Common types of HVM include locally manufactured barrier systems such as the
Jersey barrier and
Bremer wall, as well as proprietary crash-tested and engineered vehicle bollard systems designed to resist the effects of a
vehicle-ramming attack. HVM can also include adapted hard landscape features, resistive street furniture, sculpture, planters and significant level changes; with a little imagination HVM may be disguised inside architectural features in a street scene. When installed and fixed correctly, HVM is designed to resist hostile vehicle penetration of certain categories of vehicles moving at a range of speeds; these vehicle security barriers undergo various destructive tests carried out by accredited test establishments. The three standards that are generally quoted when specifying HVM performance are: •
ISO IWA 14-1 - an international working agreement •
BSI PAS 68 - the UK standard •
ASTM F2656-07 - the US standard. These standards set roughly similar criteria for destructive impact testing, although there are differences between the three and vehicle geometries in particular are at the root of some of these differences. HVM barrier selection will be conditioned by a hostile
vehicle dynamics study carried out by a suitably qualified security specialist. planters provide protection similar to that of
bollards in
Washington, D.C. from hostile vehicle attack; these have now been replaced by more attractive bollards in
London,
UK. This hostile vehicle mitigation is a common form of
target hardening and is designed to prevent a vehicle being rammed into the building or into people on the pavement next to the building. It also enforces a zone of protective stand-off from any explosive detonation location. Ideally a protective layer of HVM should surround the building or place being protected. This HVM protection line should be stood off from the building facade or places expected to be crowded. This protective
standoff distance is critical in the case of VBIEDs as 'every metre counts' and often distance is one of the best ways to achieve explosive blast effects mitigation. lettering in the foreground of the
Emirates Stadium is an example of disguised HVM. More recently the focus of HVM has expanded to reduce the potential for vehicle ram attacks directed at crowded events and places. Recent non-VBIED (i.e. vehicle as a weapon) attacks against pedestrians include: • The
2016 Nice truck attack • The
2016 Ohio State University attack • The
2016 Berlin truck attack • The
2017 Jerusalem attack • The
January 2017 Melbourne car attack • The
2017 Sandy, Utah attack • The
2017 Stockholm truck attack • The
2017 Westminster attack • The
2017 London Bridge attack • The
2017 Finsbury Park attack • The
2025 New Orleans truck attack • The
2025 Vancouver car attack HVM can also be used to protect against
ram raids which are invariably criminal attacks against high net-worth targets such as jewelers,
cash and valuables in transit depots,
bullion storage facilities, art galleries, museums, and high-end fashion stores. Correctly installed HVM barrier systems should not adversely affect pedestrian permeability. ==See also==