Context In 1938 the United States legislated a system of tight airline regulation overseen by the CAB. Under this system, the domestic scheduled airlines were, for the main routes, the
trunk carriers (certificated just prior to World War II) and for routes to smaller cities, the
local service carriers (originally known as feeder carriers) certificated after World War II. But after World War II, another set of carriers sprang up, leveraging war-surplus aircraft and war-trained pilots, exploiting a loophole that allowed for "nonscheduled carriers." Originally numbering over 100, these airlines became known as
irregular air carriers and later as supplemental air carriers. The CAB struggled to control these carriers, which remained uncertificated (the CAB issued them a "letter of registration" in lieu of a certificate). During the time North American operated, CAB regulation limited irregular carriers in their ability to offer scheduled service. Initially, scheduled flights were required to be offered on an "irregular" basis (hence the name). After 1955, the CAB simply restricted such carriers from offering more than 10 flights/month on any city pair. Irregular carriers were otherwise limited to offering charter flights.
Standard, Viking and Oxnard Oakland May 1949. In July this aircraft would
crash on approach to
Burbank with the loss of 35 lives. See
External links for photos of Viking Air Lines and other North American-related aircraft Stanley D. Weiss and James Fischgrund were partners in
Long Beach-based
Standard Air Lines, Inc. (incorporated in California on 10 June 1946, which operated as
Fireball Air Express pre-incorporation Separately, Harry Ljung incorporated
Viking Air Transport, based at
Glendale, California, on 23 January 1946. But Ljung stepped down in early May, replaced by Hart. In 1947, Viking Air Transport became the non-operating parent company of Aero-Van Express. Weiss was a former
Air Transport Command pilot who flew
the Hump, Fischgrund was a lawyer who served as a US Navy officer on a destroyer escort, Hart was a former
Douglas Aircraft Company employee and Lewin served in the
Army Air Forces Technical Training Command. Standard and Viking were two of the first irregular airlines to be shut down by the CAB for operating scheduled flights. Along with
Charles C. Sherman's
Airline Transport Carriers (ATC; Charles Sherman was Weiss's original partner in Standard before he established ATC) the three carriers petitioned the CAB in July 1948 for approval to offer scheduled service. In fact they were already offering scheduled service; in 1948, they were three of the top four irregular airlines offering cheap transcontinental flights. In October the CAB refused the petition. By then, Standard and Viking were working with each other, sharing joint ticket agencies, for instance. The CAB shut down Standard on 20 June (effective 20 July), 1949 and Viking on 5 June (effective 5 July) 1950 for holding themselves out to the public as scheduled airlines in willful and knowing violation of the regulations. For each company this meant revocation of the letter of registration that the CAB issued to irregular air carriers in lieu of a certificate. Standard suffered a
fatal crash only a week before its final date (see
Accidents). Under new owners, Viking continued to operate until 1956 as a contract carrier, otherwise known as a
Part 45 carrier (no longer a
common carrier, unable to offer service to the public, the carrier escaped CAB regulation). By the time the CAB revoked Viking, Hart was operating
Oxnard Sky Freight. In 1950, among 55 irregular carriers operating that year, Oxnard was the largest by
revenue passenger miles (RPMs: one revenue-paying passenger flown one mile), accounted for over 1/6 of the irregular carrier RPMs. Together with Viking before it was shut down, the two accounted for over 20% of all 1950 irregular industry RPMs. Oxnard Sky Freight was doing business as North American Airlines; the CAB described Oxnard Sky Freight as the "genesis" of North American. However, the CAB was already onto Oxnard and shut it for willful and knowing violations as of March 6, 1951, giving it only a week's notice versus 30 days in the case of Standard and Viking. By then, it appears the four partners were already onto the "classic" version of North American.
