Lyautey received orders from Army headquarters in Paris on 28 July 1914 the day the First World War began, requesting the dispatch of all available troops to France in anticipation of a
German invasion and the withdrawal of his remaining forces to more defensible coastal enclaves. The French government justified this stance by stating that the "fate of Morocco will be determined in
Lorraine". Lyautey, who had lost most of his own possessions when his house in
Crévic had been burnt to the ground by
advancing German forces, was keen to support the defence of France and within a month had sent 37 infantry and cavalry battalions and six artillery batteries to the
Western Front – more than had been requested of him. A further 35,000 Moroccan labourers were recruited by Lyautey over the course of the war for service in France. Nevertheless, Lyautey did not wish to abandon the inland territory his men had fought so hard for, stating that if he withdrew "such a shock would result immediately all over Morocco ... that a general revolt would arise under our feet, on all our points". Lyautey withdrew all non-essential personnel from his rear garrisons, brought in elderly reservists from France and issued weapons and elements of military dress to civilians in an attempt to convince the tribes that the French army in Morocco was as strong as before. Lyautey referred to this move as similar to hollowing out a lobster while leaving the shell intact. Henrys was counting on the onset of winter to force the Zaians from the mountains to their lowland pastures where they could be confronted or persuaded to surrender. In addition the increased national pride led many middle-aged French immigrants in Morocco to enlist in the army and, though they were of poor fighting quality, Lyautey was able to use these men to maintain the appearance of a large force under his command.
Battle of El Herri When Henrys had successfully repulsed the attacks on Khénifra, he believed he had the upper hand, having proven that the reduced French forces could resist the tribesmen. The Zaians were now contained within a triangle formed by the Oum er Rbia River, the Serrou River and the Atlas Mountains, and were already in dispute with neighbouring tribes over the best wintering land. Hammou had been promised peace talks by the French, and Lyautey twice refused Laverdure permission to attack him and ordered him to remain on the French bank of the Oum er Rbia. On 13 November Laverdure decided to disobey these orders and marched to El Herri with almost his entire force, some 43 officers and 1,187 men with supporting artillery and machine guns. This amounted to less than half the force he had in September, when he had last been refused permission to attack. Laverdure's force surprised the Zaian camp, mostly empty of fighting men, at dawn. A French cavalry charge, followed up with infantry, successfully cleared the camp. After capturing two of Hammou's wives and looting the tents the French started back for Khénifra. The French artillery proved ineffective against dispersed
skirmishers and at the Chbouka river the rearguard and gun batteries found themselves cut off and overrun. The French troops also lost 4 machine guns, 630 small arms, 62 horses, 56 mules, all of their artillery and camping equipment and much of their personal belongings.
After El Herri , October 1907|alt=An artistic interpretation of French troops with fixed bayonets defends against a charge of mounted Moroccan fighters, published in French newspaper Le Petit Journal The loss of the column at El Herri, the bloodiest defeat of a French force in Morocco, left Khénifra almost undefended. The senior garrison officer, Captain Pierre Kroll, had just three companies of men to protect the town. To counter this Henrys undertook a reorganisation of his forces, forming three military districts centred on Fez, Meknes and Tadla-Zaian (the Khénifra region), the latter under the command of Garnier-Duplessix. Few tribes took up Henrys' offer and the Zaians continued to cross the Rbia and attack French patrols. He repulsed them with artillery and counterattacked successfully over the course of a two-day engagement, killing 300 of the attackers and wounding 400 at the cost of 3 French dead and 5 wounded. The Zaians recrossed the Rbia in January 1916, camping in French territory and raiding the submitted tribes. Henrys accepted an offer of a position in France and was replaced by Colonel
Joseph-François Poeymirau, a keen follower of Lyautey who had served as Henrys' second in command at Meknes. Lyautey was offered the post of
Minister of War at the invitation of Prime Minister
Aristide Briand, which he accepted on 12 December 1916. Lyautey was replaced, at his request, by General
Henri Gouraud, who had experience fighting alongside Lyautey in Morocco and who had recently returned from the
