfavorable position for an attack and could not locate the position of the machine gun, while under fire with only one hour of daylight left and facing a rising tide, which was due to come in another hour. It would force the Marines to remain on the sand spit all night from where it would have been impossible to contact the submarine. Jones broke off contact and withdrew his company to the northern beach of ORSON. Also in the excitement, Lieutenants Corey and Shinn marched to the lagoon and surveyed the horizon with binoculars and spotted several objects which appeared and resembled ships. Due to the changing conditions of the visibility of atmospheric changes, they seemed to disappear and reappear. Corey and Shinn radioed the information to Captain Jones. Jones and his Marines standing by were convinced; after careful and lengthy observance, a native was called over and interrogated and it was learned that the objects were a beacon and several lone palm trees on the islets on the opposite side of the lagoon. These rounds would burst from the air as they would hit the palm fronds at the top of the coconut palms. This proved effective for the Japanese that were in the open but not for any Japanese seeking shelter in their coconut log bunkers.
The Marshall Islands Planning in the
Gilbert Islands was successful but highly costly during
Operation GALVANIC. In December 1943, a modified plan was made to neutralize the inessential islands in the
Marshall Islands, the atolls of
Jaluit,
Wotje,
Maloelap, and
Mili. There was also the need to seize
Kwajalein, the main Japanese naval base in the Marshalls. This honor, however, was given in error to the
Army Scouts of the
7th Infantry Division for their landing on
Kwajalein five hours later. Since the Army Scouts were trained by the VAC Amphibious Reconnaissance personnel, it didn't tarnish any mixed feelings, and they shared their honor. The 7th Scouts were subsequently commended the
Presidential Unit Citation. The Majuro Atoll consists of fifty-six islets along a lagoon that is long and up to wide ringed by a reef on the seaward side of the islands. The main island of Majuro was long, thin and enclosed on the southern side of the lagoon. Over fifty-six codenames were used on the islands that made up the Majuro Atoll, or codename SUNDANCE. Captain Jones's company was involved in the pre-planned reconnaissance. They landed only on the northern islets of Calalin (LUELLA) and Eroj (LUCILLE), considered entrance islands to the lagoon;
Uliga (ROSALIE) and
Delap (SALOME), the western portions of the atoll; the main island of Majuro (LAURA), running 10 miles (16 km) west-to-east along the southern end of the atoll; and
Djarrit (RITA). On January 21, 1944, VAC Amphibious Reconnaissance Company, with the addition of 1st Lt. Harvey C. Weeks's 4th Platoon (which returned from a mission in the
Makin Atoll), embarked on at the
destroyer escort docks in
Pearl Harbor for amphibious reconnoitering of the
Majuro Atoll. Attached to the company was Lt. George Hard,
Ocean Island Defense Force, as guide and interpreter (who was present during the Apamama operation previously); Mr. William Mueller of the
Gilbert Islands, also as interpreter; and
Staff Sergeant Schlosenberg and
Technical Sergeant Szarka from
Corps Public Relations. arriving on January 30, 1944.
