The High Court was divided with the majority of judges agreeing as to the conclusions but for different reasons such that there was no
majority opinion and the
ratio decidendi is, in part, uncertain. The
plurality opinion is found in the judgments of
Isaacs,
Powers and
Rich JJ.
The exercise of judicial power A majority of judges,
Griffith CJ,
Barton, Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ, held that the power to enforce awards, being convictions for offences and the imposition of penalties and punishments, are matters appertaining exclusively to judicial power. Because the power conferred by the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1915 was part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration could only do so if the
Arbitration Act complied with the requirements of a Chapter III court. Barton, Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ held that any judge of a Chapter III court must be appointed for life, subject only to the removal powers in section 72(ii). The life appointment must be to the particular court, not just to a court. It followed that the appointment of the President for a term of seven years was contrary to s 72 of the Constitution. Because the President was invalidly appointed, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration could not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth and the provisions conferring upon it the power to enforce its awards were, therefore, invalid. Isaacs & Rich JJ in their joint judgement held that the only power the Constitution gave the
Governor-General with respect to judges under Chapter III was to appoint or, in limited circumstances, remove the judge from office. The Governor-General had no power to assign judicial duties. Griffith CJ agreed with the majority that a judge must be appointed for life, however his Honour dissented as to the conclusion, holding at p 448 that being the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was not a separate judicial office, as it conferred no additional remuneration nor any personal right or advantage. As such the Governor-General was assigning these judicial duties to one of the Justices of the High Court and it was not an appointment under section 72 of the Constitution. In separate judgments Higgins and Gavan Duffy JJ dissented on the basis that s 72 of the Constitution did not require the appointment of a judge for life and that a person who ceased to be a judge on the expiration of that person's term of office was not removed by the Governor-General. If the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration could not enforce the award, then who could? Isaacs, Higgins, Powers and Rich JJ held that the award could be enforced in any
Magistrates' court exercising
summary jurisdiction.
The exercise of arbitration powers The majority decision that the provisions conferring judicial power to enforce awards were invalid, raised the issue as to whether the invalidity extended to the provisions that allowed the award to be made. That is whether the invalid conferral of judicial power could be severed from the valid conferral of powers of arbitration. Isaacs, Higgins, Powers and Rich JJ held that these portions could be severed and that the rest of the Act was valid. Barton J dissented on the basis that the intention of parliament was that the two spheres of power "should coexist in the same tribunal as parts of one whole", such that the Act was wholly beyond the powers of the Parliament and that award was invalid and not enforceable. Griffith CJ held that the entire Act was valid and so upheld the validity of the award. His Honour however agreed with Barton J that the Act was not severable and that if the enforcement powers were invalid, as found by the majority, then the entire Act was invalid. == Significance ==