Tariffs in the second Trump administration

During the 1990s and 2000s, globalization and international trade expanded as improvements in communications and shipping technology made offshoring more feasible and trade deals reduced tariffs and other barriers to commerce. Although the aggregate gains to the United States were substantial, the benefits were unevenly distributed; high-skilled workers generally prospered, while Americans with fewer skills and less geographic mobility struggled to adapt to rapid economic change. Although U.S. manufacturing employment had been declining for decades, job losses accelerated in the 2000s after the United States normalized trade relations with China. The surge in outsourcing, alongside advancements in automation, led to localized depressions in many manufacturing-dependent communities. During the 2000s, public opinion surveys and political rhetoric began to reflect growing skepticism toward international economic integration, a trend that intensified following the 2008 financial crisis. According to Jeffry Frieden, 2016 "was the first time since the 1930s that both major parties had candidates for the presidential nomination who were openly hostile to economic integration, and that any major party had an actual nominee with similar views. The victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election marked the victory of an economic nationalism that had long been far from the mainstream of American politics." He also initiated the China–United States trade war, which subjected 60% of US-China trade to 20% tariffs. Most sources say that the trade war did not achieve its goals: instead, the U.S. trade deficit widened, growth slowed, manufacturing jobs did not return, and prices rose. In May 2019, Trump used tariff threats of up to 25% on Mexico to negotiate an expansion of his "Remain in Mexico" policy and the deployment of Mexican soldiers to help control illegal immigration. The Mexican government, led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, deployed nearly 15,000 troops to the Mexico–US border and 6,500 troops to the Guatemala–Mexico border. In 2020, the US, Mexico and Canada renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) and recommitted to 0% tariffs on most products traded between the three countries. Five weeks after the USMCA went into effect, Trump used an exemption for national security concerns to implement a 10% tariff on Canadian aluminum after claiming it was flooding the US market. He withdrew the tariff a month later, three hours before the 29th Canadian Ministry planned to retaliate. 2024 presidential campaign During his 2024 presidential campaign, Trump pledged to impose even larger tariffs than in his first term, including 60% on China, 100% on Mexico, and 20% on all other countries. He also proposed tariffs to penalize US companies that outsourced manufacturing, such as a 200% tariff on John Deere. He proposed using tariffs to achieve a wide range of goals, including preventing war, reducing trade deficits, improving border security, and subsidizing childcare. In April 2025, Trump suggested tariff revenues could eventually replace income taxes, at least for those making less than $200,000 per year. Economists disagreed; the Tax Foundation deemed the idea "mathematically impossible". Shortly after the 2024 United States presidential election, Trump acknowledged that tariffs might cause "some pain" for Americans but said, "it will all be worth the price that must be paid". In December 2024, Trump appointed tariff hard liner Peter Navarro as his Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing. Stephen Miran, another tariff hard liner, was appointed chair of the Council of Economic Advisers. ==Section 232 tariffs==

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) allows the President to modify imports if the Secretary of Commerce conducts an investigation, holds public hearings, and determines that the imports threaten national security. Metal and metal products Trump ordered a probe into copper imports in February 2025. In March 2025, the US imposed 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports, including and derivative products, aiming to strengthen domestic production; in 2023, the US imported 44% of its aluminum and 26% of its steel, mostly from Canada. In April 2025, aluminum tariffs were expanded to include empty aluminum drink cans and canned beer. Tariffs on steel and aluminum imports were increased to 50% in June 2025, with the exception of tariffs on imports from the UK, which remained at 25%. On June 12, 2025, the White House expanded steel tariffs to include many major household appliances, effective on June 23. Later that month, Trump clarified that the tariffs would not apply to cathode copper; most of the copper imported to the US is cathode copper from Chile. The steel and aluminum tariffs were expanded to include 407 additional products