Kane harbored at a point thought to be 5000 yards seaward from LUELLA Passage, at 2030, nine hours prior to the main attack force. Before an advanced landing party was about to set off to shore, they discovered that an error had occurred in navigation, due to misinterpretation of the island profile. The group reembarked
Kane and proceeded northward approximately 12,000 yards to their corrected position toward LUELLA. No Marines nor natives, nor especially the major Japanese buildings were hit. Most of the projectiles hit the coconut trees and were air bursts. Jones concluded that there were no Japanese other than the four patrols of recon Marines already on the ground. Fifteen minutes later, Jones received word that the gunfire would cease and to move the patrols out of the area immediately. Captain Jones meanwhile had been ordered to rendezvous with the CO of BLT 2/106 on board to discuss further amphibious reconnaissance on RITA and LAURA. Reembarking USS
Kane, Capt. Jones dispatched Shinn's Platoon and Minnear's platoon. When the 1st Platoon and 2nd Platoon were proceeding across the reef passage to RITA, the 2nd Platoon was spotted by an observation plane from the USS
Portland. Assuming that the Marines were enemy Japanese troops, the pilot proceeded to strafe the platoon. Despite the signals from the Marines, the pilot maintained strafing maneuvers; no one was injured and the men sustained minor injuries from the obstacles of the coral reefs. Shinn's platoon located a village on RITA and reported no enemy with no natives present; twenty or more excellent temporary frame buildings in good condition, none of which had been damaged by the "friendly" naval gunfire. Laid scattered in the area were numerous items, such as hand carts, steel rails, lumber, window frames, empty oil drums, a small steam locomotive and a narrow gauge railway line, a heavy steam roller, explosive materials, insulated electrical wire, and abundance of coconuts and papaya. On February 1, 1944, Capt. James Jones had received orders to assemble his company on
Kane by 1700 to prepare for a reconnaissance of LAURA, disembarking by 2100, January 31 and
Arno Atoll later that night. He secretly emplaced three patrols about the headquarters and a fourth patrol set to watch the two other Japanese houses. Harbored 4000 yards off the eastern point of LAURA Island, Weeks and his 4th Platoon, reinforced with twenty Marines from Lassiter's mortar platoon, landed on LAURA at 0030 using two Higgins boats. Eliu, the interpreter accompanying Weeks, began questioning the local natives. By 2300, Eliu encountered two of her native acquaintances and had agreed to lead their patrol to three houses occupied by the Japanese in a nearby settlement. Reaching the main native settlement at 0100, they Upon receiving orders that
H-Hour would be scheduled at 1230, Capt. Jones transferred VAC Amphib Recon Company from USS
Kane to their
landing ship as instructed, then loaded onto the
amphibious tractor, for the prepared landings on CANNA and CAMELLIA. They were supported by
gun power from two nearby
infantry landing crafts. Splitting the recon company in half, Capt. Jones, two of his officers, and fifty-seven recon Marines boarded three LVTs and landed on CAMELLIA Island at 1320, February 17, 1944. Some difficulty was encountered when two of the LVTs were stuck in the impermeable sand along the
beachhead, barely able to maneuver them to a more solid sand bank. But by 1355, quickly finding that it was unoccupied, CAMELLIA was secure with no Japanese forces nor natives on the island. Meanwhile, Executive Officer 1st Lieutenant Merwyn Silverthorn also using three LVTs with four officers and fifty-seven men, landed ten minutes later at 1330 with the other half of the recon company on CANNA Island. While the recon Marines from VAC Amphib Recon Company were seizing the "artillery islands", the
United States Navy Underwater Demolition Teams, also using
amphibious tractors, or amtracs, were conducting
underwater reconnaissance. The UDT swimmers would reconnoiter fifty feet from the shore of FRAGILE, casting from LVTs. Their main focus was to locate submerged obstacles that could dismay a landing force and
naval mines. The joint-Marine and Army artillery battery began their emplacement on both CAMELLIA and CANNA, landing at around 1500. As soon as they were ashore, the recon Marines reembarked, leaving behind Lt. Shinn's 1st Platoon across the inter-islet channel of COLUMBINE to provide security for the Marine's 2nd Separate Pack-Howitzer Battalion. However, 104th's Field Artillery Battalion on CAMELLIA already had a sufficient number of soldiers providing their own security. At 1600 on
