Great Northern Railway equipment and practices Geography Abbots Ripton is about north of
Huntingdon (and south of
Peterborough) on the East Coast Main Line, which handled both fast passenger trains and slow goods (largely coal) traffic. North of Peterborough passenger and coal traffic took different routes. South of Peterborough, they shared the same route; this was twin track in 1876, but stations with 'shunting sidings' were provided at frequent intervals to avoid slow goods trains, typically travelling at , obstructing fast trains such as the prestigious 'Scotch express', which averaged (hence its unofficial nickname
The Flying Scotsman), A slow train being caught up by a faster one would stop at such a station and reverse into the shunting siding, taking about four minutes to clear the main line. After the fast train had passed, the slow train would resume its journey. Abbots Ripton station had a shunting siding; for a south-bound ('
up') train the previous siding was further north at
Holme, south of
Peterborough.
Block working Traffic along the line was regulated by block working. Abbots Ripton and Holme had signal boxes and between them were two intermediate boxes. All controlled 'home' signals near the box and 'distant' signals about half a mile (c. ) before the home signals. The line was thus divided into three blocks, each roughly long; entry to each block was controlled by the signal box at the start of the block. Shunting into the siding at Abbots Ripton took place in a fourth block. The 'home' signals at Abbots Ripton were interlocked with the siding points, so that whenever the points were open to the main line the Abbots Ripton home signal lever had to be at 'danger'. All boxes could communicate with adjacent boxes by their block telegraph. Signals were normally kept at 'all clear' but were set to 'danger' to protect trains as follows. When a train entered a block by passing a home signal, the signalman would set the home signal to 'danger', thus preventing a following train entering the same block. The distant would also be set to 'danger'. Trains were required to stop at a home signal at 'danger', but were allowed to pass a distant signal at 'danger' as this merely warned an approaching driver to moderate his speed to be ready to stop the train at the home signal. Both signals would be returned to 'all clear' when the next box telegraphed 'line clear'. Normally, as soon as a train was past a box's home signal, the signalman would telegraph 'line clear' to the preceding box. During foggy or snowy weather, however, when a train stopped at a station 'line clear' was not sent until the train had restarted, or been shunted into a siding. In good weather therefore a goods train being shunted into a siding at Abbots Ripton should have been protected against another train running into it by the Abbots Ripton 'home' and 'distant' signals; in falling snow, the home and distant signals of the previous box should have given further protection and the fast train should always have been at least one full block away. Signal boxes serving stations/sidings had, as well as the block telegraph, 'speaking telegraph' instruments. These were not telephones, but
Morse code senders, used for messages (for example how late a train was running).
Signals On the Great Northern Railway, the signals used in conjunction with the block system were lower quadrant
semaphores. They were connected to a lever in the signal box by a wire under tension, which passed over intermediate pulleys to a counterweighted arm on a signal post. To set a signal to "all clear", the signalman pulled the appropriate lever in his signal box, which caused the wire to pull the signal arm down and into a slot on the signal post, against the force of a counterweight. When the lever was moved to set the signal to "danger", it did not positively elevate the signal to the horizontal danger position, but caused the wire to become slack, allowing the counterweight to raise the arm to the horizontal position. During the day, the signal arms were normally visible from the signal box from which they were worked, so the system had no repeater in the signal box to confirm that a signal was actually showing the aspect corresponding to the position of the lever. In an emergency, the signal could be set to "danger" by cutting the wire, but a heavy weight lying on the wire might pull on it, incorrectly keeping the signal at "all clear". Since the signals were normally set at "all clear", anything which stopped the arm moving out of the slot in the signal post would lead to the signal incorrectly indicating "all clear". At night, or in poor visibility, an oil lamp displayed a white light when the signal was at "all clear" When the signal arm was raised to the horizontal “danger” position, a red lens was moved in front of the light, so that a red light was displayed to oncoming trains. Also in poor visibility, GNR regulations called for warning
detonators to be laid, if possible, on the track at the home signal when it was set to danger. At stations where
platelayers were available, detonators were also to be placed on the track at
distant signals.