North American combine Fischgrund said in Congressional testimony the group started in 1949, though his partner Weiss said 1950; as mentioned above, Oxnard sold tickets under the North American name in 1950. Sometime after that, the partners switched to the more famous/infamous configuration as follows. Weiss, Fischgrund, Hart and Lewin had identical ownership of everything, other than the airlines. As discussed below, by design the partners did not own the airlines, nor have official management roles, but they tightly controlled them nonetheless. A sales and marketing organization, North American Airlines Aircoach System (originally "North American Airlines Agency") sold tickets, taking a 45% cut, though 15–30 points of the 45 went to a travel agency if North American did not sell it directly (CAB-certificated carriers paid only 5% to travel agents). In 1956 there were 26 sales offices. A separate partnership, Republic Aircoach System, handled back office (e.g. accounting). Twentieth Century Aircraft and California Aircraft owned aircraft and leased them to whichever airline needed them (see nearby chart). In 1957, shortly before it ceased business, the group had 750 employees. There were also neon signs and TV show sponsorships. Three main sets of books were kept: the ticket agency, the back office entity and Twentieth Century Air Lines. At the end of the year, entries were adjusted to produce a 2% or zero percent profit for each of the carriers.
California Air Charter The CAB identified yet another irregular airline,
California Air Charter (CAC), as a group affiliate. The carrier was controlled by a former Oxnard Sky Freight manager who was also a former Viking shareholder, and CAC had commercial agreements with North American, including operating a shuttle between Burbank and Oakland on North American's behalf. California Air Charter was established as Kesterson, Inc., in 1946 in
Knoxville, Tennessee. The name changed when the airline was sold in 1950. Its authority was withdrawn in early 1960.
Letter of the law The group structure was an attempt to obey at least some part of the letter of the law while frustrating its purpose, including: • Running scheduled service with
irregular air carriers. Irregular carriers could fly individually-ticked passengers only if service on any one route was "irregular" (relaxed in 1955 to simply be infrequent). By farming out crews and aircraft to each of its five carriers, North American held itself out as providing regularly scheduled service while each individual carrier stayed irregular. Of course, there were specific CAB regulations against just this thing, which was known as "pooling." • By design, the carriers were easily replaceable, being little more than pieces of paper. Trans American Airways had "no office, no telephone, no employees, no stationery of its own and no salaries [...] paid to any of its officers." Twentieth Century Air Lines was acquired for $8,000. In 1954, the partners offered to settle with the CAB by shutting down the carriers. The CAB rejected the offer in part because it knew the carriers could be easily replaced, therefore very little would be solved by shutting down the specific carriers. • The four partners ostensibly neither owned nor managed the carriers. Testimony from a court case between Hart and his ex-wife explained why, with Hart telling that judge about his use of personal funds to buy another carrier in anticipation of the shut down of Oxnard Sky Freight. Hart explained he was
persona non grata with the CAB so could not be an airline owner, so the buyer's name on the bill of sale was kept blank to be filled in later with a dummy owner. Hart further explained how he and his partners were running a scheduled air service. The carriers were nominally owned and managed by stand-ins, who the CAB determined were flagrantly underqualified. For instance, the owner of Unit Export was an actor, the president of Trans National Airlines had no access to the company's bank account, his wife (the CAB summarized her qualifications as "performs regular duties of a housewife") was vice president of Trans National but the company later stipulated she did nothing but sign company minutes. None of the ostensible airline executives had offices in the group Executive Offices at
Lockheed Air Terminal in
Burbank. In practice, the partners had total control of the carriers. The CAB also followed the money. For instance, in a bank credit agreement, the partners represented the group as an integrated entity engaged in air transportation and provided guarantees from all meaningful group entities, including partner guarantees. • A flaw in this arrangement was that common control of air carriers (regardless of nominal ownership) or even ongoing cooperation between them was forbidden without CAB approval, regardless of ownership.
