Azov Brigade

Background and founding, February–April 2014 According to right‑wing radicalism researcher Vyacheslav Likhachev, Azov had many roots. The brigade was founded by the activists of Patriot of Ukraine, Automaidan, Social-National Assembly and other organisations active during the Euromaidan. Nationalism researcher Andreas Umland wrote that the Azov was created by "an obscure lunatic fringe group of racist activists" and has "a contradictory, if not paradoxical history of cooperation" between organizations involved in its creation – Social-National Assembly, Patriot of Ukraine, Misanthropic Division, Bratstvo, anti-Euromaidan and Russian neo-Nazi figures. Andreas Wimmer wrote that there is a connection between extremist groups within Ukraine and the Russian intelligence services, which use the far-right groups as a propaganda tool. According to Wimmer, Russia contributed to the growth of these groups and exposed their extremes to indirectly support a Russian narrative. Extremism researcher Kacper Rękawek notes that Russian members of Misanthropic Division infiltrated the Social-National Assembly and later Azov, and later Azov had to take steps to get rid of MD's influence. Russians from the so-called Russian Centre have also joined Azov. According to Katerina Sergatskova in Hromadske, parts of the Azov Brigade had its roots in a group of ultras of FC Metalist Kharkiv named "Sect 82" (1982 is the year of the founding of the group), which had ultranationalist leanings. In late February 2014, during the pro-Russian unrest when a separatist movement was active in Kharkiv, Sect 82 occupied the Kharkiv Oblast regional administration building in Kharkiv and served as a local "self-defense force".In February 2014, Andriy Biletsky, a far-right political activist, founder and leader of the ultranationalist organization Patriot of Ukraine and the related Social-National Assembly (SNA), who had been previously arrested in 2011 accused of robbery and assault, although his case had never reached the courts, was released from prison after the new government considered him a political prisoner of the former Yanukovych government. After returning to Kharkiv, he rallied some activists from Patriot of Ukraine, SNA, the AutoMaidan movement and some ultras groups, and formed a small militia to help local security forces against the local pro-Russian movement in the city. During March 2014, as the unrest in Kharkiv worsened, the Security Service of Ukraine and the Militsiya pulled out from the city, the Black Corps started to patrol the streets, protecting pro-Ukrainian activists and attacking pro-Russian ones. On 14 March, members of the pro-Russian militant organization "Oplot" (which would later become a separatist military battalion), and the head of the Donetsk branch, Alexander Zakharchenko (who would become Head of the Donetsk People's Republic) and of the Anti-Maidan movement, attempted to raid the local Patriot of Ukraine headquarters. The Black Corps retaliated with automatic weapons, and the situation escalated into a firefight between the two groups, Among other early patrons of the battalion were Oleh Lyashko, a member of the Verkhovna Rada, ultra-nationalist Dmytro Korchynsky, businessman Serhiy Taruta, and Arsen Avakov. Because of this, many civilians created militias and paramilitary groups, known as "volunteer battalions", to fight the separatists on their own initiative. Most of those who joined, including Azov, were Russian speakers. with "Azov" volunteers, June 2014. At this point the Azov group was known as the "Black Corps" and "Men in Black" due to their all-black masks and fatigues. The former Black Corps was initially based in Kharkiv, where they were tasked with defending the city against a possible pro-Russian uprising, but as the situation in the city subsided and calmed down, they were deployed further south to help in the war effort. After the battle, Azov remained as a garrison in Mariupol for a time, where they were tasked with patrolling the region around the Sea of Azov to prevent arms trafficking from Russia into separatist hands, and was briefly relocated to Berdiansk. On 10 June, the battalion dismissed deputy commander Yaroslav Honchar and distanced themselves from him after he made statements critical of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ihor Mosiychuk became deputy commander. On 10–11 August 2014 the Azov Battalion, together with the Shakhtarsk Battalion, the Dnipro-1 Battalion, and the Ukrainian Army, supported an assault on the city of Ilovaisk spearheaded by the Donbas Battalion. The performance of Azov was criticized by fellow members of the Donbas Battalion and by a later report by the commission of the Verkhovna Rada on the failures of the Battle of Ilovaisk, which criticized Azov for arriving undermanned and late to the battle, and failing to cover the flanks of other forces. During the initial assault, Azov suffered heavy losses. The Azov Battalion helped to clear the city of separatists and reinforce Ukrainian positions. However, in late August they were redeployed to garrison Mariupol once more, as a detachment of troops from the Russian Armed Forces was spotted moving into Novoazovsk, 45 km east of Mariupol. , 2014|234x234px In the battle of Novoazovsk from 25 to 28 August 2014 the Azov Battalion and Ukrainian forces did not fare much better, as they were pushed back by superior firepower of the tanks and armored vehicles of the separatists and Russians. On 11 August 2014 another detachment of the Azov Battalion, backed by Ukrainian paratroopers, captured Marinka from pro-Russian rebels and entered the suburbs of Donetsk, clashing with DPR fighters. With Novoazovsk captured, the separatists began preparing a second offensive against Mariupol. In early September 2014, the Azov Battalion was engaged in the Second Battle of Mariupol. As the separatist forces closed in on the city, the Azov Battalion were in the vanguard of the defense, providing reconnaissance around the villages of Shyrokyne and Bezimenne, located a few kilometers east of Mariupol. At the same time, Azov started to train Mariupol citizens in self-defense and organize popular militias to defend the city. The separatists were able to push far into Mariupol, reaching the outer suburbs and coming within five kilometers of the city. But an overnight counter-offensive on 4 September launched by Azov and the Armed Forces pushed the DPR forces away from the city. infantry fighting vehicle in July 2014 Regarding the ceasefire agreed on 5 September, Biletsky stated: "If it was a tactical move there is nothing wrong with it […] if it's an attempt to reach an agreement concerning Ukrainian soil with separatists then obviously it's a betrayal." At this time, Azov had 500 members. Reorganisation and incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine, November 2014 In September 2014, the Azov Battalion underwent a reorganisation, and was upgraded to a regiment, and on 11 November, the regiment was officially enrolled into the National Guard of Ukraine. The now-Azov Regiment officially named the "Azov" Special Operations Detachment" of the 12th Operational Brigade (Military Unit 3057). Following its official enrollment in the National Guard, Azov received official funding from the Ukrainian Interior Ministry and other sources (believed to be Ukrainian oligarchs). Around this time Azov started receiving increased supplies of heavy arms. and on 31 October 2014, deputy commander of the Azov Battalion Vadym Troyan was appointed head of Kyiv Oblast police (this police force has no jurisdiction over the city of Kyiv). Battle of Shyrokyne, January 2015 in 2015 On 24 January 2015, Mariupol came under an indiscriminate rocket bombing by separatists, which left 31 dead and 108 injured. On 28 January, two Azov members were killed in a shelling of a checkpoint in the eastern part of Mariupol. Both attacks were conducted from an area near the village of Shyrokyne, 11 km east of Mariupol, where there was significant movement of separatist troops in the region, stoking fears of a third offensive against Mariupol. In February 2015, the Azov Regiment responded by spearheading a surprise offensive against the separatists in Shyrokyne. The objective was to create a