D-Day (D-0), using their rubber boats, Minnear's 2nd Platoon and Weeks's 4th Platoon patrolled the island of BUTTERCUP that lay immediately northwest and adjacent from CANNA and CAMELLIA. After finding it unoccupied, they proceeded to reconnoiter CARNATION and COLUMBINE, reaching it by 1700. They found these two islands also unoccupied. Meantime, Lt. Silverthorn and his fifty-seven recon Marines returned to Jones and the remaining company. With VAC Amphib Recon Company rejoined, they dug in and spent the night on a nearby, unoccupied island of BITTERROOT. Crossing the channel through the heavy surf toward a small islet west of FRAGILE, Capt. Katzenbach's Scout Company, the
4th Marine Division landed on Bogen (ZINNIA) on the morning of February 18, (
D+1). After scouting and reconnoitering, by 0327 it was declared unoccupied and secured, becoming the last amphibious reconnaissance mission before the main landing assault on FRAGILE. The captured islets of CAMELLIA, CANNA and ZINNIA prevented the enemy from fleeing and "
island-hopping" to a nearby island, potentially to regroup with reinforcements or settle into defensive fortifications, awaiting the
American Marine/Navy Fleet. Preceded by extensive
naval gunfire and aerial bombardments, the
22nd Marines landed an assault on FRAGILE against the defended Japanese. One Marine was killed and two wounded from fire coming from the fierce firefight on FRAGILE. As an indication of how low the fire was, all of these Marines were lying flat on the ground when hit. Also, enemy coconut log bunkers were centralized and interconnected with complex trenches dug and constructed in a manner of radiating from its hub, covered with hidden spider holes. The Marines quickly resolved the issue by dropping
incendiary or
smoke grenades; the smoke would eventually convey through the covered trenches exposing all the hidden, unpredictable trap doors. While the 22nd Marines and 106th Infantry were in the process of capturing Engebi Island (FRAGILE), both Jones's and Katzenbach's recon and scouts captured a Japanese soldier while reconnoitering the eight other 'unoccupied' islands in the area. At 0900 on February 18, on D+1 just southeast of FRAGILE, landing on Muzingbaarkikku (ARBUTUS) "friendly-fire" hit three recon Marines, injuring two and later killing one while being evacuated to the ship. Apparently the rounds were dispersed from Marines on Engebi, firing machine guns onto a Japanese-held defense on Skunk Point. Using
60-mm mortars, the recon team was able to gain the western edge of ARBUTUS on the reef passage facing Engebi, and was ordered to secure it overnight to D+2 to flank any fleeing Japanese troops from FRAGILE. Around the afternoon of D+1, sometime around 1640, the two joint-Marine/Army infantry regiments officially secured FRAGILE. The 22nd Marines and the Army's 106th Infantry along with the 104th Artillery reembarked the USS
Kane for an upcoming assault on Parry Island (HEARTSTRINGS). This made the 2nd Marine Artillery available to pack up and reinforce Jones if necessary. Marine General Thomas Watson carefully observed the continuous hard assault and casualties on Engebi, or FRAGILE, and decided to wait for the seizure of the main Japanese
bastion on HEARTSTRINGS. Captured documents taken on FRAGILE confirmed that HEARTSTRINGS was strongly held and contained an artillery element. On D+2, General Watson ordered both the recon and scout Marine companies, to continue reconnoitering the string of islets to the west and the eastern islets of DOWNSIDE. The Marine Scouts headed for the eastern islets heading south and found Elugelab (SAGEBRUSH) unoccupied, but at Rigili (POSY) they killed nine Japanese soldiers. Fleet Admiral
Chester W. Nimitz presented Capt. James Jones his second
Legion of Merit, signed by
United States Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. In the center of the Marianas, or FORAGER lies
Saipan, only from
Tokyo,
Japan. It was known at that time, the "Pearl Harbor of Japan", being the main administrative headquarters for all of the
Japanese forces in the
western Pacific. All the supplies and troops were funneled through Saipan that made up the whole of Japan's defense forces, their inner defense line. The island of
Tinian lies south across the channel from Saipan. It was considered to contain the best airfields in the
Marianas that catered to the
Pacific campaign. One of the airfields was the launch site for the
B-29 Bomber Enola Gay, which dropped the
atom bomb on