Brakes The express trains were made up of non-bogie non-corridor four- or six-wheel carriages. There were 13 on the Leeds express, giving a weight (including the engine and tender) of somewhat over 200 tons. At this period, other railways often had to resort to using more than one engine to maintain a high top speed; the Great Northern (favoured with the
Stirling 8-foot singles) prided itself on not doing so. As with all the other railways, though, it had considerable difficulties in stopping the trains rapidly once they were at speed. To stop a train, the driver could shut off steam, get his fireman to apply a handbrake on the tender and put the engine into reverse. He had no means of applying brakes to the rest of the train; indeed most of the carriages had no brakes. Two or three of the carriages were brake carriages with handbrakes, each with a guard who would apply them when (and if) he heard the driver "whistle for brakes". In trials carried out after the accident under favourable conditions this was shown to bring the train to rest within when travelling at . The Railway Inspectors considered that much shorter stopping distances would be possible if passenger trains were provided with continuous brakes operable by the driver, and had urged such systems be fitted. This had been resisted by the railway companies as unnecessary, unreliable, expensive and dangerous.
Flying Scotsman On the night of the accident, the Scotch express had 10 passenger carriages. These were first- or second-class; as customary the train did not carry third-class passengers. Notable passengers included the Russian Ambassador, the deputy chairman and another director of the Great Northern, and a director (John Cleghorn, formerly company secretary) and the chief engineer (
Thomas Elliot Harrison, a past president of the
Institution of Civil Engineers) of the
North Eastern Railway. At the inquest, the coroner's summing up noted that it was a heavy responsibility to stop a train, but did not explicitly suggest the prestige of the Scotch express aggravated the responsibility.
The first collision On the afternoon of 21 January, the Peterborough-Huntingdon area was experiencing a very bad snow storm; more than one witness at the Inquiry said they had never known worse: "
freezing blowing and snowing .. bad for seeing signals". Crucially, the snow/sleet fell onto already cold ground and equipment, freezing on them. The southbound coal train had left Peterborough about 18 minutes late, and therefore with about 12 minutes less lead on the
Flying Scotsman than normal. It progressed steadily to Abbots Ripton where it stopped by the signalbox (at about 6.41) and on the instructions of the Abbots Ripton signalman began to shunt into the siding, as normal, to let the
Flying Scotsman overtake. The signalman urged the driver to hurry up, as he was "
keeping the Scotchman
standing at Wood Walton (the previous signal box)". The signalman at Holme had been concerned that, because the coal train was so late, if it went on to Abbots Ripton before shunting into a siding the
Flying Scotsman would be delayed. To avoid this, he had decided to stop the train at Holme and put it into a siding there. He set his signal levers to put his signals to danger, but when the coal train arrived at Holme at 6.21 pm it did not stop. He telegraphed to Abbots Ripton that the train had run past the signals, and told the stationmaster at Holme that the train had disobeyed the signals. As the Inquiry report noted
"The evidence as to what then happened at the Holme station was unsatisfactorily given, and is not clear". The Holme
station master told the enquiry that he then sent for the platelayers; whilst waiting for them he checked the up line home signal and saw it to be at 'danger'. However, when a down express went through he noticed that one of the signals did not go to 'danger' after it had passed. Other witnesses also gave evidence strongly suggesting that the platelayers were not summoned until after the Scotsman had passed and were not back at work until after the Manchester express had passed (c 6.50.). They reported that other signals (including the up home signal) were – when first checked – in the same state as the up distant. The signalman also claimed that the stationmaster had reported the up home signal to
not be working properly. The Scotch express had left Peterborough at 6.24, about 6 minutes late. It did not slacken speed for the bad weather; it passed through Holme at about 6.37, the signals all showing clear, and arrived at Wood Walton at 6.40. The signalman there had set his signal levers to put his signals to 'danger' to protect the shunting at Abbots Ripton, but had not left his levers to set detonators at the home signal, nor did he supplement his fixed signals by displaying a hand-lamp from the signal box. He told the inquiry he was busy stopping a train of empty coal wagons on the down line, and because of the weather he did not hear the express until it ran past his cabin at full speed. At 6.44 the
Scotsman reached Abbots Ripton, its driver having seen "
nothing but white lights all the way from Peterboro". It was at full speed (40–45 mph) when it crashed into the coal train, which had not yet cleared the main line. Some coal wagons were smashed, but the coal train engine itself was largely unscathed. The express engine derailed and veered to the right. It ended up lying on its side, beyond the down line. Behind it, its tender and two passenger carriages were obstructing the down line.