buffer zone to prevent more bombings of Mariupol and push the separatists forces back into Novoazovsk. The attack by the Azov Regiment was reinforced by the Ukrainian Army, and Air Assault Forces, as well the Donbas Battalion of the National Guard, the independent volunteer battalions Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, and the Chechen Muslim Sheikh Mansur Battalion. In February 2015, after breaking through DPR lines, the Azov Regiment managed to quickly capture the towns of Shyrokyne, Pavlopil, and Kominternove, and began to advance toward Novoazovsk. The Ukrainian forces were stopped in the town of Sakhanka, where the separatists held the line by using heavy artillery and armored vehicles. By 12 February 2015 the separatists launched an all-out counter-offensive which resulted in heavy losses for Azov. Azov and the rest of the Ukrainian forces retreated from Sakhanka into Shyrokyne. On 12 February 2015, the Minsk II ceasefire was signed by both parties of the conflict, and the territory around Shyrokyne was declared to be part of a proposed demilitarized buffer zone. However, the DPR rebels did not consider combat in the village itself as part of the ceasefire, The situation in Shyrokyne became a stalemate: both sides reinforced their positions and built trenches. In the following weeks, Azov and the DPR forces exchanged fire and artillery bombings with a back-and-forth on the control of the front lines and villages. The village of Shyrokyne was almost completely destroyed as a result. On 1 July 2015, the separatists withdrew from Shyrokyne. Separatist leader Denis Pushilin declared they were pulling back as an "act of good will" to conform to the Minsk II agreements. However, Biletsky claimed the action was a result of the separatists suffering heavy casualties and not being able to sustain their operation. On 29 July 2015 the Azov Regiment and the Donbas Battalion fighters in Shyrokyne were rotated out of the front and replaced with a unit of the Ukrainian Marines. The decision to pull them out from the village was met with protests from residents of nearby Mariupol, who feared that the withdrawal would lead to Russian separatists quickly retaking the village and shelling the city again. in Mariupol, June 2021|235x235px In August 2015, the Ukrainian government pulled all volunteer battalions, including Azov, off the front lines around Mariupol, replacing them with regular military units. The primary base of the regiment became a seaside villa in Urzuf, a village in Donetsk Oblast. On 1 October 2015, the Azov Civil Corps joined the Blockade of Crimea. The action was started by the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People on 20 September as a massive traffic obstruction of transport traffic going into Crimea to protest the Russian annexation of Crimea. The Azov Regiment and the Right Sector's Ukrainian Volunteer Corps paramilitaries helped provide security for the activists. 2016–2019 On 27 April 2016, 300 troops and light armored vehicles from the regiment were assigned to Odesa to safeguard public order after Oblast Governor Mikheil Saakashvili wrote in social media about a rash of pro-Russian "titushki" attacks on civilians. In 2017, the size of the regiment was estimated at more than 2,500 members. In June 2019, to commemorate the five-year anniversary of the Ukrainian victory in the battle of Mariupol, there was a military parade composed by members of the Azov Regiment, the National Guard of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. MRAP, June 2021 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine The Azov Regiment regained attention during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Before the conflict, Azov was the subject of a propaganda war: Russia used the regiment's official incorporation into the National Guard of Ukraine as one of the proofs for its portrait of the Ukrainian government and military as under Nazi control, with "denazification" as a key casus belli. The regiment, on the other hand, was noted for its ability to self-promote, producing high quality videos of its drone strikes and other military activities; The Daily Telegraph called it a "well-oiled publicity machine". The regiment's destruction has been among Moscow's war objectives. In March, France 24 described the Azov Regiment as "at the heart of the propaganda war" between Russia and Ukraine. France 24 reported that Azov posted victory claims on Telegram that are "often accompanied by videos of burning Russian tanks" and called the Russians "the real fascists". Vyacheslav Likhachev, an analyst at the ZMINA Center for Human Rights in Kyiv, stated that during the war, Azov operates in the same way as other regiments, "but with better PR". In 2022, a few months after the full-scale Russian invasion, Azov veterans marched across Kyiv to pressure the government not to make compromises with Russia. They were stopped by a police cordon before they could reach the president's office and burnt effigies of "traitors". In January 2023, Meta decided that Azov should not be regarded as a "dangerous organization", meaning that Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp users may publish content about the Azov Regiment and its members without censorship. armoured personnel carrier, June 2021 Defense of Mariupol Most of the Azov Regiment was stationed in Mariupol at the beginning of the invasion. In March 2022, Deutsche Welle reported that the regiment was the primary unit defending Mariupol in the siege of Mariupol. As the battle raged, Azov became notable for its fierce defense of the city. For example, PBS called it "a seasoned volunteer force that is widely considered one of the country's most capable units". On 19 March 2022, president Volodymyr Zelenskyy awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine to Azov's commander in Mariupol, Lieutenant Colonel Denys Prokopenko. On 9 March Russia carried out an airstrike on a maternity hospital, killing multiple civilians, and justified the bombing by the alleged presence of Azov troops in the building; similarly, on 16 March, the Mariupol theatre, which was holding civilians, was bombed, Russia accused Azov of having perpetrated it, trying to frame Russia for it. As civilians fled the city, Russian checkpoints stopped men and stripped them, looking for tattoos identifying them as Azov. On 22 March, Azov's military headquarters in the northern Kalmiuskyi District were captured by Russian and DPR soldiers, although it was already abandoned. By early April, the Azov Regiment, together with other local Ukrainian forces, started to retreat into the Azovstal iron and steel works, a massive Soviet-era steel mill built to resist military attacks and bombing. The unit became prominently associated with Azovstal; its founder Biletskiy called the industrial complex "the fortress of the Azov". The allegations, however, have not been confirmed by independent fact-checkers and organizations. Later in April, remaining pockets of Ukrainian resistance inside the city, consisting of the 36th Marine Brigade, other National Guard units, and the sea port detachments of the National Police and Border Guards, conducted operations to break through into Azovstal, while members of Azov conducted support and rescue operations to assist them. Nonetheless, the following days saw bombing and shelling of Azovstal. There were also civilians sheltering in the complex. The following day it was reported that the Russians had broken into the plant. In early May 2022 protests took place in Kyiv, organised by the families of Azov troops, Ukrainian marines and other soldiers. Kateryna Prokopenko, the wife of Denys Prokopenko, took a major role in these demonstrations, which were broken up by police. These protests accused the Ukrainian government and the international community of failing to do enough to assist wounded soldiers currently in the Azovstal steelworks. In a statement made to the press on 8 May 2022 from the steelworks, leading figures within the regiment stated that they would not surrender. They criticized the Ukrainian government for negotiating with Russia, as well as countries who refused to supply Azov with weapons in previous years. In this news conference, Sviatoslav Palamar, second