A Treatise of Human Nature begins with the introduction: "'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, more or less, to human nature.... Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man." Until recently, Hume was seen as a forerunner of
logical positivism, a form of anti-
metaphysical empiricism. According to the logical positivists (in summary of their
verification principle), unless a statement could be verified by experience, or else was true or false by definition (i.e., either
tautological or
contradictory), then it was meaningless. Hume, on this view, was a proto-positivist, who, in his philosophical writings, attempted to demonstrate the ways in which ordinary propositions about objects, causal relations, the self, and so on, are
semantically equivalent to propositions about one's experiences. Many commentators have since rejected this understanding of Humean empiricism, stressing an
epistemological (rather than a
semantic) reading of his project. According to this opposing view, Hume's empiricism consisted in the idea that it is our knowledge, and not our ability to conceive, that is restricted to what can be experienced. Hume thought that we can form beliefs about that which extends beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as custom and the imagination, but he was sceptical about claims to knowledge on this basis.
Impressions and ideas A central doctrine of Hume's philosophy, stated in the very first lines of the
Treatise of Human Nature, is that the mind consists of perceptions, or the mental objects which are present to it, and which divide into two categories: "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call and ." Hume believed that it would "not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction", which commentators have generally taken to mean the distinction between
feeling and
thinking. Controversially, Hume, in some sense, may regard the distinction as a matter of degree, as he takes
impressions to be distinguished from ideas on the basis of their force, liveliness, and vivacitywhat
Henry E. Allison (2008) calls the "FLV criterion."
Ideas are therefore "faint" impressions. For example, experiencing the painful sensation of touching a hot pan's handle is more forceful than simply thinking about touching a hot pan. According to Hume,
impressions are meant to be the original form of all our ideas. From this, Don Garrett (2002) has coined the term ''copy principle, When looking at an apple, a person experiences a variety of colour-sensationswhat Hume notes as a complex impression. Similarly, a person experiences a variety of taste-sensations, tactile-sensations, and smell-sensations when biting into an apple, with the overall sensationagain, a complex impression. Thinking about an apple allows a person to form complex ideas, which are made of similar parts as the complex impressions they were developed from, but which are also less forceful. Hume believes that complex perceptions can be broken down into smaller and smaller parts until perceptions are reached that have no parts of their own, and these perceptions are thus referred to as simple.
Principles of association Regardless of how boundless it may seem; a person's imagination is confined to the mind's ability to recombine the information it has already acquired from the body's sensory experience (the ideas that have been derived from impressions). In addition, "as our imagination takes our most basic ideas and leads us to form new ones, it is directed by three principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect": • The
principle of resemblance refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent resemble one another. For example, someone looking at an illustration of a flower can conceive an idea of the physical flower because the idea of the illustrated object is associated with the physical object's idea. • The
principle of contiguity describes the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are near to each other in time or space, such as when the thought of a crayon in a box leads one to think of the crayon contiguous to it. • The
principle of cause and effect refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they represent are causally related, which explains how remembering a broken window can make someone think of a ball that had caused the window to shatter. Hume elaborates more on the last principle, explaining that, when somebody observes that one object or event consistently produces the same object or event, that results in "an expectation that a particular event (a 'cause') will be followed by another event (an 'effect') previously and constantly associated with it". Hume calls this principle
custom, or
habit, saying that "custom...renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past". However, even though custom can serve as a guide in life, it still only represents an expectation. In other words: Experience cannot establish a necessary connection between cause and effect, because we can imagine without contradiction a case where the cause does not produce its usual effect.... The reason why we mistakenly infer that there is something in the cause that necessarily produces its effect is because our past experiences have habituated us to think in this way. Continuing this idea, Hume argues that "only in the pure realm of ideas, logic, and mathematics, not contingent on the direct sense awareness of reality, [can] causation safely...be applied—all other sciences are reduced to probability".—and both of these are inadequate. With regard to demonstrative reasoning, Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular. Turning to probable reasoning, Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past. As this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question, it would be
