Washington Naval Conference

At the end of World War I, the British still had the largest navy afloat, but its big ships were becoming obsolete, and the Americans and the Japanese were rapidly building expensive new warships. Britain and Japan were allies in a treaty that was due to expire in 1922. Although there were no immediate dangers, observers increasingly pointed to the American-Japanese rivalry for control of the Pacific Ocean as a long-term threat to world peace. By then, considering their colonial interests in Asia, the British decided that it was better for them to cast their lot with Washington than Tokyo. To stop a needless, expensive, and possibly dangerous arms race, the major countries signed a series of naval disarmament agreements. The global appetite for peace and disarmament was aplenty throughout the 1920s. Women had just won the right to vote in many countries, and they helped convince politicians that money could be saved, votes won, and future wars avoided by stopping the arms race. Across the world, leaders of the women's suffrage movement formed international organizations such as the International Council of Women and the International Woman Suffrage Alliance. Historian Martin Pugh writes that they achieved the greatest influence in the 1920s, "when they helped to promote women's contribution to the anti-war movement throughout the Western world." In the United States, practically all the major Protestant denominations and highly visible Protestant spokesmen were strong supporters of international peace efforts. They collaborated to work to educate their local congregations on the need for peace and disarmament. ==Meeting==

The American delegation, led by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, included Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge and Oscar Underwood, ==Agreements==

US President Warren Harding called the Washington Conference a deal that all countries thought best for themselves. To resolve technical disputes about the quality of warships, the conferees adopted a standard based on the tonnage displacement, a simple measure of the size of a ship. A ten-year agreement fixed the ratio of battleships at 5:5:3: 525,000 tons for the US, 525,000 tons for Britain, and 315,000 tons for Japan. Smaller limits with a ratio of 1.67 applied to France and Italy. Battleships, the dominant weapons systems of the era, could be no larger than 35,000 tons. The major powers allowed themselves 135,000:135,000:81,000 tons for the newly-developed aircraft carriers. While the admirals were unhappy, peace activists strongly supported the results and successfully worked for ratification. In the United States they included the World Peace Foundation; the American Association for International Conciliation; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the Women's Peace Society; the Women's World Disarmament Committee; the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. The Washington Conference exactly captured the worldwide popular demand for peace and disarmament. Without an agreement, the US, Britain and Japan likely would have engaged in a naval arms race much like that experienced between Britain and Germany before the First World War. However, even with the restrictions, the agreement solidified Japan's position as a great power and was treated as a colonial power with equal diplomatic interests, a first for a non-Western nation. The naval treaty was concluded on February 6, 1922. Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged in Washington on August 17, 1923, and it was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on April 16, 1924. Japan agreed to revert Shandong to Chinese control by an agreement concluded on February 4, 1922. Ratifications of the agreement were exchanged in Beijing on June 2, 1922, and it was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on July 7, 1922. ==Results==

The Washington Naval Treaty led to an effective end to building new battleship fleets, and the few ships that were built were limited in size and armament. Many existing capital ships were scrapped or sunk. Some ships under construction were turned into aircraft carriers instead. Even with the treaty, the major navies remained suspicious of one another and briefly (1927–1930) engaged in a race to build heavy cruisers, which had been limited in size (10,000 tons) but not numbers. That oversight was resolved on value of cruisers by the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which specified a 10:10:7 ratio for cruisers and destroyers. For the first time, submarines were also limited, with Japan given parity with the US and Britain, at 53,000 tons each. (Submarines typically displaced 1,000–2,000 tons each.) The US Navy maintained an active building program that replaced obsolescent warships with technically more sophisticated new models in part because its construction yards were important sources of political patronage and so were well protected by Congress. During the New Deal, relief funds were used to build more warships. "The naval program was wholly mine," President Franklin Roosevelt boasted. ==Termination==

The pacts and the treaties that resulted from the Washington Naval Treaty remained in effect for fourteen years. Japan ended participation in 1936. ==See also==

• Buell, Raymond Leslie. The Washington Conference (D. Appleton, 1922) online • Dingman, Roger. Power in the Pacific: the origins of naval arms limitation, 1914–1922 (1976) • Dukes, Paul. ''The USA in the Making of the USSR: The Washington Conference 1921–22 and 'Uninvited Russia'.'' (Routledge, 2004). • Earle, Neil. "Public Opinion for Peace: Tactics of Peace Activists at the Washington Conference on Naval Armament (1921–1922)." Journal of Church and State 40#1 (1998), pp. 149–69, online. • Elleman, Bruce A. "The Washington Conference, 1921–1922." in International Competition in China, 1899–1991. (Routledge, 2015). 89–102. • Fanning, Richard W. Peace and disarmament: Naval rivalry & arms control, 1922–1933 (1995) online • Ferris, John. Armaments and allies: The Anglo-Japanese strategic relationship, 1911–1921 (Routledge, 2003). • Field, Andrew. Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939 (2004) • Gibbs, Norman. "The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years: A study in Anglo-American Relations" Naval War College Review 30#1 (Special issue Summer 1977), pp. 50–63 Online • Goldman, Emily O. Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars. (Pennsylvania State U. Press, 1994). 352 pp. • Goldstein, Erik, and John H. Maurer, eds. The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Psychology Press, 1994) topical essays by experts. • Hayashi, Mika. "Disarmament Debates around the 1899 Hague Peace Conference and the 1921–1922 Washington Conference: Community-Oriented Aspirations and Individual Security Concerns." ''Journal of the History of International Law/Revue d'histoire du droit international'' 1.aop (2021): 1–28. • • Kaufman, Robert Gordon. Arms Control during the Prenuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars. Columbia U. Press, 1990. 289 pp. • Kitching; Carolyn J. Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919–1934 Rutledge, 1999 online • Louria, Margot. ''Triumph and Downfall: America's Pursuit of Peace and Prosperity, 1921–1933'' (Cambridge University Press, 2001). • McKercher, B. J. C. "'A Certain Irritation': The White House, the State Department, and the Desire for a Naval Settlement with Great Britain, 1927–1930." Diplomatic History 31.5 (2007): 829–863. • O'Brien; Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936 (Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought) (1998) • Schenkein, Joshua. "Japan, The Great Power: Industrialization Through The Lens Of Zaibatsu." 2014 ASIN: B00NRHRMW2 • • Willoughby, Westel Woodbury. China at the Conference: A Report. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Primary sources • ==External links==