in command of the Azov Regiment, accused Ukrainian politicians of cynicism for failing to visit Azovstal. He stated that the regiment could not be 100% sure all civilians had been evacuated due to lack of equipment and the fact they had not been assisted by specialist organizations. Palamar said that during the evacuation of civilians, three Azov soldiers had been killed and one wounded, and said that criticisms made towards the troops about the speed of the evacuation were 'extremely painful'. An Azovstal factory worker who had stayed in a bunker under the factory for two months before her evacuation told Deutsche Welle that, contrary to Russian media reports, they were not forced by soldiers in Azovstal to stay against their will, however, it became increasingly unsafe to leave due to constant bombardment. and on the right is a multicam combat uniform. On 10 May 2022, the Azov Regiment posted images on its Telegram page of what it said were its wounded soldiers in the bunkers of Azovstal. These images showed severe shrapnel injuries and in some cases amputated limbs which the soldiers were unable to treat properly. They called for an immediate evacuation where these soldiers could be provided with medical assistance. In an interview with the Kyiv Post, a soldier of the Azov Regiment repeated this call, alleging that he had been tortured and witnessed killings by Russian separatists when he had been captured in the previous phase of the war. On 17 May 2022, negotiations, which included mediators from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), managed to end the siege of Azovstal and establish a humanitarian corridor. On 16 May, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that the Mariupol garrison, including remnants of the Azov Regiment stationed in Mariupol, had "fulfilled its combat mission" and that evacuations from the Azovstal steel factory had begun. Following orders from the high command, over the next few days Azov members in Azovstal, including Prokopenko, surrendered to Russian forces among ~2.5k Ukrainian soldiers from the plant, and were taken to Russian-controlled territory of the Donetsk People's Republic. The ICRC registered the surrendered troops as prisoners of war at the request of both sides, collecting information to contact their families. Ukrainian and Russian sources make contradicting statements on the future of surrendered combatants, from pre-arranged exchange to Russian POWs with support of international humanitarian organizations, to criminal prosecution in Russia on war crime and terrorism charges. As reported by the Wall Street Journal, according to Azov chief of staff on 18 May, Ukraine had proposed a prisoner swap of the most severely wounded prisoners, but Russia had countered "everyone or no one". Leonid Slutsky suggested to lift the moratorium on death sentences in Russia to allow execution of surrendered Azov fighters. According to international human rights law professor Christina Binder at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich, despite Russia leaving the Council of Europe in March 2022, its provisions are effective for an additional 6 months. This leaves open the potential for a case at European Court of Human Rights in the case of torture and execution of fighters from the Azov Regiment until September 2022. Amnesty International USA issued a statement saying that "Ukraine's soldiers deployed in Mariupol area have been dehumanized by Russian media and portrayed in Putin's propaganda as 'neo-Nazis' throughout Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. This characterization raises serious concerns over their fate as prisoners of war", while calling for Russia to fully respect the Geneva conventions. On 24 May 2022, The Guardian reported that Denys Prokopenko was able to briefly call his wife from captivity, and according to him surrendered Azov fighters are being held in "satisfactory" conditions, with injured combatants held in a prison in Olenivka, and a small number of severely injured fighters held in a hospital of Novoazovsk. Presumably, none of the surrendered fighters had been taken to Russia so far. Also on 30 May 2022, a group of family members announced the creation of a "Council of Wives and Mothers" to help ensure the surrendered soldiers are treated according to the Geneva Conventions. They noted that most of the relatives have no idea what is going on with the captured fighters, and there is no evidence of activity by the Red Cross. On 5 June 2022, Kateryna Prokopenko told Ukrayinska Pravda that as far as she understands, international humanitarian groups such as the Red Cross were only with the surrendered soldiers during the beginning of their captivity, but that it was not the case anymore. She suggested that the Russian side is restricting access to the soldiers by the Red Cross. In mid-June, the lack of monitoring continued, even though it was a provision of the surrender agreement. On 7 June 2022, Human Rights Watch and Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group separately announced that Ukrainian refugees, as well as civilians forcibly deported to Russia, were being pressured and intimidated to implicate Ukrainian military personnel in war crimes, including implicating Azov in the Mariupol theatre airstrike. Bodies of 210 Ukrainian fighters have been transferred to Kyiv. These are being processed by Azov's "guardianship" unit. After a Donetsk court conducted a show trial of three foreign members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and sentenced them to death, there was worry that the prisoners of war from Azovstal would face similar show trials, with people associated with Azov especially vulnerable due to their depiction in Russian propaganda. Some civil society members also claim that Russia wants to destabilize Ukraine by pitting the interests of captives and the victims of Russian war crimes against each other. According to Yulia Fedosyuk, wife of Azov soldier Arseniy Fedosyuk, Russia will most likely try and convict the Azovstal soldiers terrorism and war crimes against civilians, to try and shift blame for crimes committed by Russia. She also said the Azov officers, including Prokopenko and Palamar had been moved to the Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, the site of an FSB detention center, while others were in Olenivka. On 30 June, it was announced that 95 Azovstal prisoners would be exchanged, along with 43 from the Azov Regiment. It was revealed that about 1,000 Azov soldiers were still prisoners of war. On 18 June 2022, Mykyta Nadtochiy was appointed as new commander of the Azov Regiment. According to Moskovskij Komsomolets, Nadtochiy was appointed by Prokopenko as his successor during the siege of Mariupol and was later evacuated from the city by helicopter after being wounded in action. On 29 July 2022, at least 50 of the captured fighters died in the Olenivka prison explosion, claimed by the Russian side to be a missile strike by Ukrainian forces on the Olenivka prison in Donbas where they were kept, and claimed by the Ukrainian side to be a murder of prisoners by Russia, disguised as a false flag operation. Ukraine asked the UN and Red Cross, which vouched for the life and health of surrendered soldiers, for an immediate reaction to the incident. On 22 September 2022, as part of a prisoner exchange, Ukraine handed Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch, former People's Deputy of Ukraine and personal friend of Vladimir Putin over to Russia, along with another 55 Russian prisoners of war, in exchange for over 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war, including 188 members of the Azov Regiment. Prisoners exchanged included Azov commander Denys Prokopenko and his deputy Sviatoslav Palamar, along with three other leaders. It was agreed that the five leaders of the Azov Regiment that were released as part of the prisoner exchange would remain in Turkey until the end of the war. The swap caused controversy in Russia among hardliners and pro-war supporters, as in the past few months the Russian government had affirmed that the Azov prisoners were going to be trialled over crimes and would not be handed over in any prisoner exchanges, and had used Azov extensively