On 20 March 1999,
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission monitors withdrew from Kosovo citing a "steady deterioration in the security situation", and on 23 March 1999
Richard Holbrooke returned to Brussels and announced that peace talks had failed. During the ten weeks of the conflict, NATO aircraft flew over 38,000 combat missions, with a little over 10,000 of those being airstrike missions. The air operation was controlled from a NATO
Combined Air Operations Centre in
Vicenza, Italy. with missiles being launched from the
USS Philippine Sea (CG-58),
USS Gonzalez DDG-61, 's
USS Albuquerque (SSN-706) &
USS Miami (SSN-755), and the
Royal Navy HMS Splendid (S106). The regiment was augmented by pilots from
Fort Bragg's
82nd Airborne Attack Helicopter Battalion. The battalion secured AH-64 Apache attack helicopter refueling sites, and a small team forward deployed to the Albania–Kosovo border to identify targets for NATO air strikes. The campaign was initially designed to destroy Yugoslav air defences and high-value military targets. NATO military operations increasingly attacked Yugoslav units on the ground, as well as continuing the strategic bombardment. Montenegro was bombed several times, and NATO refused to prop up the precarious position of its anti-Milošević leader,
Milo Đukanović. "
Dual-use" targets, used by civilians and military, were attacked, including bridges across the
Danube, factories, power stations, telecommunications facilities, the headquarters of
Yugoslav Leftists, a political party led by Milošević's wife, and the
Avala TV Tower. Some protested that these actions were violations of
international law and the
Geneva Conventions. NATO argued these facilities were potentially useful to the Yugoslav military and thus their bombing was justified. Showing video footage, General Wesley Clark later apologized and stated that the train had been traveling too fast and the bomb was too close to the target for it to divert in time. The German daily
Frankfurter Rundschau reported in January 2000 that the NATO video had been shown at three times its real speed, giving a misleading impression of the train's speed. On 14 April, NATO planes
bombed ethnic Albanians near Koriša who had been used by Yugoslav forces as human shields. Yugoslav troops took TV crews to the scene shortly after the bombing. The Yugoslav government insisted that NATO had targeted civilians. NATO claimed that the bombing was justified because the station operated as a propaganda tool for the Milošević regime. On 2 May, specialised
graphite bombs were used to disable more than 70% of Serbia's electricity supply, including striking Serbia's largest power plant,
TPP Nikola Tesla, near
Obrenovac. The supply was restored in less than 24 hours, though civilians were asked to conserve water and power. Through to 2 June further attacks caused major power disruptions throughout Serbia, some of protracted length, affecting electricity and running water in many cities, towns, and villages. Nine major power plants were targeted and 19 power plants overall were attacked. The NATO air component commander stated that he hoped the distress of the public would undermine support for the Serbian government. On 7 May, the
US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists and injuring at least 20. The US defence secretary explained the cause of the error as "because the bombing instructions were based on an outdated map", but the Chinese government did not accept this explanation. The Chinese government issued a statement on the day of the bombing, stating that it was a "barbarian act". The target had been selected by the
Central Intelligence Agency outside the normal NATO targeting regime. The US president Bill Clinton apologised for the bombing, saying it was an accident. The US gave China financial compensation. In April 2000,
The New York Times published its own investigation, claiming to have found "no evidence that the bombing of the embassy had been a deliberate act."
NATO command organisation Solana directed Clark to "initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". Clark then delegated responsibility for the conduct of Operation Allied Force to the Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, who in turn delegated control to the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, USAF Lieutenant-General Michael C. Short.
Serbian Television claimed that huge columns of
refugees were fleeing Kosovo because of NATO's bombing, not Yugoslav military operations.
Air combat in
Ugljevik, Bosnia, on 25 March 1999 , the commander 3rd battery of the Yugoslav
250th Missile Brigade, which
shot down a NATO
F-117 Nighthawk with the
S-125 Neva An important portion of the war involved combat between the
Yugoslav Air Force and the opposing air forces from NATO.
