On March 31, 1968, President
Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he was withdrawing from the 1968 presidential election, announced a partial halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and stated his willingness to open peace talks with North Vietnam on ending the war. After much haggling about where to hold the peace negotiations, talks finally began in Paris in May 1968 with
W. Averell Harriman heading the American delegation and
Xuân Thủy the North Vietnamese delegation. In the
1968 election, Chennault served as the chairwoman of the Republican Women for Nixon Committee. According to records of President
Lyndon B. Johnson's secret monitoring of
South Vietnamese officials and his political foes, Chennault played a crucial role on behalf of the
Nixon campaign, which sought to sabotage the rapidly progressing peace treaty in what one long-term Washington insider called "activities ... far beyond the bounds of justifiable political combat." On July 12, 1968, at the Hotel Pierre in New York, Chennault introduced South Vietnamese ambassador
Bùi Diễm to Nixon. Unknown to Diễm, he was followed secretly by the CIA, who kept him under surveillance while the
National Security Agency (NSA), which had broken the South Vietnamese diplomatic codes, read all of the messages going back and forth from the South Vietnamese embassy in Washington. In June 1967,
Henry Kissinger, the Harvard professor of political science who had started his career as an unofficial diplomat involved in the peace efforts to end the Vietnam War, met Herbert Marcovich, a French biologist, who told him that his friend
Raymond Aubrac was a friend of
Ho Chi Minh. Kissinger contacted Ambassador Harriman with a mandate to end the war. Marcovich and Aubrac agreed to fly to Hanoi to meet Ho and to convey his messages to Kissinger, who was to pass them on to Harriman. Though nothing came of the scheme, called "Operation Pennsylvania", as Ho demanded that the United States must "unconditionally" stop bombing North Vietnam as a precondition for peace talks, a demand that Johnson rejected, it established Kissinger as someone who was interested in making peace in Vietnam. After Rockefeller lost to Nixon, Kissinger switched camps, telling Nixon's campaign manager
John N. Mitchell that he had changed his mind about Nixon. but falsely portrayed himself as having broken with the Republicans, writing a letter that began with: "My dear Averell, I am through with Republican politics. The party is hopeless and unfit to govern." Upon returning to the United States from France, Kissinger contacted
Richard V. Allen, another Nixon adviser, to tell him that Harriman was making progress in Paris. As a result, Humphrey began to rise in the polls, and by late October 1968, polls showed Humphrey with a 44%-43% lead over Nixon. In October, Harriman's delegation in Paris reported to Washington that peace talks with Ho were proceeding well and that the ambassador believed that a peace agreement could be possible before the election. On October 12, 1968, Kissinger reported to Allen that Harriman had "broken open the champagne" because he believed that he was very close to a peace deal. On October 23, Ambassador Diễm cabled President Thiệu to say that he was in close contact with Chennault and that: "Many Republican friends have contacted me and encouraged us to stand firm. They were alarmed by press reports to the effect that you have already softened your position." In another message, Diễm reported to Thiệu that Chennault wanted him to object to the American offer to cease bombing North Vietnam altogether, saying this would be a deal-breaker at the Paris peace talks. Chennault's messages to Thiệu also intimated that Nixon, if elected, would bargain for a better peace deal than would Humphrey, which encouraged Thiệu's sabotage of the peace negotiations. According to the notes, written during meetings by Nixon aide
H.R. Haldeman's, the orders were: "Keep Anna Chennault working on SVN [South Vietnam]." Both the CIA and the FBI had tapped Chennault's phone and were recording her conversations with Diễm, and the
NSA was intercepting South Vietnamese diplomatic cables. The CIA had also bugged Thiệu's office, and as a result knew that Chennault's messages were indeed encouraging Thiệu to make unreasonable demands at the Paris peace talks. One FBI report stated: "Anna Chennault contacted Vietnam Ambassador Bùi Diễm and advised him that she received a message from her boss...which her boss wanted her to give personally to the ambassador. She said the message was that, 'Hold on. We are gonna win...Please tell your boss to hold on." that Republicans advised Saigon to refuse participation in the talks, promising a better deal once elected. Records of FBI wiretaps show that Chennault phoned Diễm on November 2 with the message "hold on, we are gonna win." Before the election, President Johnson "suspected (…) Richard Nixon, of political sabotage that he called
treason." On January 2, 2017, the
New York Times reported that historian and Nixon biographer
John A. Farrell had found a memo written by Haldeman that confirmed that Nixon had authorized "throwing a monkey wrench" into Johnson's peace negotiations. and on October 30, 1968, Thiệu announced that South Vietnam was withdrawing from the peace negotiations. Thiệu publicly blamed the seating arrangements, claiming that it was unacceptable that the Viet Cong delegation should be seated apart from that of North Vietnam and stating that the entirety of the communist delegation should be seated together. He told his friend
Everett Dirksen, the Republican minority leader in the Senate, "We could stop the killing out there. But they've got this...new formula put in there-namely wait on Nixon. And they're killing four or five hundred a day waiting on Nixon." As much of the information had been gathered illegally, such as through warrantless FBI phone tapping, Johnson felt that he could not have the
Justice Department charge Chennault to the degree that he wished. In part because Nixon won the presidency, no one was prosecuted for this possible violation of the
Logan Act. Former FBI deputy director
Cartha "Deke" DeLoach mentioned in his book ''Hoover's FBI'' that his agency was only able to connect a single November 2, 1968, phone call from Nixon's running mate
Spiro Agnew to Chennault, unrecorded details of which Johnson had believed were subsequently transmitted to Nixon. Later phone calls to Nixon aide
John N. Mitchell were made using direct personal numbers that changed every several days, as was Mitchell's custom. A week after the election and a joint Nixon-Johnson statement regarding Vietnam policy, Mitchell asked Chennault to intercede again, this time to persuade Saigon to join the talks, but she refused. By Chennault's account, when Nixon personally thanked her in 1969, she complained that she "had suffered dearly" for her efforts on his behalf, and he replied, "Yes, I appreciate that. I know you are a good soldier." American historian and Chennault biographer Catherine Forslund has argued that Chennault would have been in a good position to demand that Nixon appoint her ambassador to an important American ally or that she be given some other prestigious job as a reward, but Chennault declined, fearing that she might have to answer difficult questions during Senate confirmation hearings. William Bundy wrote that "probably no great chance was lost" for peace. John A. Farrell has argued that, given the incompatible agendas of Hanoi and Saigon, the chances for peace in the fall of 1968 were overrated. By contrast, Catherine Forslund, told the
Wall Street Journal that Thiệu would have acted to sabotage the peace talks in October 1968 without any prompting from Chennault. ==Later life==