in propaganda. Post-Mariupol reformation under the Offensive Guard and expansion into a brigade tank, January 2024 On February 2023, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the Offensive Guard initiative, a recruitment campaign by the Ministry aimed at forming new assault units within the National Guard, National Police, and State Border Guard Service. As part of this program, a new Azov Brigade was established, drawing on survivors on the siege of Mariupol, experienced veterans and newly recruited volunteers. The brigade was formed within the National Guard as a successor formation to the earlier Azov units, replacing the structure previously centered around the now-dissolved 12th Operational Brigade. Prokopenko resumed command of Azov in August. On 10 June 2024, the United States Department of State announced the lifting of a ban which previously prevented the Azov Brigade from using weapons supplied by the US, writing in a statement that "Ukraine's 12th Special Forces Azov Brigade passed Leahy vetting" and that the department found no evidence of human rights violations committed by the unit. This policy shift allows the Azov Brigade to use the same US military equipment as any other unit in the Ukrainian National Guard. In August 2024, the brigade was reportedly diverted from Lyman to assist in the ongoing fighting around Niu-York. In September 2024, the Azov brigade was reported to be part of Ukrainian reinforcements to Pokrovsk conducting small-scale counterattacks slowing or slightly pushing Russian gains back. 1st Azov Corps In April 2025, the brigade became part of the 1st Azov Corps, a newly created formation led by the brigade's former commander Denys Prokopenko, which contains other four brigades in addition to the 12th brigade "Azov". northeast of northeast of Rodynske. The 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov was deployed to the area and thwarted the offensive During the operation the Brigade captured 18 Russian prisoners in a 24 hour period. The 12th Special Forces Brigade continued to grow their expertise in Drone warfare with NATO beginning to train units based off of Azov tactics. In February of 2026 the unit destroyed two Russian Merlin-VR reconnaissance drones,worth 600,000 USD, with modified FPV drones.The Brigade became the fist unit in history to fight a fire resulting from a bombing using ground robotic systems. In March of 2026 The brigade was awarded the Orders of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, “For Courage,” and of Danylo Halytskyi. President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi also promoted Denys Prokopenko to brigadier general. By April of 2026, the Brigade, as part of the 1st Corps was defending a larger geographic region. In Donetsk UAV drone operators were effective in controlling, attacking, and limiting Russian supply lines. The 12th Special Purpose Brigade Azov of Ukraine’s National Guard was protecting a 12–13 kilometer defensive line around Bilytske, Rodynske, and Hryshyne. == Structure ==

Battalion (May–September 2014) • 1st Hundred "Century" • "Borodan Division" platoon • 2nd "Iron" Hundred • 3rd hundred • 4th "Spartan" Hundred • separate reconnaissance and sabotage platoon • • separate shock-assault platoon • mortar battery • 2nd Battalion • Tank company "Kholodny Yar" • Artillery division • anti-aircraft missile artillery division • engineer-sapper company • commandant's company • Horn service Brigade (from February 2023) • Azov Brigade • Brigade Headquarters and HQ Company • Brigade Administration • Command Platoon • 1st Special Forces Battalion • Spear Group • Young Team • 1st Special Purpose Company • 1st Platoon • 2nd Platoon • 3rd Platoon • Mortar Platoon • 2nd Special Purpose Company • 1st Platoon "Scuto Company" • 2nd Platoon • 3rd Platoon • Mortar Platoon • 3rd Special Purpose Company • 1st Platoon • 2nd Platoon • 3rd Platoon • Mortar Platoon • Reconnaissance Platoon • Combat Engineering Platoon • Mortar Battery • Medical Service • 2nd Special Forces Battalion • 1st Special Purpose Company • 2nd Special Purpose Company • 3rd Special Purpose Company • Unmanned Systems Company • Reconnaissance Platoon • Combat Engineering Platoon • Mortar Battery • Medical Service • 3rd Special Forces Battalion (disbanded in May 2024) • 5th Special Forces Battalion "Lyubart" • 6th Special Forces Battalion • 1st Special Purpose Company • 2nd Special Purpose Company • 3rd Special Purpose Battalion • Unmanned Systems Company • Reconnaissance Platoon • Combat Engineering Platoon • Mortar Battery • Medical Service • 3rd International Battalion • 1st International Company • 2nd International Company • 3rd International Company • Unmanned Systems Company • Reconnaissance Platoon • Sapper Unit "Foxtrot" • Mortar Battery • Medical Service • special purpose reconnaissance unit • Special purpose reconnaissance technical equipment company • tank battalion • 1st Tank Company • 2nd Tank Company • 3rd Tank Company • Reconnaissance Platoon • Anti-Aircraft Platoon • Engineer Platoon • Support Company • Medical Station • Brigade Artillery group • Kontakt-12 • 1st Artillery Battalion • 2nd Artillery Battalion • Rocket Artillery Battalion • Anti-Tank Battalion • battalion of strike unmanned systems • FPV Drone Strike Company • UAV Reconnaissance Company • Electronic Warfare and Anti-Drone Company • Technical & Maintenance Company • Engineer-sapper company • Anti-Aircraft Missile Battery • Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery • Radar and Detection Platoon • Maintenance and Support Platoon • Logistics and Supply Company • Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon • RCBZ platoon • Electronic Warfare Company • Signal Intelligence Platoon • Electronic Attack Platoon • Electronic Support Platoon • Counter-UAV Platoon • Reconnaissance Detachment • Neptune Reconnaissance Group • Pirates Reconnaissance Group • Thunderstorm Reconnaissance Group • Recruitment Service • Support Forces Battalion • Engineering and Sapper Company • Engineering and Positioning Company • Flamethrower Platoon • Sniper Company • Gladius Ultor • Mortems Squad • Automobile Battalion • Communications Node • Personnel Training Battalion • Firefighting Platoon • Psychological Service • Brigade Band Other 'Azov' units '' While the bulk of the Azov Regiment was based in Mariupol, with the full-scale invasion new Azov units began to be organized outside of the city, in particular in Kyiv and Kharkiv. In January, the unit was deployed to the battle of Bakhmut. The commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade is Andriy Biletsky, the founder of the Azov Battalion. In Dnipro, the 98th Territorial Defence Battalion 'Azov-Dnipro' of the Territorial Defense Forces was organized, led by First Deputy Head of National Corps and Azov veteran Rodion Kudryashov. == Leadership and organisation ==

leading units of the battalion on a patrol near Mariupol in July 2014 The brigade's first commander and founder was Andriy Biletsky. After Biletsky was elected into the Ukrainian parliament in the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election he left the regiment, and terminated his contract with the National Guard in 2016 (Ukrainian elected officials cannot be in the military, nor the police). A 16 July 2014 report placed the Azov Battalion's strength at 300. The unit included 900 volunteers . Commanders Biletsky led Azov from its inception as a volunteer battalion in May to October 2014, when he ran for office in the 2014 parliamentary elections. Previous Azov commanders included Ihor Mykhailenko and Maksym Zhorin. From July 2017 to May 2022, the unit's commander was Lieutenant Colonel Denys Prokopenko, who became the youngest commander in the history of the armed forces of Ukraine. In May 2022, the unit's second in command was Captain Sviatoslav Palamar, who was captured by Russian forces and later released in a prisoner swap. On 18 June 2022, Mykyta Nadtochiy was appointed as new commander of the Azov Regiment. Status Azov was initially formed as a volunteer militia in May 2014. Recruits were then assigned to the combat units of the regiment, or to support and supply units, where they undertake intensive combat drills. Reconnaissance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units