United States Air Force (USAF)
F-15s and
F-16s aircraft flying from Italian airforce bases attacked the defending Yugoslav fighters, mainly
MiG-29s, which were severely outmatched by the modern and more advanced F-15 and F-16's due to having obsolete radar systems and missiles, and were in poor condition due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance. Other NATO forces also contributed to the air war. Air combat incidents: • During the night of 24/25 March 1999: Yugoslav Air Force scrambled five MiG-29s to counter the initial attacks. Two fighters that took off from
Niš Airport were vectored to intercept targets over southern Serbia and Kosovo were dealt with by NATO fighters. The MiG-29 flown by Maj. Dragan Ilić was damaged; he landed with one engine out and the aircraft was later expended as a decoy. The second MiG, flown by Maj. Iljo Arizanov, was shot down by an USAF F-15C piloted by Lt. Colonel
Cesar Rodriguez. A pair from
Batajnica Air Base (Maj. Nebojša Nikolić and Maj. Ljubiša Kulačin) were engaged by USAF Capt. Mike Shower who shot down Nikolić while Kulačin evaded several missiles fired at him, while fighting to bring his malfunctioning systems back to working order. Eventually realising that he could not do anything, and with Batajnica AB under attack, Kulačin diverted to
Belgrade Nikola Tesla Airport, hiding his aircraft under the tail of a parked airliner. • On the morning of 25 March, Maj. Slobodan Tešanović stalled his MiG-29 while landing on
Ponikve Airbase after a re-basing flight. He ejected safely. This was the first and, as of 2024, the only time a
stealth aircraft has been shot down by hostile ground fire in combat; the only other stealth aircraft in operation is the
B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, only two of which have been lost, with both incidents being accidents. • Several times between 5 and 7 April 1999, Yugoslav MiG-29s were scrambled to intercept NATO aircraft, but turned back due to malfunctions. • On 30 April, some US sources claim that a second F-117A was damaged by a surface-to-air missile. On the same day, an
A-10 Thunderbolt II was damaged by a
Strela 2 shoulder-mounted SAM over Kosovo and had to make an emergency landing at
Skopje International Airport in
Macedonia, • On 4 May, a Yugoslav
MiG-29, piloted by Lt. Colonel
Milenko Pavlović, commander of the 204th Fighter Aviation Wing, was shot down at a low altitude over his hometown Valjevo by two USAF F-16s. Whilst attempting to chase A raid returning after bombing the town. The falling aircraft was possibly hit as well by
Strela 2 fired by Yugoslav troops. Pavlović was killed. • On 11 May, an A-10 was lightly damaged over Kosovo by a
9K35 Strela 10. • During the war NATO lost two
AH-64 Apache strike helicopters (one on 26 April and the other on 4 May in Albania) near the border with Yugoslavia, in training accidents resulting in death of two US Army crew members.
Air defence suppression operations Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) operations for NATO were principally carried out by the US Air Force, with 50-
F-16CJ Block 50 Fighting Falcons, and the US Navy and Marines, with thirty
EA-6B Prowlers. The F-16CJs carried
AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles which would home in on and destroy any active Yugoslav radar systems, while the Prowlers provided
radar jamming assistance (though they could carry HARMs as well). Additional support came in the form of Italian and German
Tornado ECRs which also carried HARMs. USAF
Compass Call EC-130s were used to intercept and jam Yugoslav communications, while
RC-135s conducted
bomb damage assessment. The standard tactic for F-16CJs was for two pairs to come at a suspected air defence site from opposite directions, ensuring total coverage of the target area, and relaying information to incoming strike craft so they could adjust their flight path accordingly. Where possible, NATO attempted to proactively destroy air defence sites, using F-16CGs and
F-15E Strike Eagles carrying conventional munitions including
cluster bombs,
AGM-130 boosted bombs, and
AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon missiles. Many NATO aircraft made use of new
towed decoys designed to lure away any missiles fired at them. Reportedly, NATO also for the first time employed
cyberwarfare to target Yugoslav air defence computer systems. A number of deficiencies in NATO's SEAD operations were revealed during the course of the bombing campaign. The EA-6Bs were noticeably slower than other aircraft, limiting their effectiveness in providing support, and land-based Prowlers flying out of
Aviano Air Base were forced to carry extra fuel tanks instead of HARMs due to the distances involved. Moreover, the US Air Force had allowed its
electronic warfare branch to atrophy in the years after the
Gulf War. Training exercises were fewer and less rigorous than before, while veterans with electronic warfare experience were allowed to retire with no replacement. The results were less than satisfactory: response times to engaging a SAM threat actually increased from the Gulf War, and electronic warfare
wings could no longer reprogram their own
jamming pods but had to send them elsewhere for the task. Further difficulties came in the form of airspace restrictions, which forced NATO aircraft into predictable flight paths, and
rules of engagement which prevented NATO from targeting certain sites for fear of
collateral damage. In particular this applied to early-warning radars located in Montenegro, which remained operational during the campaign and gave Yugoslav forces advanced warning of incoming NATO air raids. The Yugoslav integrated air defence system (IADS) was extensive, including underground command sites and buried landlines, which allowed for information to be shared between systems. Active radar in one area could target NATO aircraft for SAMs and AAA in another area with no active radar, further limiting NATO's ability to target air defence weapons. radar facility. During the course of the campaign, NATO and Yugoslav forces engaged in a "cat-and-mouse" game which made suppressing the air defences difficult. Yugoslav SAM operators would turn their radars on for no longer than 20 seconds, allowing little chance for NATO anti-radiation missions to lock on to their emissions. In response, over half of NATO's anti-radiation missiles were preemptively fired at suspected air defence sites so that if a radar system did become active the missiles would be able to lock on more quickly. ==NATO forces==