in August 2025. In April 2026, Trump clarified the tariffs on metals as follows: Articles made entirely or almost entirely of aluminum, steel, or copper will pay a flat 50% on their full value — for example, steel coils and aluminum sheet. Derivative articles substantially made of steel, aluminum, or copper will pay a flat 25% on their full value. Certain metal-intensive industrial equipment and electrical grid equipment will pay 15% through 2027. Products made abroad but entirely with American steel, aluminum, and copper will be subject to lower tariffs of 10%. Products made of 15% or less steel, aluminum, or copper will no longer be subject to Section 232 metals tariffs. Automobiles and auto parts In January 2025, Trump announced broad tariffs on Canada and Mexico, threatening the highly integrated North American auto supply chain. Due to decades of free trade agreements including USMCA, factories in the US, Canada, and Mexico were accustomed to shipping auto parts back and forth multiple times during the manufacturing process. Non-USMCA compliant brands manufacturing in Canada or Mexico, such as BMW, were affected starting March 4, 2025. In April 2025, Trump imposed a new 25% tariff on all imported cars, including those from Mexico and Canada; car prices were expected to increase. While the 25% tariff extended to auto parts in May 2025, Trump exempted parts made in Mexico or Canada that were compliant with the USMCA. In April 2025, he exempted carmakers that pay a 25% on imported cars from paying other tariffs, such as those on steel and aluminum, and provided a rebate on a proportion of tariffs paid for the next two years. Solar panels from Southeast Asian countries In April 2025, in support of American manufacturers complaining of dumping and subsidies, the Commerce Department furthered plans first issued by the Biden Administration to tariff Chinese solar panel makers with factories in Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Proposed tariff rates ranged from 41% to 3,521% in the case of Cambodia because its producers did not cooperate with the US investigation. In February 2026, the Commerce Department announced tariffs on solar cells and panels imported by companies in India, Indonesia and Laos to counteract subsidies offered by those countries. Lumber and furniture In September 2025, Trump announced 10% tariffs on imports of softwood timber and lumber. He also announced 25% tariffs on kitchen cabinets, bathroom vanities, and upholstered furniture effective October 14. Also in September 2025, Trump announced tariffs on large trucks, kitchen cabinets, bathroom vanities, and upholstered furniture, to begin on October 1. Pharmaceuticals In April 2025, the United States Department of Commerce initiated a Section 232 investigation into pharmaceuticals, including "both finished generic and non-generic drug products, medical countermeasures, critical inputs such as active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials, and derivative products of those items." In September 2025, Trump announced, effective on October 1, 2025, a 100% tariff on "any branded or patented" pharmaceutical product, unless the companies were "breaking ground" or had "under construction" pharmaceutical manufacturing plants in the US. Trump also agreed to honor previously negotiated trade deals that capped pharmaceutical tariffs at 15%. Following the announcement, several large branded pharmaceutical companies announced or accelerated U.S. manufacturing investments to qualify for tariff exemptions tied to domestic production. In December 2025, the UK secured a 0% tariff on its pharmaceutical and medical technology exports in exchange for a commitment to invest more money into the US. The country also pledged to spend around 25% more in new and effective treatments, the first major increase in over two decades. In January 2026, Trump issued 25% tariffs on a narrow range of semiconductor imports, primarily advanced computing chips, including the Nvidia H200 and the AMD MI325X, with the exemption of chips imported to support the buildout of the U.S. technology supply chain or to bolster domestic manufacturing capacity for derivatives of semiconductors. Semiconductors used for data centers, research and development, and non-data center consumer applications are exempted. ==Country-specific tariffs implemented under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ==

Trump imposed tariffs under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the President to modify imports if the Secretary of Commerce conducts an investigation and holds public hearings. Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. imposed phased-in tariffs on imports from Nicaragua that do not qualify under the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The tariff rate is 10% in 2027 and 15% in 2028. The tariffs "address Nicaragua's acts, policies, and practices related to abuses of labor rights, abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and dismantling of the rule of law". ==Country-specific tariffs implemented under IEEPA==