were considered the elite of Azov and were manned by the most experienced personnel (typically, former Ukrainian Army special forces or similar). The Offensive Guard is to be an all-volunteer formation of eight assault infantry brigades, six of the National Guard, one of the Border Guard, and one under the National Police, anticipated to be fully active by April 2023. Foreign fighters According to The Daily Telegraph in August 2014, the Azov Battalion's extremist politics and professional English social media pages had attracted foreign fighters, including people from Brazil, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Greece, Sweden, While the February 2015 Minsk II Ceasefire Agreement speaks of the withdrawal of foreign fighters, the agreement was never fully implemented. Though only about 50 Russian nationals were members of the Azov regiment in April 2015, the regiment still included foreign fighters in August 2015, for example the ex-British army serviceman Chris Garrett and a 33-year-old former soldier of the Greek army and French Foreign Legion known by the nom-de-guerre of "The Greek". Investigative journalist Michael Colborne wrote that by 2015 the regiment had largely lost interest in recruitment of foreigners, "let alone in forming international friendships". However, he noted that the same could not be said for the broader Azov movement, especially the National Corps political party. In late 2016, Brazilian investigators uncovered an alleged plot to recruit Brazilian far-right activists for the Azov-aligned Misanthropic Division. American white nationalists have unsuccessfully tried to join Azov. In 2016, Andrew Oneschuk, who later joined the neo-Nazi terrorist group Atomwaffen Division, joined an Azov movement podcast in 2016. Azov has cultivated ties with the Atomwaffen Division. According to the Counter Extremism Project, the Azov Regiment made clear in 2019 that it was no longer accepting foreigners, since foreigners could only serve in the Ukrainian Army as contract service members. However, during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine it once again actively recruited foreign volunteers. In 2019, support for the Azov Movement and associated organizations was temporarily forbidden under Facebook's Dangerous Individuals and Organizations policy. In 2021, Time reported on the use of Facebook by the Azov Movement to recruit far-right individuals from other countries, reporting instances from 2018. During the full-scale invasion the "Dangerous Individuals and Organizations" policy was relaxed. In 2019, the FBI arrested a 24-year-old American soldier for a bomb plot, who had wanted to travel to Ukraine to join the regiment. In 2020, Ukraine deported two American Atomwaffen members who wanted to join the regiment. A Ukrainian official told BuzzFeed News that for anyone to join the regiment, official channels had to be used. Two former Russian Azov volunteers and other right-wing emigrants formed a separate unit as a response to the Russian invasion, known as the Russian Volunteer Corps. In November 2022, four members of the neo-Nazi subversive group "Order of Hagal" were arrested by the Italian police, and for one suspect who could not be found "investigative activity showed that he was in contact with the Azov battalion". == Azov movement ==

, 2019 The Azov Battalion has created its own civilian political movement, collectively known as the "Azov movement", made up of an umbrella of organizations formed by former Azov veterans or groups linked to Azov, and with roots in the ultranationalist paramilitary Patriot of Ukraine group led by Azov founder Andriy Biletsky and the associated far right Social-National Assembly. In 2015, according to Reuters, since Azov has been integrated into the National Guard and started to receive more supplies of heavy weapons, Biletsky has toned down his rhetoric. The Patriot of Ukraine websites were shut down or put under restricted access. They concluded that more of those posts reflected openness to the possibility that they would advance their views through official, institutional politics than those that expressed the contrary view. of FC Dnipro raise a tifo in support of Azov Battalion in a game against Napoli for the 2014–15 UEFA Europa League Other experts, however, disagree, and point to specific cases where there have been interactions between the regiment and the broader movement. Oleksiy Kuzmenko of Bellingcat in a 2020 article, noted that soldiers from the regiment appeared together with leaders of the "National Corps" political party in a 2020 video ad for a rally, and that a 2017 YouTube video appeared to show the émigré Russian neo-Nazi Alexey Levkin giving a lecture to the regiment. Both entities have admitted to being part of the wider "Azov Movement" led by Biletsky, who worked directly with Arsen Avakov (Minister of the Interior until July 2021) on matters relating to the regiment. Similarly, Michael Colborne wrote in a book on Azov published in January 2022 that it "would be a mistake to claim...that the Azov regiment is somehow not a part of the broader Azov movement" and points to repeated description of the regiment as the "military wing" of the Azov movement by Olena Semenyaka, the main international representative of the movement. Colborne also stated "the Azov movement tries to be a one-stop shop for all things far right. There's also a bevy of loosely affiliated but more extreme subgroups under its umbrella as well, including open neo-Nazis who praise and promote violence". In late 2021, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he said the movement had become less strong since 2019, as a result of infighting and the group needing to temper most of its international outreach activity due to high-profile attention. In 2022, there were continued reports of Biletsky interacting with the regiment, including his own claims that he was in daily contact with the current leader, Lt. Col Prokopenko, and other Azov soldiers during the siege of Mariupol. According to commentary by far right watcher Vyacheslav Likhachev, Biletsky's main goal is to exploit the Azov "trademark" in political life, and that although it is no secret that he was in touch with the regiment, his role is limited to an informal one. He went on to say that "the entire National Corps" had joined the Ukrainian army, highlighting a number of units including the Third Assault Brigade. The party advocates for a stronger government control over politics and economy, completely breaking ties with Russia and opposes Ukraine joining both the European Union and NATO. According to an expert in a 2022 article by Bayerischer Rundfunk, there is an "incompatibility resolution", which meant that active fighters could not become members of the National Corps. After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, it suspended its political activities, as most of its active members were engaged in military service. During the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election, the party formed a far-right political coalition alongside the Governmental Initiative of Yarosh, the Right Sector, and Svoboda parties. This coalition won a combined 2.15% of the nationwide electoral list vote but ultimately failed to win any seat in the Verkhovna Rada. Youth Corps The Youth Corps (Yunatskyy Korpus) is a non-governmental organization engaged in the "patriotic upbringing" of children, and to take them once they grow up, to the National Militia of "Azov movement". Many members of the Youth Corps, beginning in 2015, organized summer camps where children and teenagers received combat training mixed with lectures on Ukrainian nationalism. National Militia, 2017–2020 In 2017, a paramilitary group called the National Militia (), closely linked to the Azov movement, was formed. Its stated aim was to assist law enforcement agencies, which is allowed under Ukrainian law, and it has conducted street patrols. In March 2019, its membership was reportedly "in the low thousands". On 29 January 2018, members of the National Militia stormed a municipal council meeting in Cherkasy, and refused to let officials leave the building until they had approved the city's long-delayed budget. In 2018, the National Militia carried out a series of attacks on Romani settlements. In one attack on 7 June 2018, they used axes and sledgehammers to dismantle a Romani community in Holosiyivskiy Park in Kyiv, which was the fourth such instance of attacks by far-right groups against Romani settlements in Ukraine in the past month and a half. According to Michael Colborne, the National Militia has been de facto replaced by the Centuria group. The organization "has promoted Azov to Hetman Petro Sahaidachny National Army Academy (NAA) cadets, and credibly claimed that its members lectured in the Azov Regiment of the National Guard, the military wing of the Azov movement." Belltower.News similarly states that Centuria has "close connections with the Ukrainian neo-Nazi scene" while both Belltower and Colborne say that Centuria is the successor organization to the National Militia. The Jerusalem Post carried an article in October 2021 that cited Kuzmenko's report on the group, which stated that it is "led by people with ties to" the Azov movement and that its members received training from Western countries while at the NAA. ==Human rights violations==

