Center squeeze Wasted votes and Condorcet winners Compared to a plurality voting system that rewards only the top vote-getter using non-transferable votes, instant-runoff voting mitigates the problem of
wasted votes. However, it does not ensure the election of a
Condorcet winner, which is the candidate who would win a direct election against any other candidate in the race. Some advocates of instant-runoff voting argue that the failure to elect a Condorcet winner is positive, as it enables instant-runoff voting to pass
later-no-help and
later-no-harm, which together render the method immune to
burying strategy. FairVote, in particular, has stated that they "believe [later-no-harm] is necessary in the context of high-stakes, competitive elections".
Resistance to strategy Instant-runoff voting has notably high resistance to
tactical voting but less to
strategic nomination.
Party strategizing and strategic nomination In Australia, preference deals (where one party's voters agree to place another party's voters second, in return for their doing the same) between parties are common. Parties and candidates often encourage their supporters to participate in these preference deals using
How-to-vote cards explaining how to use their lower rankings to maximize the chances of their ballot helping to elect someone in the preference deal before it may exhaust. Instant runoff may be manipulable via strategic candidate entry and exit, reducing similar candidates' chances of winning. Such manipulation does not need to be intentional, instead acting to deter candidates from running in the first place. Spatial model simulations indicate that instant runoff rewards strategic withdrawal by candidates.
Tactical voting Gibbard's theorem demonstrates that no (deterministic, non-dictatorial) voting method can be entirely immune from tactical voting. This implies that instant-runoff voting is susceptible to tactical voting in some circumstances. In particular, when there exists a
Condorcet winner who instant-runoff voting fails to elect, voters who prefer the Condorcet winner to the instant-runoff voting winner have an incentive to use the
compromising strategy. Research suggests that instant-runoff voting is highly resistant to strategic voting. In a test of multiple methods, instant runoff was found to be the second-most-resistant to tactical voting, after a class of instant runoff-
Condorcet hybrids. Instant-runoff voting is also completely immune to the
burying strategy: ranking a strong opposition candidate lower can't get one's preferred candidate elected. by taking away first-choice votes from the more mainstream candidate until that candidate is eliminated, and then that candidate's second-choice votes helping a more-disliked candidate to win. In these scenarios, it would have been better for the third party voters if their candidate had not run at all (spoiler effect), or if they had voted dishonestly, ranking their second-favorite first and their favorite second, rather than first (favorite betrayal). This is the same bracketing effect exploited by Robinette and Tideman in their research on strategic campaigning, where a candidate alters their campaign to cause a change in voter honest choice, resulting in the elimination of a candidate who nevertheless remains more preferred by voters. This occurred in the
2022 Alaska's at-large congressional district special election. If Republican
Sarah Palin, who lost in the end, had not run, the more centrist Republican candidate, Nick Begich, would have defeated the winning Democratic candidate,
Mary Peltola, because the ballot data shows that the votes for the two Republican candidates would have been combined behind Begich and would have exceeded those of Peltola. This did not happen in the IRV election due to the way 15,000 Begich supporters marked their back-up preferences across party lines. This may be observed when a candidate leads in the first count but is in the end unsuccessful. For example, in the
2009 Burlington, Vermont, mayoral election, if Kurt Wright, the Republican candidate who lost in the end, had not run, the Democratic candidate, Andy Montroll, would have defeated the winning Progressive candidate, Bob Kiss. In that sense, the Republican candidate was a spoiler—albeit for an opposing Democrat, rather than some political ally—even though he led in first-choice support. to 8.5 percent in the case of a strict
left–right spectrum.
Participation criterion The
participation criterion says that candidates should not lose as a result of having "too many voters"—a set of ballots that all rank A>B should not switch the election winner from A to B. Instant-runoff voting fails this criterion. In his 1984 study, mathematician Depankar Ray found that in elections where instant-runoff voting elects a different candidate from plurality, that there was an estimated 50 percent probability that some voters would have received a more preferable outcome if they had not participated.
Reversal symmetry criterion The
reversal symmetry criterion states that the first- and last-place candidates should switch places if every ballot is reversed. In other words, it should not matter whether voters rank candidates from best-to-worst and select the best candidate, or whether they rank them worst-to-best and then select the least-bad candidate. Instant-runoff voting fails this criterion: it is possible to construct an election where reversing the order of every ballot does not alter the final winner; that is, the first- and last-place finishers, according to instant-runoff voting, are the same candidate. == Criticism ==