Glidewell LJ held Williams had provided good consideration even though he was merely performing a pre-existing duty. Williams got £3,500 (not full
expectation damages). He said that the idea of
promissory estoppel was not properly argued and 'not yet been fully developed'. The concept of economic duress provided an answer to Stilk's old problem, that an agreement to perform an existing legal duty cannot constitute good consideration for a new contract. The test for understanding whether a contract could legitimately be varied was set out as follows. • if A has a contract to employ B for work • before it is done, A has reason to doubt whether B will, or be able to complete his side of the bargain • A promises B to pay more • A 'obtains in practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit' from giving the promise • there is no economic duress or fraud The practical benefit of timely completion, even though a pre-existing duty is performed, constitutes good consideration. On
Stilk v Myrick, Glidewell LJ said, However, the principle had not in fact been subjected to any refinement and the three cases he relied on for this proposition -
Ward,
Williams v Williams and
Pao On - unanimously applied it by finding legal consideration (without which the post-contractual modifications would not have been upheld). Glidewell LJ expanded that this test merely refined the
Stilk v Myrick principle further but left it unscathed. This is debatable as he held that other practical benefits than those envisaged as the original consideration may
per se constitute the requisite good consideration to fulfil the contract (something
Stilk v Myrick specifically did not allow). The two cases would until then have been seen as indistinguishable on their facts. or whether he overruled the High Court precedent (later relied on in more senior courts) of
Stilk v Myrick.
Russell LJ, giving his own interpretation in the plaintiff's favour held: He noted that Roffey Bros' employee, Mr Cottrell had felt the original price to be less than reasonable, and there was a further need to replace the 'haphazard method of payment by a more formalised scheme' of money per flat. "True it was that the plaintiff did not undertake to do any work additional to that which he had originally undertaken to do but the terms upon which he was to carry out the work were varied and, in my judgment, that variation was supported by consideration which a pragmatic approach to the true relationship between the parties readily demonstrates."
Purchas LJ concurred with Glidewell LJ. ==Subsequent cases==