At the end of a 15-month investigation, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the fire had developed in a cargo compartment below the passenger cabin. This violated
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations forbidding the transport of
hazardous materials in passenger-aircraft cargo holds. Failure to cover the generators' firing pins with the prescribed plastic caps made accidental activation much more likely. The investigation revealed that rather than covering the pins, maintenance personnel simply cut the cords attached to the pins or applied
duct tape around the cans, and consumer-grade adhesive tape was also used to secure the ends. SabreTech employees indicated on the cargo manifest that the "oxy canisters", which were loosely packed in boxes that were each sealed with tape and bubble wrap, were "empty." ValuJet workers then loaded the boxes in the cargo hold in the mistaken belief that the devices were simply empty canisters that would be safe and legal to transport on a passenger aircraft. Chemical oxygen generators, when activated, produce
oxygen for passengers if the plane suffers a decompression. However, they also produce a great quantity of heat because of the
exothermic nature of the chemical reaction involved. Therefore, not only could the heat and generated oxygen start a fire, but the oxygen could also keep the fire burning. Investigators determined that one of the oxygen generators was likely triggered when the plane experienced a slight jolt while taxiing. As the aircraft taxied and took off, the generator began releasing heat that caused other canisters to activate. Each activation created more heat, which rapidly caused all of the generators to activate. The intense heat ignited a fire in the other materials in the cargo hold. The fire was worsened by the presence of two main aircraft tires, one of them mounted on a main wheel, and a nose tire and wheel that were also included in the list of materials shipped as COMAT. Laboratory testing showed that canisters of the same type could heat nearby materials up to . The oxygen from the generators fed the resulting fire in the cargo hold without any need for outside air, defeating the cargo hold's airtight design. A pop and jolt heard on the cockpit voice recording and correlated with a brief and dramatic spike in the
altimeter reading in the flight data recording were attributed to the sudden cabin-pressure change caused by one of the wheels in the cargo hold exploding from the heat.
Culpability The NTSB report placed responsibility for the accident on three parties: • SabreTech, for improperly packaging and storing hazardous materials • ValuJet, for not supervising SabreTech • The FAA, for not mandating smoke-detection and fire-suppression systems in cargo holds as recommended in 1988 after a similar incident with
American Airlines Flight 132 In 1997, a federal grand jury indicted SabreTech for mishandling hazardous materials, failing to train its employees in proper handling of hazardous materials,
conspiracy and
making false statements. SabreTech's maintenance supervisor Daniel Gonzalez and two mechanics who worked on the plane, Eugene Florence and Mauro Ociel Valenzuela-Reyes, were charged with conspiracy and making false statements. Two years later, having been found guilty on the mishandling hazardous materials and improper training charges, SabreTech was fined $2 million and ordered to pay $9 million in restitution. Gonzalez and Florence were acquitted on all charges, while Valenzuela failed to appear and was indicted
in absentia for
contempt of court. A warrant was issued for Valenzuela's arrest in 2000, and he remains a fugitive as of 2026. In 2010, he was specifically highlighted in the EPA's announcement of a website to search for "environmental fugitives." The FBI has offered a $10,000 reward for information on his whereabouts. In May 2001, SabreTech agreed to pay $2.25 million in fines to the FAA (later reduced to $1.75 million), but did not admit wrongdoing. Just before the federal trial, a Florida grand jury indicted SabreTech on 110 counts of
manslaughter and another 110 counts of
third-degree murder: one for each person who died in the crash. SabreTech settled the state charges by agreeing to plead
no contest to a state charge of mishandling hazardous materials and make a $500,000 donation to promote aviation safety. Many families of Flight 592's victims were outraged that ValuJet was not prosecuted, given the airline's poor safety record. ValuJet's accident rate was not only 14 times higher than that of legacy airlines, but one of the highest in the low-fare sector as well. In the aftermath of the crash, an internal FAA memo surfaced questioning whether ValuJet should have been allowed to stay in the air. The victims' families also point to statements made by ValuJet's officials immediately after the crash that led many to believe that ValuJet knew that the generators were on the plane and had ordered them returned to Atlanta rather than properly disposed in Miami.
Name change to AirTran In 1997, the company acquired
AirTran Airways. Although ValuJet was the nominal survivor, the merged airline took the AirTran name. ValuJet executives believed that a new name was important to regain the trust of the flying public. AirTran made little mention of its past as ValuJet. For example, it did not make any major announcements on the crash's 10th anniversary. In 2011, AirTran was purchased by Southwest Airlines. ==Legacy==