During the 1920s, several new cipher machines were developed generally based on using
typewriter mechanics and basic electrical circuitry. An early example was the
Hebern Rotor Machine, designed in the US in 1915 by
Edward Hebern. This system offered such security and simplicity of use that Hebern heavily promoted it to investors. Friedman realized that the new
rotor machines would be important, and devoted some time to analyzing Hebern's design. Over a period of years, he developed principles of analysis and discovered several problems common to most rotor-machine designs. Examples of some dangerous features which allowed cracking of the generated code included having rotors step one position with each keypress, and putting the fastest rotor (the one that turns with every keypress) at either end of the rotor series. In this case, by collecting enough
ciphertext and applying a standard statistical method known as the
kappa test, he showed that he could, albeit with great difficulty, crack any cipher generated by such a machine. Friedman used his understanding of rotor machines to develop several that were immune to his own attacks. The best of the lot was the
SIGABA—which was destined to become the US's highest-security cipher machine in
World War II after improvements by
Frank Rowlett and
Laurance Safford. Just over 10,000 were built. A patent on SIGABA was filed at the end of 1944, but kept secret until 2001, long after Friedman had died, when it was finally issued as . In 1939, the Japanese introduced a new cipher machine for their most sensitive diplomatic traffic, replacing an earlier system that SIS referred to as "RED." The new cipher, which SIS called "
PURPLE", was different and much more difficult. The Navy's cryptological unit (
OP-20-G) and the SIS thought it might be related to earlier Japanese cipher machines, and agreed that SIS would handle the attack on the system. After several months trying to discover underlying patterns in PURPLE ciphertexts, an SIS team led by Friedman and
Rowlett, in an extraordinary achievement, figured it out. PURPLE, unlike the German
Enigma or the
Hebern design, did not use
rotors but
stepper switches like those in automated
telephone exchanges.
Leo Rosen of SIS built a machine using—as was later discovered—the identical model of switch that the Japanese designer had chosen. Thus, by the end of 1940, SIS had constructed an exact analog of the PURPLE machine without ever having seen one. With the duplicate machines and an understanding of PURPLE, SIS could decrypt increasing amounts of Japanese traffic. One such intercept was the message to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., ordering an end (on December 7, 1941) to negotiations with the US. The message gave a clear indication of impending
war, and was to have been delivered to the US State Department only hours prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor. The controversy over whether the US had
foreknowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack has roiled well into the 21st century. In 1941, Friedman was hospitalized with a "
nervous breakdown", widely attributed to the mental strain of his work on PURPLE. While he remained in hospital, a four-man team—
Abraham Sinkov and
Leo Rosen from SIS, and Lt.
Prescott Currier and Lt. Robert Weeks from the U.S. Navy's OP-20-G—visited the British establishment at the "
Government Code and Cypher School" at
Bletchley Park. They gave the British a PURPLE machine, in exchange for details on the design of the
Enigma machine and on how the British
decrypted the Enigma cipher. However Friedman visited Bletchley Park in April 1943 and played a key role in drawing up the
1943 BRUSA Agreement. == National Security Agency ==