Profits North American was highly profitable by comparison with CAB-regulated airlines. In 1951, North American made operating profit of $1.16 million on operating revenues of $6.69 million. In 1955, sales were $15.50 million, operating profits of $1.16 million. By contrast, small
trunk carrier Northeast Airlines had 1955 operating profits of $148,000 on revenues of $10.12 million, achieving a breakeven result only after receiving 15% of revenues as government subsidy. It was also rewarding for the partners; for the period 1951 through October 1953, they had drawn (i.e. dividended) $2.4 million between them (over $24 million in 2024 dollars). Each partner drew another $213,000 in 1954 and 1955, along with a salary of $2,000 per month. A 1954 study by the Air Transport Association, the scheduled airline trade group (today known as
Airlines for America), noted that the North American Group's revenue per airplane mile exceeded that of the
trunk carriers (the domestic mainline scheduled airlines), which it attributed to North American running its aircraft at high
load factors (87.8% vs 64.5% for the trunks). As discussed in
Innovation North American's aircraft also had many more seats. But profits also reflected the CAB's then fare policy. The CAB set fares nationally for all scheduled carriers under its control at a constant amount per mile, regardless of distance (see nearby graph). This ignored underlying economics, that the cost per mile is higher for a short flight than long-flight (since many costs for a flight are independent of length). This meant CAB fares for long-haul flights were overly remunerative (but the CAB forced airlines to fly both long and short flights, essentially subsidizing shorter flights with the longer). North American could undercut CAB fares and still make money, something critics described as "cream-skimmming." The group fought it all the way to the Supreme Court, which denied
certiorari on 30 April 1956. The Federal appeals court ruling against the group described North American Aviation's virtues at length, referred to the ticket-selling organization as nothing more than a "ticket drummer", of knowing full well it was taking advantage of the good name of the aircraft manufacturer, noted that California had refused to register the name "North American" due to obvious confusion and said the group's hands were "unclean". The group changed its name to Trans American on 14 May 1956. But in August, a Federal judge fined three of the partners for contempt for continuing to use the North American name. Separately, in a case that also went to the U.S. Supreme Court, American Airlines, along with the CAB, sought to stop North American from using "American" in their name. It was for this reason the CAB also refused to use the name "North American Airlines" for the carrier previously known as Twentieth Century Air Lines. The case was heard by the Supreme Court and remanded. The appeals court decided "North American" was not OK, but the use of the word "American" as part of a name was not in itself forbidden. By this time, the group was already calling itself Trans American.
Public relations and lobbying for its trademark suit against the group and submitted into evidence by opponents in Congressional testimony. North American engaged in substantial public relations and lobbying. North American's $15.5mm in 1955 revenue remained tiny against the $1.59bn of the certificated carriers (American alone was $255mm in domestic revenue), so there was a David-vs-Goliath story to be told. and occasional newspaper advertisements not about its service, but its existence. They put a former senator,
Joseph C. O'Mahoney on their board. Lobbying resulted in some blowback. The group hired
Murray Chotiner to lobby on its behalf, leading to North American becoming part of a 1956 influence peddling scandal in the
Eisenhower Administration. Chotiner had run
Richard Nixon's early political campaigns (Nixon being Eisenhower's vice president.) In 1958, it was revealed that Eisenhower's powerful chief of staff,
Sherman Adams, had assisted Chotiner with the CAB, making it an even bigger deal. But by then, the group was dead. The group's complexity worked against it in settings like Congress. In one hearing, opponents republished a complex group organizational chart which North American Aviation prepared for its trademark suit against the group. The group's lawyer, testifying, objected to the chart as "childish", something "you would see in a psychiatrist's office" and "perfectly ridiculous", but then, only a moment or two later, conceded it was "essentially accurate." Further, because the group re-used names, apparently simple questions had confusing answers. A member of Congress asked: "Is the North American Airlines a single corporation?" The answer was both yes (North American Airlines, Inc., the airline was a single corporation) and no (North American Airlines the Group was not). Testimony got bogged down just trying to understand the organization. The CAB answered the question of why the group was so complex by saying that in part it was to evade and circumvent the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. In other words, the law.
Demise The CAB revoked North American's right to operate on 1 July 1955, the culmination of an investigation lasting over two years. North American took the case to an Federal appeals court, during which the group kept operating. On 20 December 1956, the appeals court said that North American (now Trans American) circumvented the law, both in creating a de facto scheduled airline, and in effectively merging multiple carriers. That the partners had a history of willfully disobeying CAB strictures, and were doing so, blatantly, again with North American, meant the CAB was within its rights to refuse to certificate the carrier and shut it down. On 18 January 1957, the appeals court denied a rehearing. Trans American appealed to the Supreme Court. Anticipating the end, in March 1957 Trans American pre-emptively leased its then five DC-6B aircraft, plus two others on order, to
Eastern Air Lines starting in May. The group said legal and other costs of trying to stay in business were over $1mm. Trans American's last flight arrived at Burbank on 6 June 1957. A US senator said that Trans American had brought its own troubles upon itself. Another said that giving Trans American a certificate would have been like awarding a liquor license to a
bootlegger after
Prohibition on the grounds of having proved his efficiency. ==Legacy==