Cosmological argument

and Aristotle, depicted here in Raphael's The School of Athens, both developed first cause arguments. Classical philosophy Plato (c. 427–347 BC) and Aristotle (c. 384–322 BC) both presented cosmological arguments, though each had notable caveats. In The Laws (Book X), Plato theorised that all movement in the world and cosmos was "imparted motion" that required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. In Timaeus, he posited a demiurge of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos. Aristotle disputed the idea of an efficient First Cause, noting that it contradicts his doctrine of an eternal cosmos without a beginning in time. His conception of the unmoved mover describes a timeless being that sustains cosmic motion through an infinite duration, rather than an efficient cause that initiates motion from a cosmic beginning. He proposed the existence of multiple unmoved movers, each powering a celestial sphere, dwelling eternally beyond the sphere of fixed stars, subordinated to a Prime Mover ( or primus motor) that serves as the ultimate source for all motion. In what he called "first philosophy", or metaphysics, Aristotle intended a theological correspondence between the Prime Mover and a deity. Practically, however, he had presented an explanation for the apparent motion of the fixed stars. According to Aristotle's natural theology, his pantheon of eternal beings did not create the world, nor do they act on whims. He illustrated the unmoved movers as timeless, immutable beings of pure actuality and thought. Being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire", the celestial spheres imitate this perfection by moving in the most perfect way possible, in a uniform circular motion. The unmoved movers are no different in kind from the Prime Mover, yet subordinated to it via a dependency of relation. Late antiquity to the Islamic Golden Age Plotinus, a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (creatio ex deo). His disciple Proclus stated, "The One is God". In the 6th century, Syriac Christian neo-Platonist John Philoponus (c. 490 – c. 570) examined the contradiction between Greek pagan conceptions of past eternity and Aristotle's rejection of the existence of actual infinities. He categorised arguments for the finitude of the past, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God. Philoponus's ideas would later receive further articulation among Muslim and Jewish exponents of kalam, or medieval Islamic scholasticism. In the 11th century, Islamic philosopher Avicenna (c. 980 – 1037) inquired into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence (māhiyya) and existence (wuǧūd). He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an agent cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing. Medieval Christian theology Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225 – 1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the Proof of the Truthful) and Maimonides to formulate one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of the first cause was the idea that the universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is 'that which we call God': Notably, Aquinas's Five Ways, given the second question of his Summa Theologica, are not the entirety of Aquinas's demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas's Treatise on the Divine Nature. == General principles ==

The infinite regress A regress is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of recursive analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress (i.e. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an infinite regress, continuing in perpetuity. In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to causal regress, in which the series is a chain of cause and effect, with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member. Some variants of the argument may also refer to temporal regress, wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a temporal sequence. The cosmological argument is a type of positive infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a first cause) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress. An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons: • Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as begging the question or when investigating causes concerning ultimate origins or fundamental principles. Accidental and essential ordering of causes Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's Physics (8.5) that a series of causes may either be accidental or essential, though the designation of this terminology would follow later under John Duns Scotus at the turn of the 14th century. Based upon this distinction Frederick Copleston (1907–1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes in fieri, which cause an effect's becoming, or coming into existence, and causes in esse, which causally sustain an effect, in being, once it exists. Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument: :"Each member of the series of causes possesses being solely by virtue of the actual present operation of a superior cause ... Life is dependent inter alia on a certain atmospheric pressure, this again on the continual operation of physical forces, whose being and operation depends on the position of the earth in the solar system, which itself must endure relatively unchanged, a state of being which can only be continuously produced by a definite—if unknown—constitution of the material universe. This constitution, however, cannot be its own cause ... We are thus irresistibly led to posit a first efficient cause which, while itself uncaused, shall impart causality to a whole series." == Versions of the argument ==