circular reasoning. Thus, no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences. Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human practice of making inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." In 1985, and in agreement with Hume, John D. Kenyon writes: Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment ... but the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief. Others, such as
Charles Sanders Peirce, have demurred from Hume's solution, while some, such as Kant and
Karl Popper, have thought that Hume's analysis has "posed a most fundamental challenge to all human knowledge claims". The notion of
causation is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we reason inductively by associating constantly conjoined events. It is the mental act of association that is the basis of our concept of causation. At least three interpretations of Hume's theory of causation are represented in the literature: • the
logical positivist • the sceptical realist • the
quasi-realist Hume acknowledged that there are events constantly unfolding, and humanity cannot guarantee that these events are caused by prior events or are independent instances. He opposed the widely accepted theory of causation that 'all events have a specific course or reason'. Therefore, Hume crafted his own theory of causation, formed through his empiricist and sceptic beliefs. He split causation into two realms: "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact." Hume explains his theory of causation and causal inference by division into three different parts. In these three branches he explains his ideas and compares and contrasts his views to his predecessors. These branches are the Critical Phase, the Constructive Phase, and Belief. In the Critical Phase, Hume denies his predecessors' theories of causation. Next, he uses the Constructive Phase to resolve any doubts the reader may have had while observing the Critical Phase. "Habit or Custom" mends the gaps in reasoning that occur without the human mind even realising it. Associating ideas has become second nature to the human mind. It "makes us expect for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past". In his
Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wrote: Power and necessity...are...qualities of perceptions, not of objects...felt by the soul and not perceiv'd externally in bodies. This view is rejected by sceptical
realists, who argue that Hume thought that causation amounts to more than just the regular succession of events. It has been argued that, while Hume did not think that causation is reducible to pure regularity, he was not a full-fledged realist either.
Simon Blackburn calls this a
quasi-realist reading, saying that "Someone talking of cause is voicing a distinct mental set: he is by no means in the same state as someone merely describing regular sequences." In Hume's words, "nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion".
'Self' Empiricist philosophers, such as Hume and
George Berkeley, favoured the
bundle theory of
personal identity. In this theory, "the mind itself, far from being an independent power, is simply 'a bundle of perceptions' without unity or cohesive quality". The self is nothing but a bundle of experiences linked by the relations of causation and resemblance; or, more accurately, the empirically warranted idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle. According to Hume: Hume denied the existence of practical reason as a principle because he claimed reason does not have any effect on morality, since morality is capable of producing effects in people that reason alone cannot create. As Hume explains in
A Treatise of Human Nature (1740): so Hume believed that reason's shortcoming of affecting morality proved that practical reason could not be authoritative for all rational beings, since morality was essential for dictating people's intentions and actions.
Ethics Hume's writings on ethics began in the 1740
Treatise and were refined in his
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). He understood
feeling, rather than
knowing, as that which governs ethical actions, stating that "moral decisions are grounded in moral sentiment." Arguing that reason cannot be behind morality, he wrote: Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason. Hume's
moral sentimentalism was shared by his close friend
Adam Smith, and the two were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of their older contemporary,
Francis Hutcheson.
Peter Singer claims that Hume's argument that morals cannot have a rational basis alone "would have been enough to earn him a place in the history of ethics." Hume also put forward the
is–ought problem, later known as ''Hume's Law
, denying the possibility of logically deriving what ought
to be from what is
. According to the Treatise
(1740), in every system of morality that Hume has read, the author begins by stating facts about the world as it is
but always ends up suddenly referring to what ought
to be the case. Hume demands that a reason should be given for inferring what ought to be
the case, from what is'' the case. This is because it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others." Hume's theory of ethics has been influential in modern-day
meta-ethical theory, helping to inspire
emotivism, and ethical
expressivism and
non-cognitivism, as well as
Allan Gibbard's general theory of moral judgement and judgements of rationality.