The second collision The railway workers involved were badly shaken – some admitted it took them a few minutes to fully gather their wits but the guards (whose duty it was to 'protect their train') were affected to a lesser extent. The guard of the express walked back up the up line towards Wood Walton, laying fog-signals (detonators) on the rails to warn any further trains to stop. Despite the signals showing 'all clear', the Manchester express stopped in response to the Wood Walton signalman using a hand-lamp to show a red light from his signal-box. It finally pulled up beyond the Wood Walton down distant signal; the Abbots Ripton up distant signal could be seen ahead showing the white “all clear”. It then proceeded cautiously towards Abbots Ripton, being stopped successively by the
Scotsman guard waving a red hand-lamp and then by a platelayer, eventually drawing up at the rear of the wrecked
Scotsman. The fireman of the coal train similarly laid detonators on the down line just inside the Abbots Ripton down distant signal, and was then picked up by the coal train engine running light to Huntingdon to seek assistance and warn approaching down trains. This was at the instigation of a GNR “relief clerk” (i.e. a clerk qualified to act as a ‘’locum’’ stationmaster) who had been travelling on the express. The Abbots Ripton signalman was evidently dazed by the events; he set his signals in both directions to 'danger' but did not (as he should also have done) immediately send the 5-beat 'obstruction danger' bell signal to Stukeley, the next signal box south. Instead he tried to send a message reporting the crash and seeking assistance by the speaking telegraph to
Huntingdon station to the south. He prefixed the message with the special 'SP' code indicating top priority but the signalman at Huntingdon did not answer. The Abbots Ripton signalman kept trying to raise Huntingdon, but without success; when the Huntingdon signalman did answer he first refused to accept any message not starting with a code to indicate time sent, and rebuffed subsequent sends with an 'MQ' code – roughly translating as "Go away, I'm busy". Indeed, he was; he was accepting the Leeds express and passing it on to the next signal box. At 6:52pm, after trying and failing for 8 minutes to pass his message to Huntingdon South, the Abbots Ripton signalman sent the 5-beat 'obstruction danger' bell signal to Stukeley. The down Leeds express passed through Huntingdon at about 6:49pm (at which time no message had been accepted from Abbots Ripton) and reached Stukeley at 6:52pm. The signalman at Stukeley received the 'obstruction danger' message just seconds after the express had passed. The Abbots Ripton down distant signal was showing 'all clear' and the Leeds express approached it at full speed. I found a white light at the distant signal at Abbotts Ripton. After passing that signal post, I was alarmed by passing over two fog-signals which exploded; I at once shut off steam and told my mate to put on the tender break . I was then going at 40 or 50 miles an hour. In another instant I met an engine on the up road giving sharp whistles, and saw a red lamp from it, which I took to mean that there was something out of the ordinary way. I reversed my engine, and reapplied my steam, and as soon as that was done the collision occurred Still travelling at some speed, the Leeds express ploughed through the tender and carriages blocking the line (this, rather than the first collision, is when most – if not all – of the deaths are thought to have occurred). The Abbots Ripton signalman had just started his 12-hour shift at 6 pm. His colleague on the day shift returned to work on hearing of the first collision, arriving soon after the second collision. He took over the speaking telegraph, because whilst the duty signalman
appeared to be doing his best to send the message he
was confused at the time, and I felt I was more able to send the message than he. Messages seeking assistance were then sent to Huntingdon and Peterborough. ==Inquiry==