Hiroshima. They only major town at that time was Tinian Town, which centered at its mass, a 9,000-man Japanese defense force led by Japanese Colonel Keishi Ogata. All the Marine assault commanders confirmed by aerial photography and reconnaissance flown from nearby Saipan that the 2,000-yard wide sandy beach along Sunharon Bay, on the southwest side of Tinian, was the most heavily defended of all possible usable beaches. On the eastern side of Tinian at Asuga Bay, were more beaches chosen for contingency beach landings, which would encompass around the 25-foot cliffs for beach exits. These two beaches at Asuga Bay were designated as YELLOW #1 and #2, which also contained formidable Japanese defenses. Major Jones with Capt. Silverthorn's Company A accompanied by
UDT Team 7 under
Navy Lieutenant Richard F. Burke embarked onto , while Shinn's Company B embarked on the with UDT Team 5 under
Lt. Commander Draper L. Kauffman. The
APDs carried the joint-reconnaissance force to a point just offshore of Tinian. Faces colored with black and silver nonreflective face paint, they donned cammies or cut-off shorts made from utility trousers with soft covers as headgear. To avoid their feet being cut and torn by the coral, they either wore coral or tennis shoes, or an occasional pair of
boondockers. Also, every sailor and Marine had a small inflation bladder (usually not inflated), providing positive buoyancy when required. Armed with only
Ka-Bar or
Fairbairn-Sykes combat knives, the recon Marines and the UDT Teams disembarked from their APDs. The recon Marines used eight rubber boats for each beach while the UDT teams were in two rubber boats for each beach, and were towed by Higgins boats to within 400 to 500 yards offshore from the beach. Two Marines were left in each boat to paddle them to keep them stationary off from the beaches while the swimmers went to their objectives, YELLOW Beach off Tinian Town, and WHITE #1 and #2 in the northwestern portion of the island. The Navy UDT and the recon Marines were accustomed to different reconnoitering methods, the Marines, reconnoitering the beach and the land inward, scouted the size and location of exits inland through the hills and dunes, the UDT, conducting
underwater reconnaissance found that the shelving reef had only a few ragged breaks in its sea edge for the amphibian tractors to avoid. Silverthorn's Alpha Company and Burke's UDT 7 disembarked from the USS
Stringham at 2100 and were towed to their position off YELLOW #1 (Asuga) Beach. The UDT found anchored mines, numerous potholes and coral heads. The hydrography of YELLOW #1 made it negatively inconclusive to land a beach assault. At 2232, the moonlight conveyed through the recently heavy clouds and revealed double-apron barbed wire along the beaches. 2nd Lieutenant Donald Neff of Alpha Company worked his way inland about 30 yards, silently evading a Japanese sentry that was having a cigarette. As he was looking for beach exits for tracked and wheeled vehicles, sounds of explosives were heard from a nearby beach. The UDT interpreted the explosion that had been spotted and departed the area since the security orders were to avoid disclosure of any landing intentions. Also, if any mines or obstacles were encountered, they were not to be disturbed. On the other hand, the Marines that were closer to the beach later surmised that the Japanese were working on their beach fortifications in hasty construction of trenches and blockhouses, and proceeded with their reconnaissance. Occasionally, Japanese sentries patrolling atop the twenty-five-foot escarpments flanking YELLOW #1 would shine flashlights onto the beach below but Silverthorn's Marines were never detected. Although one enemy patrol walked within a few yards of the Marines, they failed to spot them. They returned to the
Stringham at 0200 with "negative" collective information in consideration of using YELLOW #1 for beach landings. As Silverthorn briefed Admiral Hill, Hill kept pressuring for Silverthorn's opinion on the WHITE beaches. To convince Admiral Hill, Silverthorn emphatically said... :"Admiral, the beaches are narrow... [but] there are no mines, no coral heads, no boulders, no wire, no boat obstacles and no offshore reefs. The beaches are as flat as a
billiard table!" Heavy batteries would repeatedly lay suppressive fire by using light mortars, machine guns, rifle fire, and occasionally antiboat guns. The eastern beaches were photographically reconnoitered left-to-right by Sergeant Jim Burns and Captain Reynolds on GREEN Beach under the southeastern corner of Suribachi. Sgt. Clete Peacock covered RED Beach #1 in the center and Sgt. Robert Cole covered RED Beach #2 on the right, where Futatsu Rock separated RED #1 from RED #2. Both Burns and Peacock used a
Contax 35 mm camera, and Cole used a