In 2016, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch received several credible allegations of abuse and torture by the regiment. Reports published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented looting of civilian homes and unlawful detention and torture of civilians between September 2014 and February 2015 "by Ukrainian armed forces and the Azov regiment in and around Shyrokyne". Another OHCHR report documented an instance of rape and torture, writing: "A man with a mental disability was subject to cruel treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence by 8 to 10 members of the 'Azov' and the 'Donbas' battalions (both Ukrainian battalions) in August–September 2014. The victim's health subsequently deteriorated and he was hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital." A report from January 2015 stated that a Donetsk People's Republic supporter was detained and tortured with electricity and waterboarding and struck repeatedly on his genitals, which resulted in his confessing to spying for pro-Russian militants. == Neo-Nazi origins and allegations of ongoing far-right associations==

and the Black Sun, two symbols associated with the Wehrmacht and SS, over a small Tryzub''. Since 2015, it is no longer in use as a symbol of the regiment. and has been used since 1991 by the Social-National Party of Ukraine. There is broad agreement among observers that at its formation in Spring 2014, the Azov Battalion was associated with Neo-Nazi and far-right ideas, including through the use of symbolism and the political associations and statements of its leaders and cadre. However, there is disagreement about the subsequent course of its evolution. Several researchers have stated in the years since that the Battalion's successors have depoliticized or deradicalized, identifying key landmarks in that process as its November 2014 incorporation into the national guard, a 2017 expulsion of some far right radicals, and Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. Observers have also commented on the brigade's relationship to the cluster of organisations known as the "Azov movement". Some commentators who have stressed the depoliticization of the brigade have also argued that the movement has retained substantial far right associations. Official symbols At its founding, and through Spring 2015, the unit's emblem foregrounded a runic device called the National Idea symbol. The symbol was originally designed for the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) and was later used by the Patriot of Ukraine organisation and the Social-National Assembly; all three of which were far-right groups whose members joined Azov in 2014. The device was also similar to a version of the wolfsangel symbol used by a Nazi armored division. It is sometimes described simply as a wolfsangel, and sometimes as a "variation" or "mirror image" of that symbol, but not identical to it. According to the original designer of the National Idea symbol, the SNPU deliberately selected a version that used the Latin, rather than Cyrillic, initials of "national idea", knowing that it would be "provocative", due to its visual similarity to the Nazi swastika. He claimed not to have encountered the wolfsangel symbol at the time. In Spring 2015, the battalion adopted a new emblem, without the Black Sun and featuring a version of the National Idea symbol adapted, but distinct, from the original version. Like the original National Idea symbol, its replacement is sometimes referred to as a wolfsangel, Representatives of the unit have claimed that the runic device, rather than connected to Nazism, represents the Ukrainian words for "united nation" including swastikas and SS symbols. A Guardian correspondent also observed a swastika tattoo in 2014. In 2015, Marcin Ogdowski, a Polish war correspondent, gained access to one of Azov's bases located in the former holiday resort Majak; Azov fighters showed him Nazi tattoos as well as Nazi emblems on their uniforms. Analyst Vyacheslav Likhachev later wrote that the "right-wing radicals" who had remained in the formation after 2014 were "cleaned out" by the new regimental leadership in 2017. Bellingcat, an investigative journalist group, has traced ties between the Azov movement and American white supremacist groups. In 2019, Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov, who had helped found the battalion and overseen its incorporation within the National Guard, claimed that "The shameful information campaign about the alleged spread of Nazi ideology (among Azov members) is a deliberate attempt to discredit the 'Azov' unit and the National Guard of Ukraine." In February 2020, the Atlantic Council published an article by Anton Shekhovtsov, a scholar of right-wing extremism in Europe and expert on Russia's connections to Europe's far-right. Shekhovtsov argued that Azov should not be designated a foreign terrorist organization, for reasons including that it was a regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard, and therefore followed orders given by the Interior Ministry, and that there was insufficient evidence to support claims of links to Brenton Tarrant, the Rise Above Movement, and American right-wing terrorists. In a March 2020 article on the same website, however, Oleksiy Kuzmenko of Bellingcat argued that "the Regiment has failed in its alleged attempts to 'depoliticize.'" In 2021, according to Kuzmenko, the Azov regiment was “actively involved in the training of the movement’s youth leaders”. This followed the announcement from Kadyrov of their deployment in Ukraine and displays of their combat readiness. In a similar vein, Andreas Umland said in March 2022, that "In 2014 this battalion had indeed a far-right background, these were far-right racists that founded the battalion" but it had since become "de-ideologised" and a regular fighting unit. Its recruits now join not because of ideology but because "it has the reputation of being a particularly tough fighting unit," Umland said. and the red-and-black UPA flag at the Battalion's base in Urzuf, Mariupol Raion, July 2014|280x280px In March 2022, in an open letter to Russia published through Russian journalist Alexander Nevzorov, the Azov Regiment strongly denounced allegations of its neo-Nazi orientation, defining Nazism as a "tireless need to exterminate those who dared to be free" and noting that the regiment incorporated people of many ethnicities and religions, including Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Muslims, Greeks, Georgians, Crimean Tatars and Belarusians. According to the letter, Nazism, as well Stalinism, were "despised" by the regiment, since Ukraine greatly suffered from both. In April 2022, The Washington Post painted a picture of a group aware of its origins, and still with a far-right adherent commander and some extremist members, but much changed from its origins. Shekhovtsov also told the Financial Times that though it was originally formed by leadership of a neo-Nazi group, "It is certain that Azov [the battalion] has depoliticised itself. Its history linked to the far-right movement is