with a 50-round
drum magazine In 1903, French military theorists noticed that the
machine guns of the day, heavy and relatively immobile, were of little use in infantry assaults. They determined that "the machine gun must learn to walk". A marching fire tactic (French:
feu de marche) was expected to involve incidental suppressive fire, with the advancing troops considered a deadlier threat than the unaimed bullets, causing the enemy to fall back. The prototype guns were not approved for production, and none were in service when
World War I began. Seeing the potential of such a gun, the British Army settled upon the American-designed
Lewis gun fitted for a round; infantry platoons provided with the guns were instructed in
fire and movement tactics. Soon, the gun was seen to be useful in marching fire assaults, notably by the
Australian Corps in the July 1918
Battle of Hamel. To serve the same purpose, the
German Army adopted the
MG08/15 which was impractically heavy at counting the water for cooling and one
magazine holding 100 rounds. The tactic was to be employed under conditions of limited field of fire and poor visibility such as advancing through woods. That same year the
U.S. Navy instructed its landing forces (usually
Marines) that marching fire with a BAR was to be used in very limited circumstances, such as when the enemy line was clearly defined and the range was less than . Marching fire was not usually employed in the open and was more appropriate in dense woods. The
Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) handbook of 1921 included a description of marching fire as an assault tactic in which the BAR men walk and shoot from the hip with the weapon's weight supported on a shoulder sling, but the accompanying riflemen were expected to halt and carefully aim each of their shots, firing from the shoulder, from a standing or kneeling position. The psychological value of marching fire was quickly recognized. Marching fire was seen as a boost to the morale of the assault troops. It was hoped that enemy troops would lose courage if they heard bullets flying around them, if they believed that their position was known to the attackers.
World War II in 1943 The tactic of marching fire was praised by General
George S. Patton for three reasons: friendly forces using the tactic continued to advance rather than get bogged down, the positive action of shooting provided self-confidence to the soldier, and the enemy's defensive fire was reduced in accuracy, volume and effectiveness. Patton recommended that the rifleman carrying "that magnificent weapon", the
M1 Garand rifle, should fire his weapon every two or three paces, holding the weapon at his shoulder if desired, but a lower position between the belt and armpit was "just as effective". in 1943, supported by an
M3 Stuart tank General
William E. DePuy, who rose from junior staff officer to battalion commander in the
90th Infantry Division between 1942 and 1945, evaluated the efficacy of unsupported marching fire and found it lacking. Writing after the war, DePuy said that marching fire became a fad, in some American units almost the sole form of attack. DePuy noted that when it was employed against Germans who were "well hidden and in very good positions"—as they usually were—the attackers walked into the enemy's
kill zone. DePuy said that if maneuvering infantry alone performed marching fire, the moment when enemy suppression was most needed it would cease during the final charge at which time "the enemy then comes up out of his foxholes and starts to fire at you." DePuy asserted that suppression gained by fire from non-moving units was critical to the success of marching fire. Such units could be as large as rifle companies or as small as squads equipped with heavy and light machine guns. == References ==