Trump invoked unprecedented powers under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by declaring multiple "national emergencies" related to border security, energy, and trade deficits. The administration claimed that declaring these emergencies allowed Trump to enact tariffs quickly without following the complex procedures required by TEA or other trade statutes and did not require congressional approval. While the IEEPA had been used to enact economic sanctions, it had never before been used to enact tariffs. As he signed the orders, Trump stated that declaring an emergency "means you can do whatever you have to do to get out of that problem." He instructed them to consider factors such as existing tariffs, exchange rates, and trade balances in their analysis. Trump also threatened tariffs on countries that purchase Russian oil and countries that trade with Iran. In March 2025, following actions such as the March 2025 Venezuelan deportations, in what he called "secondary tariffs", Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on nations that purchase oil from Venezuela at the Secretary of State's discretion, under IEEPA. On April 2, 2025, a day he called "Liberation Day", Trump declared a national emergency to address what he described as a "large and persistent US trade deficit" and invoked the IEEPA to impose a 10% minimum "reciprocal tariff" on nearly all other countries, effective April 5, 2025. After prices of U.S. assets including equities, the US dollar, and bonds declined significantly on the morning of April 9, Trump announced on Truth Social that "reciprocal" tariffs above 10%, which had gone into effect that morning, would be paused for 90 days for all countries except China. China's minimum tariff rate was increased to 145%, while imports from all other countries were sustained at the 10% rate. Other global tariffs imposed under section 232 also remained in effect. Stocks surged within minutes of the pause announcement, with the S&P 500 rising 9.52% for its largest one-day gain since 2008. To terminate a national emergency under the NEA, a member of Congress may file a privileged resolution requiring their chamber to vote on the topic within 15 days. In May 2025, Democratic representatives introduced resolutions to end several of Trump's national emergencies justifying tariffs, but these efforts were blocked by the Republican congressional majority. JD Vance cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate to uphold the emergency underpinning the Liberation Day tariffs. However, the United States has de facto paralyzed the WTO since 2019 by blocking new appointments to its Appellate Body and therefore, no final rulings can be made. In March 2025, the US notified the WTO that it would suspend contributions to its budget indefinitely. The US was set to provide about 11% of the WTO's $232 million 2024 budget, a fee based on the country's share of global trade. Markets continued to rise in after further policy rollbacks and the S&P 500 set a new all-time high on June 27, 2025. Analysts suggested Trump's threats had lost credibility and that Trump Always Chickens Out. The administration announced only three trade agreements by July. While negotiations took place, the tariffs were delayed again to August 7, when they finally took effect after modifications as a result of various trade agreements. Legal challenges to IEEPA tariffs At least seven cases were filed in American federal courts challenging Trump's authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA. Central to each case is the argument that the imposition of tariffs, in the absence of clear congressional authorization, may constitute an overextension of executive power into areas that are traditionally reserved for the legislative branch. Several complaints invoke the nondelegation doctrine, asserting that the IEEPA, as applied, grants the executive branch an excessively broad scope of discretion. In addition to constitutional claims, the cases highlight significant economic consequences for states, businesses, and individuals, emphasizing the potential for such executive action to set a precedent for expansive policymaking beyond the intended purpose of emergency economic legislation. The CIT found the IEEPA tariffs "illegal because the triggering emergency (fentanyl trafficking and trade deficits) bore no rational connection to the trade measures imposed." In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, a Washington D.C. district court went further by holding that the IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all. The rulings were stayed pending appeal, allowing the tariffs to temporarily remain in effect until the Supreme Court issued a final decision. The Supreme Court consolidated V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources into a single case and heard oral arguments in November 2025. In February 2026, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, affirmed the decision of the appeals court that Trump's use of emergency powers to enact the tariffs under IEEPA was not legal. The government collected an estimated $166 billion in IEEPA tariffs, later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, from more than 330,000 businesses that was required to be refunded. In April 2026, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries, or CAPE, portal to allow for companies to submit requests for tariff refund claims. ==Closure of the de minimis exemption==