Dardanelles, where he had lost his right arm. Lyautey soon became disillusioned with French tactics in Europe, the disunity prevailing between
the Allies and his position as a symbolic figurehead of the government. He was unfamiliar with dealing with political opposition and resigned on 14 March 1917, after being shouted down in the
Chamber of Deputies. The government could not survive the resignation of such a senior cabinet member and Briand himself resigned on 17 March, to be replaced by
Alexandre Ribot. In preparation for this new offensive Poeymirau established a French post at
El Bekrit, within Zaian territory, and forced the submission of three local tribes. The two columns met at
Assaka Nidji on 6 June, a moment which represented the establishment of the first French-controlled route across the Atlas mountains, and earned Poeymirau promotion to brigadier-general. A defensive camp was soon established at
Kasbah el Makhzen, and Doury began construction on a road that he promised would be traversable by motor transport by 1918. Local tribes resisted the French presence, killing a translator working at the mission in July 1918. Entering a thick, jungle-like date palm oasis, one subgroup of Doury's force suffered a close, hard-fought action, hampered by exhaustion and poor supply lines. The whole force suffered casualties of 238 men killed and 68 wounded, the worst French losses since the disaster at El Herri, and also lost much of their equipment and transport. Lyautey was doubtful of Doury's claim to have almost wiped out his foe, and in response chastised him for his rash action in "this most peripheral of zones" and placed him under Poeymirau's direct command. German intelligence had identified Northwest Africa as the "
Achilles' heel" of the French colonies, and encouraging resistance there became an important objective. Their involvement began in 1914, with the Germans attempting to find a suitable Moroccan leader that they could use to unite the tribes against the French. Their initial choice, former Sultan Abdelaziz, refused to co-operate and moved to the south of France to prevent any further approaches. During this time he was also selling information to the French. Money (in both
pesetas and
francs) was smuggled into Morocco from the German embassy at Madrid. The money was transferred to
Tétouan or
Melilla by boat or wired through the
telegraph before being smuggled to the tribes, who each received up to 600,000 pesetas per month. The Germans found it hard to get resources to the Zaians in the Middle Atlas due to the distances involved and most of what did get through went to Said's forces. German attempts to distribute supplies inland were frustrated when many tribes hoarded the best resources. Ammunition remained scarce in the Middle Atlas, and many were forced to rely on locally manufactured gunpowder and cartridges. They co-operated with German intelligence to write and distribute propaganda in Arabic, French and the Middle Atlas Berber dialect. Much of the Ottoman intelligence effort was coordinated by Arab agents operating from the embassy in Madrid and at least two members of the Ottoman diplomatic staff there are known to have seen active service with the tribes in Morocco during the war. Ottoman efforts in Morocco were hindered by internal divisions among the staff, disagreements with their German allies and the outbreak of the
Arab Revolt in 1916, with which some of the embassy staff sympathised. French intelligence forces worked hard to combat the Central Powers and to win the support of the Moroccan people. A series of commercial expositions, such as the
Casablanca Fair of 1915, were held to demonstrate the wealth of France and the benefits of co-operation. In addition to stepping up their propaganda campaign and increasing the use of bribes to convince tribes to submit, the French established markets at their military outposts and paid Moroccans to undertake
public works. French and British intelligence agents co-operated in French and Spanish Morocco and Gibraltar, tracking Ottoman and German agents, infiltrating the advisers sent to the tribes and working to halt the flow of arms. German citizens in Morocco were placed under careful scrutiny and four were executed within days of the war's start. The French broke the codes used by the German embassy and were able to read almost every communication sent from there to the General Staff in Berlin. There were few cases of mass civil disorder, France was not required to reinforce the troops stationed in Morocco, and the export of raw materials and labour for the war effort continued. The tribes were thus unable to face the French in direct confrontation and had to continue to rely on ambushes and raids. This contrasted with the Spanish experience in the
Rif War of 1920–26, in which tribes with access to such weapons were able to inflict defeats upon the Spanish Army in the field, such as at the
Battle of Annual. ==Post-war conflicts==