On 9October, a Japanese patrol plane was lost to the east of Okinawa. On 10October, American forces conducted an air raid over the islands. Throughout the day and night of 11October, radar-equipped Japanese reconnaissance aircraft sighted various task groups of the Third Fleet, giving area commanders on Formosa and in the Philippines early warning. Knowing that dawn strikes on 12October were imminent, ground forces were placed on alert and aircraft were readied for early morning intercept. The Japanese forces on Formosa positioned their fighter planes in two groups, one covering Taihoku and the other covering Takao. In
Kyushu, the T Attack Force prepared for night missions while other air units planned a large formation attack against the American carriers. Combat experience of U.S. carrier air groups during the battle depended to a considerable degree upon disposition of their task group and assigned strike targets. On the morning of 12October, the four task groups of the Fast Carrier Task Force were strung out roughly from northwest to southeast. Task Group 38.2, as the northernmost group, was assigned the northern third of Formosa. Task Group 38.3 was next in line and assigned the central portion of the island. Finally, Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 were jointly assigned southern Formosa.
12 October All four task groups completed launch of predawn fighter sweeps by around 06:00 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert,
Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters from all four groups were intercepted by enemy aircraft and moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where aircraft from Rear Admiral
Gerald F. Bogan's TG38.2 and Rear Admiral
Frederick C. Sherman's TG38.3 operated. Sherman's and claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three
Essex-class carriers, and .
Intrepid and
Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese aircraft destroyed, making the combined claims for the two groups around 100. The Japanese lost 17 of their 50 operational Formosa-based fighters, according to survivor
Kazuo Odachi. Many of Japan's more experienced pilots were killed during the first wave of American air raid. American carrier air groups had suffered minimal personnel losses with nine U.S. aircraft shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships or submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAS fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines were still in training. The bulk of enemy fighter aircraft reported by U.S. aviators were Japanese Army types, primarily the
Nakajima Ki-44 (
Allied reporting name "Tojo"),
Kawasaki Ki-61 ("Tony") and
Nakajima Ki-43 ("Oscar") models. Even though there were some experienced Japanese naval aviators operating at this time, IJNAS
Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter units reconstituted after the
Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage. In addition, Japanese commander
Shigeru Fukudome observed that while planes in his units caught fire almost immediately upon receiving damage, American fighters were less likely to ignite. Though the day's remaining carrier strikes by Hellcat fighters,
Curtiss SB2C Helldiver dive bombers, and
Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, they failed to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. Many surviving structures would be destroyed by
B-29 raids during the later days of the battle, however. The only effective Japanese counterattack to develop against TF38 came from the home islands of Japan. A hundred or so aircraft from
Kyushu attacked the task force during day time on the 12th, reportedly damaging two carriers. Hundreds more would sortie out on the 14th and 15th but fail to sight the American fleet again. Meanwhile, the T Attack Force trained for all-weather and night operations flew south to execute Japan's first large-scale radar assisted nighttime aerial torpedo attack. The results were lackluster. U.S. Navy ships made smoke for cover and engaged in radical maneuvering to keep enemies astern as Japanese aircraft dropped flares to illuminate their targets. Eight Japanese aircraft were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three
Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers were claimed by night fighters from the . suffered damage from friendly fire, but no damage from enemy aircraft was incurred.
13 October On 13 October the weather was more uncooperative than on the previous day. Even though a wider array of targets was assigned to the task groups, from the
Pescadores to northern
Luzon and Formosa, far fewer enemies were encountered in the air. Results of the day's strike operations were hard to ascertain due to the overcast. Pilots' reports from these two days of strikes helped uncover a larger network of air bases on Formosa than previously anticipated. This knowledge, combined with radio intercepts and the dusk strikes fended off the previous evening, led Commander Task Force 38 Mitscher to cancel any strikes scheduled to take off after 14:00 hours. Instead, the task groups prepared to defend against another night assault. Elements of the T Attack Force returned as expected to carry out twilight strikes against U.S. warships. This time, TGs38.1 and 38.4 found themselves under attack. Japanese formations were spotted via radar at 16:40 and intercepted by Combat Air Patrol (CAP) planes from TG38.4's an hour later. The
Belleau Wood fighters put the enemy formation to rout more than from the carrier force, destroying 10fighters and bombers before returning to their ship. By 18:12, just before sunset, another formation of T Attack Force pilots was closing to within striking range of the task groups. Six more planes were shot down in the vicinity of TG38.4 in the span of twenty minutes. A subsequent group of six Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers which had penetrated the picket and evaded the CAP made determined attacks on the carriers of TG38.4, putting four torpedoes in the water before all six were shot down by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. One torpedo ran just ahead of the , and another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into
Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water. TG 38.1 was not as lucky. Ten
Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers made contact with the group at 18:23 after eluding early radar detection by flying low over the water. Though visual contact was made and shipboard anti-aircraft fire destroyed six planes, one Frances pressed home a determined torpedo attack on the carriers. The pilot was forced off course, missing his chance to torpedo a fleet carrier; however, his torpedo struck the , killing 23 of her crew and inflicting serious damage upon the cruiser. Both engine rooms flooded and damage was done to the rudder. As a result,
Canberra had to be taken in tow as part of a new task group, TG30.3, composed of ships detached from the carrier groups. Around 22:00 began towing the crippled cruiser to the southeast.