Aquinas's argument from contingency In the scholastic era, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency", following Aristotle in proposing that there must be an unmoved mover to explain the origin of the universe. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist (i.e. it is contingent) its existence must have a cause. This cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists by necessity, i.e. something that must exist for anything else to exist. he states: "... and this we understand to be God." :"Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself." Alexander Pruss formulates the argument as follows: • Every contingent fact has an explanation. • There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts. • Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact. • This explanation must involve a necessary being. • This necessary being is God. Premise 1 expresses the principle of sufficient reason. Premise 2 proposes the existence of a logical conjunction of all contingent facts—representing the sum total of contingent reality—referred to in later literature as the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF). In premise 3, Leibniz applies the principle of sufficient reason to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, requires a sufficient explanation. It follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF cannot be contingent, therefore necessary, given that the BCCF incorporates the totality of contingent facts. Philosophers Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly have argued in defence of the inference from statement 4 to statement 5, which identifies as God the necessary being explaining all of contingent reality. Duns Scotus's metaphysical argument At the turn of the 14th century, medieval Christian theologian John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) formulated a metaphysical argument for the existence of God inspired by Aquinas's argument of the unmoved mover. Like other philosophers and theologians, Scotus believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered distinct to that of Aquinas. The form of the argument can be summarised as follows: • An effect cannot be produced by itself. • An effect cannot be produced by nothing. • A circle of causes is impossible. • Therefore, it is necessarily true that an effect is produced by something else. • An accidentally ordered causal series cannot exist without an essentially ordered series. Each member in an accidentally ordered series (except a possible first) exists via causal activity of a prior member. That causal activity is exercised by virtue of a certain form. Therefore, that form is required by each member to effect causation. The form itself is not a member of the series. Therefore [c,d], accidentally ordered causes cannot exist without higher-order (essentially ordered) causes. It is impossible for an essentially ordered causal series to regress to infinity. Therefore [4,5,6], it is possible that a first agent exists. Therefore [7], it is necessarily true that a first agent exists (by S5 modal logic). If a first agent does not exist, then it is impossible that a first agent exists. Therefore [a], if it is possible that a first agent exists, then it is necessarily true that a first agent exists (by contraposition). Therefore [b,7], it is necessarily true that a first agent exists. Scotus reasons, in premise 5, that an accidentally ordered series of causes is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic principles of accidental causation, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes. Premise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the Second Way and Third Way, that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress. Statement 7 evolves this framework to declare that it is possible for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue of ontological perfection. Scotus pronounces that, if it is possible that a first agent exists, then it is necessarily true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the causal chain). developed within the proceedings of medieval Islamic scholasticism through the 9th to 12th centuries, eventually returning to Christian theological scholarship in the 13th century. These ideas were revitalised for modern discourse by philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig through publications such as The Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979) and the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (2009). The form of the argument popularised by Craig is expressed in two parts, as an initial deductive syllogism followed by further philosophical analysis. He emphasises the theorem's reach, noting its independence of any physical description of the early universe—such as the presence or absence of an initial singularity—and its applicability to almost any cosmological model, including oscillating and multiverse models. He affirms the past boundary it defines as either a cosmic beginning or a border with a nonclassical spacetime that itself must have a beginning on account of its quantum instability. For philosophical evidence, Craig cites the Hilbert’s Hotel thought experiment, to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of actual infinites existing in reality. Considering past events to have been instantiated in reality, he deems an infinite past to be similarly impossible. Conceptual analysis of the First Cause Craig argues that the cause of the universe necessarily embodies specific properties, in being: • Uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise. • Timeless (therefore changeless), spaceless, immaterial and enormously powerful, in creating spacetime and its contents ex nihilo. • Personal, possessing non-deterministic agency, in creating the universe from a timeless state (without prior determining conditions). • Singular, per Occam's razor, in the absence of good reasons to believe in the existence of more than one uncaused cause. Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion: :"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth." == Criticism and discourse ==

"What caused the first cause?" Objections to the cosmological argument may question why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Critics contend that the concept of a first cause qualifies as special pleading, or that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why there should be a first cause at all. Defenders maintain that this question is addressed by various formulations of the cosmological argument, emphasizing that none of its major iterations rests on the premise that everything requires a cause. Andrew Loke refers to the Kalam cosmological argument, in which the causal premise ("whatever begins to exist has a cause") stipulates that only things which begin to exist require a cause. William Lane Craig asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible. Various arguments have been presented to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite regress occurring in the real world, referring to thought experiments such as Hilbert's Hotel, the tale of Tristram Shandy, and variations. "Does the universe need a cause?" Craig maintains that the causal principle is predicated in the metaphysical intuition that nothing comes from nothing. If such intuitions are false, he argues it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause. Whereas J. L. Mackie argues that cause and effect cannot be extrapolated to the origins of the universe based upon our inductive experiences and intellectual preferences, Craig proposes that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist". Identifying the first cause Secular philosophers such as Michael Martin argue that a cosmological argument may establish the existence of a first cause, but falls short of identifying that cause as personal, or as God as defined within classical or other specific conceptions of theism. In Scotus's Ordinatio, his metaphysical argument is the first component of the 'triple primacy' through which he characterises the first cause as a being with the attributes of maximal excellence. J. Richard Gott and James E. Gunn assert that the question of "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense and that the concept of before becomes meaningless when considering a timeless state. They add that questioning what occurred before the Big Bang is akin to questioning what is north of the North Pole. He affirms that the history of 20th century cosmology belies the proposition that researchers have no strong intuition to pursue a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe. Feser also notes that versions of the cosmological argument presented by classical philosophers do not require a commitment to the Big Bang, or even to a cosmic origin. The Hume-Edwards principle William L. Rowe characterises the Hume-Edwards principle, referring to arguments presented by David Hume, and later Paul Edwards, in their criticisms of the cosmological argument: The principle stipulates that a causal series—even one that regresses to infinity—requires no explanatory causes beyond those that are members within that series. If every member of a series has a causal explanation within the sequence, the series in itself is explanatorily complete. Causal loop arguments Some objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of cause and effect that would avoid the need for a first cause. Gott and Li refer to the curvature of spacetime and closed timelike curves as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence. Richard Hanley contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: "[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them." Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a first cause. He proposes that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of vicious circularity, rendering it metaphysically impossible. == See also ==