Leica camera. Once they completed their objectives, they planned to extract from the sea by rubber boats towed from the Higgins LCIs and quickly headed to the gunboats. Meantime, fighter planes came in laying smoke while the destroyers were firing white phosphorus shells to cover their withdrawal. They speculated that some Japanese coast-watchers were in the vicinity helping adjust their fire upon the American ships during three weeks ago in the beginning phases of the battle. After finding no evidence, except a stone emplacement and some caves recently vacated from Japanese presence, Lt. Corey and B Company reboarded the LVTs and returned the VAC Corps headquarters on Iwo Jima. Their objectives were to seize offshore enemy artillery bases from which the mixed, "sea-based"
Army/
Marine 'provisional' field artillery battery could fire their
155-mm "Long Toms" and other artillery at hand for support for the upcoming main landing on Okinawa. Beginning on the nights of 25 – March 26, 1945, L-Day minus 7–6 days, Jones's ABLE Company of FMFPAC Amphib Recon Battalion, led by company commander Capt. Merwyn Silverthorn, disembarked the USS
Scribner and
Kinzer and landed in the Keise Shima islets of Kuefo Shima, Naganna Shima and Kamiyama Shima. Finding the islands unoccupied of enemy Japanese defenders or coastwatchers, the
Navy UDT teams came offshore and blew up coral with explosive charges for clearing a passage for the upcoming joint-provisional artillery elements. Meanwhile, Major Jones, the commanding officer of FMFPAC Amphib Recon Battalion ordered Lt. Corey and BRAVO Company to board on to the next available
APD-54 at Saipan and arrive to the Okinawa Islands to reinforce Jones and the rest of FMF Amphib Recon Battalion (particularly Major Jones and ABLE Company) by April 1. Later that day, the 77th Scouts landed in the Kerama Retto Islands and Silverthorn's ALPHA Company continued their mission reconnoitering the islands throughout Keise Shima. ALPHA Company landed ashore the southern tip of Awara Saki on Tokashiki at L-5, one of the larger islands that rests in the islands of Kerama Rhetto. It too was found unoccupied. Simultaneously, Major Tony Walker's 6th Marine Division Recon Company seized the eastern islands in the vicinity offshore from Okinawa. The recon Marines of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion were awarded for their accomplishments, however the recon Marines were always inadequately commended due to public recognition. Rubber-stamped in very large letters on both top and bottom of the page clearly stated, 'TOP SECRET'. The Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion received a commendation from Major General A. D. Bruce of the 77th Infantry Division. The commendation notes that the battalion joined the Division at Leyte prior to departure for Okinawa Gunto, and Major Jones and his staff participated in the final planning phase for the operation, and that the information obtained during the patrols played a crucial part in the successful operations against Kerama Retto, Keise Shima, and Minna Shima, as well as valuable assistance during the Kerama Retto and Ie Shima operations. An endorsement personally signed by
Lt General Simon Buckner also classified TOP SECRET, noted: :"... I personally followed the excellent performance of the Battalion with much interest and would add that the part played by this splendid organization materially assisted in the success of our present campaign. The close cooperation of the services, Marine and Army, was here exemplified to the highest degree." In addition, the battalion also received an unclassified commendation signed personally by
General Joseph Stilwell, commanding
Tenth Army: :"... for your superior performance under the capable leadership of Major James Jones in carrying out your assigned missions in the Ryukyus Campaign. The Fleet Marine Force may well be proud of the development of amphibious reconnaissance as exemplified by your activities. Use of your battalion as the 'only-ground reconnaissance' agency held under Tenth Army Headquarters expedited the accomplishment of all phases of the recent campaign. Your aggressive action made unnecessary the use of large forces in the seizure of the eastern islands of Okinawa, the islands off Motobu Peninsula and Kume Shima."—General Joseph W. Stilwell, Tenth Army to Fleet Marine Force Reconnaissance Battalion.
Disbandment Dissolution of the battalion following World War II was quick. The battalion embarked 1 – August 22 on the , a slow-moving troop transport from Okinawa, formulating plans to invade one of the southern
Ryukyu Islands toward mainland Japan. They had progressed as far as
Ulithi Atoll in the
Caroline Islands when the first
atomic bomb was dropped. The Company remained at Ulithi, 23 Aug – 11 Sep, and embarked the
President Johnson, arriving at Pearl Harbor September 12. Major Jones was transferred to the continental United States after having served 25 months under combative service, leaving his executive officer, Markovitch, to command the FMFPAC Amphib Recon Battalion. ==Post World War II==