The de minimis exemption waived tariffs on packages valued under $800 to reduce administrative burdens. On Liberation Day, President Donald Trump also signed Executive Order 14256, which eliminated the de minimis exemption for imports from China and Hong Kong, and Executive Order 14257, which directed the United States to end the de minimis exemption globally once customs infrastructure was capable of doing so. On July 4, 2025, Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act which included a provision to eliminate the de minimis exemption for all countries beginning on July 1, 2027. A few weeks later, Trump imposed an earlier deadline by signing Executive Order 14324. This order, which cited the IEEPA, ended the de minimis exemption globally on August 29, 2025. Although the Supreme Court invalidated Trump's authority to impose other tariffs under the IEEPA on February 20, 2026, Trump issued an executive order arguing the ruling did not apply to the de minimis exemption and stating it would remain closed. == Timeline of key events and negotiations ==

January–March 2025 Trump was inaugurated for a second term on January 20, 2025. In his inaugural address, he pledged to "immediately begin the overhaul of our trade system to protect American workers and families." On February 1, 2025, he declared several "national emergencies" regarding fentanyl trafficking and invoked the IEEPA to impose 25% tariffs on most goods from Mexico and Canada and 10% on goods from China. Tariffs on USMCA-compliant Mexican and Canadian goods were quickly suspended, On February 13, 2025, Trump announced plans to impose "reciprocal tariffs" on all countries with trade barriers against the US in April, prompting a wave of diplomatic outreach. Analysts and foreign governments expressed confusion over the administration's tariff strategies and openness to negotiation. Canada alleged that tariffs on its exports were intended to damage its economy and pressure annexation into the US. Trump and Navarro refused to negotiate with any country. On March 12, 2025, the administration imposed 25% tariffs on imported steel and aluminum products. First-quarter US GDP fell -.05%, but investors attributed the decline to a rush to import goods before tariffs took effect rather than to underlying weakness. April–June 2025 On April 2, 2025, a day he called "Liberation Day", Trump declared a national emergency regarding the national trade deficit and announced "reciprocal tariffs" on all countries not subject to other sanctions. A minimum 10% tariff on almost all US imports took effect on April 5. Panic induced by the announcement led to the 2025 stock market crash and new country-specific tariffs, planned for April 9, were paused for 90 days. However, after a retaliatory spiral, US tariffs on Chinese goods were increased to 145% while Chinese tariffs on US goods were increased to 125%. Steel and aluminum tariffs, a 25% tariff on automobiles imposed April 3, and other sector-specific duties also remained. The first cargo ships carrying Chinese goods tariffed at 145% arrived on May 6 with shipments cut in half. Trump reportedly pivoted his focus toward negotiation, sidelining Navarro and promoting Scott Bessent as his lead economic advisor. By the end of June 2025, the US had only signed a deal with the UK and a 90-day temporary deal with China. Under terms expiring November 9, as extended, China lowered tariffs on US goods to 10% and resumed exports of rare-earth elements, while the US lowered its tariff on Chinese goods to 30% (10% baseline + 20% fentanyl) and cut de minimis tariffs to 54%. Trump reduced some of his tariffs that preceded the 2025 stock market crash, inspiring the phrase "Trump Always Chickens Out." The stock market subsequently reached new highs. On June 4, 2025, Trump doubled the tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from 25% to 50%, and on June 12, he expanded them to include household appliances like refrigerators and dishwashers. US GDP rebounded to 3.8% in the second quarter of 2025 as imports normalized. July–September 2025 On August 1, 2025, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released revised data showing a sharp slowdown in hiring, which some