pretty irrelevant today." In a May 2022 interview with The Kyiv Independent, Ilya Samoilenko, an Azov officer, stated that while he acknowledged the regiment's "obscure past", he and other members had chosen to leave the past behind when they integrated with the mainstream Ukrainian military. Similarly, in an interview with Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Azov deputy commander Sviatoslav Palamar denied the regiment being a neo-Nazi formation and said: "What is Nazism? When someone thinks that one nation is superior to another nation, when someone thinks he has a right to invade another country and destroy its inhabitants... We believe in our country's territorial integrity. We have never attacked anyone, and we have not wanted to do that." Vyacheslav Likhachev of the Centre for Civil Liberties, an expert on the far right, stated in April 2022 that there were no grounds for describing Azov as a neo-Nazi unit. Journalist Lev Golinkin, writing in June 2023, believed that there has never been a true depoliticization, and criticized the Western media's reporting on the brigade following the invasion, writing "for the West, it's appropriate to lionize neo-Nazis because they're fighting Russia". According to three researchers writing in 2023, Azov has, since its foundation, acted "with considerably less neo-Nazism and extremism, and included Muslims, Jews, and other minorities within its ranks". They said that "the Azov regiment and its commanders maintained a close organisational and ideological relationship with the neo-Nazi National Corps". According to Vyacheslav Likhachev several Jewish soldiers (including one Israeli citizen) served amongst the "first fighters" of Azov in 2014. In 2022, in a commentary published by the Center of Civil Liberties, antisemitism researcher Vyacheslav Likhachev said that despite Mariupol's fairly large Jewish community, there had not been any incidents between members of the Azov Regiment and the Jewish community since 2014. Colborne's June interview with Haaretz included mention that the Azov Battalion and the entire Azov movement are almost completely untainted by antisemitism. He said that not only for Azov, but for all the far-right movements in Ukraine, especially since 2014, antisemitism has lost its importance. == International arms and training controversies ==

United States In March 2015, Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov announced that the Azov Regiment would be among the first units to be trained by United States Army troops in the Operation Fearless Guardian training mission. US training however was withdrawn on 12 June 2015, as the US House of Representatives passed an amendment blocking any aid (including arms and training) to the regiment due to its neo-Nazi background. However, the amendment was later removed in November 2015, The decision was opposed by the Simon Wiesenthal Center which stated that lifting the ban highlighted the danger of Holocaust distortion in Ukraine, and by a Likud MP, but supported by Ukraine's Jewish community. Ultimately the regiment was not placed into the foreign terrorist organisation list. In early 2022, during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US continued to officially ban arms support to Azov via the yearly Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 following the 2018 provision. In June 2024, following the US State Department's lifting of restrictions on the Azov Brigade, the unit is no longer banned from US arms support, with officials stating that because the Azov Battalion of 2014 is structurally distinct from the Azov Brigade within the National Guard, restrictions due to US appropriations laws no longer apply. It was lifted after, according to the United States Government in Washington, there was no evidence of any human rights violations and also to bolster the brigade's fighting capacity at a challenging time during the war against Russia's invasion, with Ukraine struggling amid persistent shortages of ammunition and personnel. The arms embargo was established after reports that the Azov Brigade was violating human rights and committing war crimes and also due to the implicit bias against certain ethnic and religious groups due to the allegations of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi ideologies being present of the brigade's members. The law that made this sanction applicable was Leahy's Law, an act sponsored in 1997 by then-Senator Patrick Leahy in order to find a foreign military unit that has committed various violations of the Geneva Convention and human rights can be cut off from assistance from the United States Armed Forces. Canada In June 2015, the Canadian defense minister declared that Canadian forces would not provide training or support to the Azov Regiment. There is mounting evidence that Canada helped train members of Centuria (a far-right group of military officers, tied to the Azov movement and regiment). This was during Operation UNIFIER, a $890 million project to train the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 2021, a report from George Washington University discovered that extremists from this group were bragging about being trained by Canadian forces. In addition, an investigation by Ottawa Citizen discovered that Canadian officials met with leaders from the Azov Regiment in 2018, and that Canadian officials did not denounce the unit's neo-Nazi beliefs. Canadian officials were more concerned that the media would expose the meeting. Canadian officers and diplomats were photographed with battalion officials which was subsequently used as propaganda by Azov. CTV News found evidence on the social media account of an Azov leader of the unit's members training with Canadian instructors in 2019. The Canadian military has denied any knowledge that extremists were trained by Canadian forces. Israel In 2018, more than 40 Israeli human rights activists signed a petition to stop arms sales to Ukraine, saying there was evidence some of these arms might end up in the hands of the forces that the activists said openly espouse a neo-Nazi ideology, such as the Azov Regiment. In 2022, The Jerusalem Post raised concerns about the MATADOR anti-tank weapon, co-developed by Germany, Israel and Singapore, being shown in videos fired by a fighter from what it characterized as "the Neo-Nazi Azov Battalion". Greece In April 2022, a controversy occurred in Greece when Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared with a soldier from the Azov Regiment via video link to address the Hellenic Parliament. This soldier had allegedly been chosen to speak on the destruction of Mariupol because of his Greek ethnicity and knowledge of the language. The appearance caused outrage by opposition parties Syriza and KINAL and was labelled a "provocation" because of the association of the Azov Regiment with neo-Nazism. , spokesperson of the Greek Government, said the inclusion of the Azov Regiment message was "incorrect and inappropriate", but criticized SYRIZA for using the incident for political gain. == Use in Russian propaganda and information campaigns ==