14 October The task groups were forced to stay within enemy air range longer than anticipated due to
Canberra situation. Early morning fighter sweeps were launched to suppress air power on Luzon and Formosa while the newly formed task group attempted to escort
Canberra to safety. Some air groups encountered Japanese planes in the strike zones, but no major air-to-air combat developed. Throughout the afternoon, enemy aircraft flew to the perimeter of the task groups to relay sighting reports. Another long night at general quarters was anticipated by CTF 38. This intelligence was proved correct in short order. TGs38.1, 38.2, and 38.3 all suffered mass enemy air attacks between roughly 15:00–18:30 hours. TG 38.2 was the first group attacked. A formation of 25
Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the
Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tub without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack. At around 17:00 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG38.3. As before, a great many of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planestorpedo bombers and fighterssuccessfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather, and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage. Task Group 38.1 had been designated as cover for the retiring
Canberra group. At 16:15 joined TG38.1 to replace
Wichita, which had been positioned to port off
Wasp bow before its assignment as tow boat. A large bogey appeared after sunset at 1831. Anti-aircraft batteries of the group's
picket ships downed ten planes as they attempted to close on the carriers, but there were many more that made it to the center of the group. At least two enemy aircraft put torpedoes into the water in the vicinity of the
Houston. The ship turned hard to starboard in an attempt to avoid the first torpedo wake that was seen. Though a second torpedo missed the ship to port, the first struck the cruiser amidships between the keel and
armor belt. Flooding in the engine rooms and other interior spaces caused the ship to take on a 16°list. Many of the ship's crew had gone over the side of the wallowing vessel into the water. An order to abandon ship was almost given, but it was decided that would tow the damaged cruiser back east. Though attacks against TG 38.1 continued for hours after the
Houston was hit, no further successes were scored by Japanese raiders.
15 October Initially, operations orders called for the task groups to refuel on this date. Given the torpedoing of
Houston and
Canberra, however, only TGs38.2 and 38.3 departed for refueling. TG38.4 was reassigned strikes on Luzon to keep attacking planes at bay while TG38.1 continued to function as escort for the group of damaged ships now nicknamed "Crippled Division1". Faced with the decision to either
scuttle or protect the damaged cruisers, advisers to Admiral
William Halsey Jr., the commander of the U.S.
3rd Fleet, convinced him to turn a bad situation into an opportunity. Unofficially dubbed "Bait Division", the slow-moving ships and their escorts were used as a lure to draw out the Japanese fleet. Urgent radio transmissions were broadcast on open channels in the hopes of enemy interception. It appeared based on sighting reports that the plan might work: in the morning and evening, cruiser and battleship forces were reported heading south from Japan and southeast from Formosa. Meanwhile, enemy air attacks did not slack off despite severe losses suffered by the Japanese over the preceding days. Rather than waiting for nighttime raids, Japanese attack formations, escorted by A6M Zero fighters, conducted strikes on TGs38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk. Combat air patrol over TG38.4 had to be augmented with additional fighters to intercept incoming Japanese aircraft. Approximately two dozen Japanese attack and fighter planes were shot down between 10:45–10:56 hours by a combination of CAP fighters and ships' guns. Fighters from accounted for many more planes destroyed throughout the afternoon hours. Though
Franklin took a glancing bomb hit during these battles, the damage proved superficial. TG38.4 planes did battle with the enemy over land as well. Air Group 13 (CAG-13) aboard
Franklin encountered a large group of enemies at
Nielson Field during the morning strikes against Luzon. They claimed at least 20 enemy planes for a loss of just one Hellcat fighter. Once again, TG 38.1 was subject to the most concerted Japanese attacks. No offensive strikes were launched by the group's aircraft. Instead, CAP strength was bolstered as much as possible. Fighting Squadron 14 (VF-14) aboard claimed 30 enemy planes shot down by day's end, and other carrier fighter groups in the task group downed over a dozen more. Some close bomb hits were recorded by the carriers, but no real damage was done to any U.S. warship during these attacks.
16 October . Long-range searches were conducted in the morning and afternoon by task force aircraft. It was hoped that a Japanese surface fleet would be heading towards the broadcast location of Bait Division. Unfortunately, by the evening it was clear that enemy reconnaissance aircraft had taken stock of remaining U.S. fleet strength. No surface engagement developed from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait". Though enemy ships did not materialize, Japanese air attacks continued in force throughout the morning and into the afternoon. Dedicated air cover for TG30.3 was provided by light carriers and , whose air groups intercepted numerous bandits. The largest strike, consisting of 75 Japanese attack and fighter planes, arrived around 13:30 hours. One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea. The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of the
Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. Initially unsure whether the ship would hold together, the captain ordered the evacuation of 300 crew members while the ship's condition was ascertained. In the end it was determined she would stay afloat. Towing continued as before, slowly moving the task group towards the
Naval Base Ulithi. == Aftermath ==