1960 Ethiopian coup attempt

In the 1950s, discontent grew within Ethiopia toward Emperor Haile Selassie's imperial regime. Many members of the aristocracy became frustrated with the empire's stagnation and limitations. The government's repression and prohibition of autonomous organizations stifled any reformist movements within the ruling class. Although many elites recognized the need for serious reform, Emperor Selassie refused to tolerate any form of protest, especially organized efforts. Even influential Ethiopian families feared the regime's extensive network of spies and the emperor's potential reaction to dissent, creating an atmosphere of fear among the ruling class. Historian Bahru Zewde concluded, "The obstruction he encountered even in these remote posts convinced him of the need for change, and he began to work with his brother to that end." Germame then managed to persuade his brother, Brigadier-General Mengistu Neway, that a successful military coup against the current government was feasible. Mengistu was vital to the success of Germame's plan because he commanded the Kebur Zabangna, the Emperor's imperial guard whose members were expected to follow orders without question, and had connections throughout the Ethiopian armed forces. Two more important members, Colonel Warqenah Gabayahu, imperial chief of security, and Brigadier-General Tsege Dibu, the commissioner of the police force, were recruited to form a clandestine "Council of the Revolution", and the group began planning their move. According to Paul Henze, fearing that their plans had already leaked out, the conspirators rushed into action when the Emperor departed on a state visit to Brazil without sufficient planning. According to the memoirs of John H. Spencer, Makonnen Habte-Wold had been seriously suspicious of Colonel Warqenah's activities two years prior to the attempted coup, and only five months before the conspirators acted Makonnen confided his renewed suspicions about both the Colonel as well as Brigadier-General Tsege to Spencer. A year before the coup, Colonel Warqenah sought out one of the many Israeli military advisors working with the Ethiopian army. Warqenah revealed that the Emperor feared a potential military uprising that could lead to a march on Addis Ababa. He requested the advisor to identify weak points on a map of the capital and suggest defensive strategies for the imperial guard. This very map was later discovered among Warqenah's possessions after the failed coup attempt to overthrow Haile Selassie. While emperor Selassie was on a state visit to Brazil, the commander of the Imperial Guard, Mengistu Neway and his brother Germame Neway attempted a coup d'état. ==Coup==

On the evening of Tuesday, 13 December 1960, the group duped several Ministers of the Imperial Crown and other important political personages into coming to Guenete Leul Palace in the capital, Addis Ababa, for an emergency meeting. They then were taken hostage, including Prime Minister Ras Abebe Aregai. At the same time, followers of Colonel Warqenah occupied the central bank, the radio station, and the Ministry of Finance. The Kebur Zabagna surrounded the other army bases in and around the capital. Before dawn, telephone exchanges were seized and Addis Ababa airport was under control of the bodyguards, who banned all flights. Tanks occupied strategic positions around the capital and by days end most of the imperial family and high ranking officials had been seized. An Israeli radio operator aboard the aircraft transporting Haile Selassie during his trip to Brazil relayed news of the coup. Tel Aviv advised the Emperor to land in Liberia, where Mossad chief Isser Harel hurried to meet him. The Israelis also advised Ethiopian paratroop commanders, who had been trained in Israel, to secure the Addis Ababa airport in preparation for Selassie's return. Meanwhile, Tel Aviv directed all Israeli officials in Ethiopia to coordinate with the governor of Eritrea to facilitate the Emperor's arrival in Asmara.) Dejazmach Asrate Medhin Kassa, Major General Mared Mangesha, and the other loyalists spent their time more usefully; they secured the support of the tank squadron and the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, both stationed within reach of the capital, and made up their initial shortage of troops by airlifting about 1,000 loyal soldiers in from outlying provinces; they also issued leaflets signed by Abuna Basilios, head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, which condemned the rebels as anti-religious traitors and called for loyalty to Haile Selassie. These leaflets are believed to have had a great effect on the uncommitted. Clashes Fighting broke out in the afternoon of the next day. Heavily outnumbered, the rebels were slowly driven back. Many ordinary soldiers of the Kebur Zabagna, once they learned they were fighting against the Emperor, lost heart as they had been given to understand that they were fighting for him. Coup suppressed The use of force saved Selassie's regime, but in effect turned the Imperial Army into a major pillar of the regime. General Tsege was killed in the fighting; Colonel Warqenah committed suicide. Mengistu and Germame evaded capture until 24 December 1960 when they were surrounded by the army near Mojo. Rather than face capture, Germame committed suicide; Mengistu surrendered. He was publicly hanged in a church square a few months later. Germame's body was brought to Addis Ababa and hanged as well, as a manner of demonstrating the Emperor's resolve. Official casualty figures state that at least 300 people were killed, many of them civilians caught in the street fighting; Christopher Clapham considers these figures "likely to be underestimates", noting in a footnote that The East African Standard in Nairobi, in what was then Kenya Colony, estimated about 2,000 dead and wounded in its 20 December 1960 story. ==Aftermath==

) By elevating the political importance of the military during the coup attempt, the emperor became exclusively dependent on their loyalty for survival going forward. This made the stability of the imperial regime precarious, as any sign of discontent within the armed forces could threaten Selassie's survival. The emperor attempted to placate the military over the following decade, with the effect of enhancing the militaries awareness of their growing power and political importance. The loyalty of Ethiopian paratrooper forces, trained in Israel, played a critical role in the swift suppression of the insurrection, with Israeli advisors providing guidance on how to respond during the crisis. Despite their role in helping loyalist forces assert control, the Israelis were deeply embarrassed by the revelation that the main coup plotters had maintained regular contact with their military advisors in the period leading up to the coup. While some within the Emperor's inner circle harbored suspicions about Israel's involvement, Haile Selassie himself believed that Israel was in favor of stability rather than revolution in Ethiopia and had moved in support of him. The Israelis argued to the Ethiopians that the coup plotters had a 'Nasserite spirit'. Zewde sees the coup as a precursor to the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974: Edmond Keller adds that following the coup, "rather than being able to dictate comfortably the rate and direction of change, the emperor was placed ever more on the defensive, having to work harder to mediate the demands of increasingly politically significant social groupings." Keller also disagrees with the assertion that the leaders of the coup were the only organised group critical of the imperial monarchy and its policies, pointing to nationalist organisations coalescing among the Oromo, Somali, Eritreans, and Tigreans, noting that "these pockets of opposition might never have emerged if the emperor's policies had been more sensitively directed at building legitimacy among the masses rather than simply at securing compliance or acquiescence to laws and policies." Selassie successfully avoided another coup attempt thanks to a tight system of control and his effective divide and rule policies, though it was clear that the regime was in a precarious position. ==References==