Pre-2022 Nationalism researcher Andreas Umland notes "a contradictory, if not paradoxical history of cooperation" of organizations, involved in the creation of Azov, with anti-Euromaidan and the Russian neo-Nazi figures. This narrative has been a part of Russian propaganda since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, according to Russia scholar Izabella Tabarovsky of the Wilson Center, who said "there has been an intensive campaign of demonization, a certain resonance for Putin's core supporters in Russia" because "there is a national historical memory formed around World War II and the victory over Nazis. It is a strong part of the [Russian] national identity." During the early days of the war in Donbas, mostly in 2015–2017, Azov was featured in various fabricated videos by Russia and Russia-linked groups. Shortly before the 2016 Dutch Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement referendum, a video appeared of fighters supposedly from Azov. In it, the fighters burned a Dutch flag and threatened terrorist strikes if the referendum failed. They said "We will find you everywhere: in the cinema, at work, in your bedroom, public transport, we have our guys in the Netherlands, ready to follow any order." The video, according to a Bellingcat investigation, was produced and distributed by the Internet Research Agency and spread virally before being posted by the group that sponsored the referendum. In another instance, CyberBerkut, which portrayed itself as disgruntled Ukrainians but was later linked to the GRU, leaked a fabricated video portraying ISIS soldiers supposedly fighting in Azov. According to the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, this was part of a broader narrative surrounding Muslim soldiers in various units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, most notably Crimean Tatars. In another video, a follow-up to the atrocity propaganda Crucified boy-series of videos, acting as "punishers", members of Azov supposedly crucify and burn a separatist. Some of these resurfaced once again after the 2022 invasion on social media. During the war in Donbas, the unit was represented as similar in composition to the unit in the 2014–2015 timeframe, despite international observers in Donbas and other people saying otherwise. Especially in parts of central/eastern Europe, this was potentiated with manipulated imagery on social media, and the appearance of pro-Kremlin propaganda that mirrored pejorative language used in Russian media that painted Ukraine as a fascist aggressor against a Russian minority. In addition, Azov was attributed as responsible for a significant portion of the civilian deaths in Donbas. Russian invasion In justifying the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the narrative oriented around Ukrainian neo-Nazism continued, and the Azov Regiment has similarly played a central role under the pretext of "denazifying" Ukraine, with Russian media claiming its overwhelming presence and influence within Ukraine to paint a picture of the whole of the Ukrainian government and military as under Nazi control. Russian leaders have sometimes made aggressive denouncements of Ukrainian nationalism. For example, former Russian President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said "to dehumanise and denigrate Russia, "the crazed beasts of the nationalist and territorial defense battalions are ready to kill Ukrainian civilians"; all because "the very essence of Ukrainianness, fed by anti-Russian venom and lies about its identity, is one big sham. Ukrainian identity does not exist and never has". Azov has also featured in Chinese social media and news outlets in a similar fashion to Russian media. Azov's connections to neo-Nazism are often depicted as indicative of the views of Ukrainian society more widely despite Azov Regiment being a fringe group. After the war started, Chinese media attempted to link imagery of some Azov veterans in the 2019–2020 Hong Kong protests as proof the US was funding members of Azov to attend rallies and sow discord. According to radicalism researcher Vyacheslav Likhachev, these were people who participated as part of the group "Honor", which he no longer considers far right. During the Siege of Mariupol, Russia was accused of using the presence of Azov in the battle as justification for war crimes. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov justified the Mariupol hospital airstrike by claiming that Azov was using the hospital as a base and had previously evicted the patients and staff. On 16 March, the Donetsk Regional Drama Theater, which was sheltering almost 1,300 civilians, was struck and largely destroyed by an airstrike. Russia denied the bombings and claimed that the Azov Regiment had taken civilians as hostages inside the building and bombed the theater themselves to frame Russia. This was sharply disputed by Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of Donetsk region administration, who asserted that "the Russians are already lying, [saying] that the headquarters of the Azov Regiment was there. But they themselves are well aware that there were only civilians." Due to the increased prevalence of fact-checking websites, Russia, in counter-disinformation, utilized fake fact checking websites to counter common narratives in the west. For example, in the case of the Mariupol theater bombing, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started linking to a site that declared the images, videos and foreign news reports that attributed it to a Russian airstrike as fake, and instead, the site was used to add credence to the narrative according to which Azov had mined the building. After the discovery of the Bucha massacre following the end of the Battle of Kyiv, Russia and Russian media offered multiple contradictory explanations, in an approach disinformation experts called a "scattershot approach". In one of these narratives, Russian media claimed people associated with Azov and/or Azov fighters killed anyone not wearing a pro-Ukrainian blue ribbon after Russian troops left. International media have disproved this timeline using other evidence. The Azov-Kyiv territorial defense unit had been in the Kyiv area, according to Maksym Zhorin. In a post on 20 April 2022, Russian journalist wrote on his Telegram page, ('The Commissar Vanishes'), that following the Russian occupation of Mariupol, Azov leaders such as Prokopenko should be publicly executed and their bodies left to hang "as a reminder of who was in charge." The Russian Supreme Court scheduled a hearing for 29 June 2022, on whether or not to classify the Azov Regiment as a terrorist organization. It was subsequently rescheduled to 2 August 2022. On 2 August, the Supreme Court declared the regiment as a terrorist organization. This allows for harsher penalties to be imposed on members of the Azov Regiment. Members face up to 10 years in jail while leaders face up to 20 years. This decision supports "the use of Russian criminal law against prisoners of war", and opens the possibility to manipulate with the accusations of war crimes and fictional charges "to punish participants in the Ukrainian war". == Sham trials in Russia ==

The Azov Regiment led the defense of Mariupol at the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Around 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers were taken prisoners by Russia in Mariupol in May 2022. In August 2022, Russia declared the Azov regiment as a terrorist organization. This decision supports "the use of Russian criminal law against prisoners of war", and opens the possibility to manipulate with the accusations of war crimes and fictional charges "to punish participants in the Ukrainian war". and, per HRW, are an excuse to prosecute Ukrainian soldiers for participating in the conflict. As international lawyer Maksym Vishchyk notes, "Russian sham trials thus appear to entirely negate these core IHL principles, and appear aimed at de facto legitimizing revenge against the POWs for fighting in defense of their country." An OSCE report of December 2023 stated that "trials have raised questions as to their fairness, impartiality and independence, and appear to violate a range of IHL rules, including that combatants cannot be prosecuted merely for their participation in hostilities, as well as the prohibitions on exposing POWs to public curiosity, on subjecting them to ill-treatment and on coercing admissions of guilt." Ukrainian officials have characterized the trials as a media campaign for Russian audiences. Russia appears to use fictional justice trials to legitimize "revenge against the POWs for fighting in defense of their country". to persuade own Russians that "Ukrainian fighters are allegedly committing crimes against their own population." On one of the hearings in 2023, at least three of the POWs have asserted ill-treatment during detention and forceful confessions, and two have reported of health deterioration. As reported by HRW, "in courtroom photos from the hearing, the defendants appear exhausted and thin." "Prosecuting prisoners of war for participation in the conflict, depriving them of their fair trial rights, and subjecting them to torture or inhuman treatment are all breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes. The Russian authorities should immediately drop all charges against the Azov defendants." == See also ==