attributed to policy uncertainty caused by tariffs. Trump dismissed the data as "rigged" and fired the BLS Commissioner. Trump also called for the removal of Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, who had warned that tariffs could fuel inflation and resisted Trump's calls to cut the federal funds rate. Country-specific Liberation Day tariffs were postponed and changed several times before finally taking effect on August 7. Trump notified foreign governments of adjustments to their Liberation Day tariffs rates in a series of letters. In one letter to Brazil, he threatened a 50% tariff while denouncing charges against Jair Bolsonaro, an ally facing trial for the 2022 Brazilian coup plot. On July 30, Trump declared Brazil's actions a US "national emergency" and imposed an additional 40% tariff on top of a 10% "reciprocal" tariff. In August 2025, Trump ordered an additional 25% tariff on imports from India, intended to penalize India for purchasing Russian oil. Beginning August 27, 2025, Indian exports faced an extra 25% tariff and a total baseline tariff of 50%. Trump withdrew the tariff in February 2026 after several Indian oil companies agreed to stop buying Russian oil unless absolutely necessary or unless related to the fulfillment of previously agreed to contracts. October–December 2025 On October 1, 2025, new tariffs on large trucks, cabinets, and furniture took effect. A 100% tariff on "any branded or patented" pharmaceutical product also began, unless the companies were building manufacturing plants in the US. On October 10, 2025, Trump made new threats against China, including an additional 100% tariff starting November 1, in retaliation of China's broadening of export controls on rare earths. China announced retaliatory measures. However, after meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in South Korea on October 30, Trump announced the US would cut the "fentanyl tariff" on Chinese goods entering the US from 20% to 10% in return for soybean and other farm product purchases and easier access to rare earths. The US also was expected to suspend an expansion of export controls. The trade deal lowered tariffs on Chinese goods to levels similar to or below those on other countries. On November 14, 2025, Trump exempted a variety of agricultural products from "reciprocal" tariffs or Brazilian tariffs after acknowledging domestic demand and lack of production capacity. Newly exempted products included coffee, tea, tropical fruits, cocoa, spices, bananas, oranges, tomatoes, and beef. By December 2025, half of all US imports had been exempted from Trump's IEEPA tariffs, although some of the remaining were targeted by section 232 tariffs. January–March 2026 On January 17, 2026, Trump threatened tariffs of up to 25% on goods from 8 European countries as part of the Greenland Crisis. On January 21, 2026, he retracted the threat after saying he had reached "framework of a future deal" with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte. Diplomatic talks began soon after. On February 2, 2026, Trump cut tariffs on Indian exports from 50% to 18% after several Indian oil companies agreed to stop buying Russian oil unless absolutely necessary or unless related to the fulfillment of previously agreed to contracts. With the prohibition expired, on February 11, six House Republicans crossed party lines to vote to end Trump's tariffs on Canada; Trump said that he would veto the measure. The government collected an estimated $166 billion in IEEPA tariffs, later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, from more than 330,000 businesses that was required to be refunded. He also threatened to increase the tariff to 15%. Existing exemptions were maintained. == Impacts ==

Studies have shown that the tariffs have increased expenses and reduced earnings for companies A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimated that in the first 11 months of 2025, between 6% and 14% of tariff costs were paid by foreign exporters. Studies by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Kiel Institute estimated that US consumers and businesses pay a total of 94% and 96% of the tariffs, respectively. More than half of Americans blamed the Trump administration responsible for the rising cost of living and disapproved of the Trump administration increasing tariffs. Corporate bankruptcies in the United States increased to the highest level since 2010. However, although many economists and economic research bodies predicted slower growth and even a possible recession due to the tariffs, U.S. GDP has continued to grow, which partially has been attributed to backtracking by Trump off of the initial high tariff rates. There has also been no definitive indication of a significant aggregate effect on the labor market so far; however, industries most exposed to tariffs show some signs of weakness relative to the pre-2025 trend. ==Summary table==