Planning On 18 May, Vajpayee reviewed the preparedness with the
defence minister Fernandes, director-general military operations and military intelligence chief. The CCS met and favored taking military action against terrorists in Pakistan. A limited military action similar to the one planned in January was not considered viable as Pakistan had strengthened its forces on the LoC. Any action limited to Pakistan administered Kashmir would only have limited military gains. Indian military favored an offensive along the Indo-Pak border that will stretch the Pakistani troops and provide India access to Pakistan administered Kashmir. On 21 May, clashes killed six Pakistani soldiers and 1 Indian soldier, as well as civilians from both sides. On 22 May, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced to his troops to prepare for a "decisive battle". Between 25 and 28 May, Pakistan conducted 3
missile tests. India reviewed its nuclear capability to strike back.
Threat of nuclear war As both India and Pakistan are armed with nuclear weapons, the possibility a
conventional war could escalate into a
nuclear one was raised several times during the standoff. Various statements on this subject were made by Indian and Pakistani officials during the conflict, mainly concerning a
no first use policy. Indian
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said on 5 June that India would not use nuclear weapons first, while Musharraf said on 5 June he would not
renounce Pakistan's right to use
nuclear weapons first. There was also concern that a 6 June 2002
asteroid explosion over Earth, known as the
Eastern Mediterranean Event, could have caused a nuclear conflict had it exploded over India or Pakistan.
Diplomacy Vajpayee contacted the leaders of the global community including Bush, Blair,
Russian president Vladimir Putin and
French president Jacques Chirac and informed them Musharraf could not deliver on his 12 January speech and the patience of the country was running out. In the diplomacy that followed, Bush, Putin, Blair and
Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi requested Vajpayee to avoid taking the extreme step. The global community informed India that it would negotiate with Musharraf to clarify his position on stopping the cross-border infiltration. Restraint was urged by the global community as there were fears that Pakistan would proceed to use its nuclear weapons in the face to counter its conventional asymmetry as compared to the Indian armed forces. In April, in an interview to German magazine
Der Spiegel Musharraf had already hinted that he was willing to use nukes against India. Pakistan's nuclear threats led to US Secretary of State Powell contacting Musharraf at five occasions in the last week of May and reading the
riot act. On 5 June 2002, American Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Pakistan. He asked Musharraf if he would "permanently" end cross-border infiltration and help to dismantle the infrastructure used for terrorism. On 6 June 2002, Musharraf 's commitment was conveyed to Powell, and to India after his arrival. On 10 June 2002, Powell announced Musharraf's promise to the global community, after which India called off its strike plans. A full-frontal invasion would have translated into war. Political logic implied it was better to give another chance to Musharraf. The military build-up on the border by India in January and June had forced both the international community and Pakistan into action. == July–August strikes ==