Aesthetics Hume's ideas about
aesthetics and the
theory of art are spread throughout his works, but are particularly connected with his ethical writings, and also the essays "
Of the Standard of Taste" and "
Of Tragedy" (1757). His views are rooted in the work of
Joseph Addison and
Francis Hutcheson. In the
Treatise (1740), he touches on the connection between beauty and deformity and vice and virtue. His later writings on the subject continue to draw parallels of beauty and deformity in art with conduct and character. In "Standard of Taste", Hume argues that no rules can be drawn up about what is a tasteful object. However, a reliable critic of taste can be recognised as objective, sensible and unprejudiced, and as having extensive experience. "Of Tragedy" addresses the question of why humans enjoy
tragic drama. Hume was concerned with the way spectators find pleasure in the sorrow and anxiety depicted in a tragedy. He argued that this was because the spectator is aware that he is witnessing a dramatic performance. There is pleasure in realising that the terrible events that are being shown are actually fiction. Furthermore, Hume laid down rules for educating people in taste and correct conduct, and his writings in this area have been very influential on English and Anglo-Saxon aesthetics.
Free will, determinism, and responsibility , on the
Royal Mile in Edinburgh Hume, along with
Thomas Hobbes, is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of
freedom and
determinism.
Compatibilism seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist view that human beings are part of a deterministic universe, which is completely governed by
physical laws. On this point, Hume was influenced greatly by the scientific revolution, particularly by
Isaac Newton. Hume argued that the dispute between freedom and determinism continued over 2000 years due to ambiguous terminology. He wrote: "From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot...we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression", and that different disputants use different meanings for the same terms. Hume defines the concept of necessity as "the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together", and
liberty as "a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will". He then argues that, according to these definitions, not only are the two compatible, but liberty
requires necessity. For if our actions were not necessitated in the above sense, they would "have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other". But, if our actions are not thus connected to the will, then our actions can never be free: they would be matters of "chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence". The philosopher
John Passmore writes that confusion has arisen because "necessity" has been taken to mean "necessary connexion". Once this has been abandoned, Hume argues, "liberty and necessity will be found not to be in conflict one with another". Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that, in order to be held
morally responsible, it is required that our behaviour be caused or necessitated, for: Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some
cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. Hume describes the link between causality and our capacity to rationally make a decision from this an inference of the mind. Human beings assess a situation based upon certain predetermined events and from that form a choice. Hume believes that this choice is made spontaneously. Hume calls this form of decision making the liberty of spontaneity. Education writer Richard Wright considers that Hume's position rejects a famous moral puzzle attributed to French philosopher
Jean Buridan. The
Buridan's ass puzzle describes a donkey that is hungry. This donkey has separate bales of hay on both sides, which are of equal distances from him. The problem concerns which bale the donkey chooses. Buridan was said to believe that the donkey would die, because he has no
autonomy. The donkey is incapable of forming a rational decision as there is no motive to choose one bale of hay over the other. However, human beings are different, because a human who is placed in a position where he is forced to choose one loaf of bread over another will make a decision to take one in lieu of the other. For Buridan, humans have the capacity of autonomy, and he recognises the choice that is ultimately made will be based on chance, as both loaves of bread are exactly the same. However, Wright says that Hume completely rejects this notion, arguing that a human will spontaneously act in such a situation because he is faced with impending death if he fails to do so. Such a decision is not made on the basis of chance, but rather on necessity and spontaneity, given the prior predetermined events leading up to the predicament. Hume's argument is supported by modern-day compatibilists such as R. E. Hobart, a pseudonym of the philosopher
Dickinson S. Miller. However,
P. F. Strawson argued that the issue of whether we hold one another morally responsible does not ultimately depend on the truth or falsity of a metaphysical thesis such as determinism. This is because our so holding one another is a non-rational human sentiment that is not predicated on such theses.
Religion The philosopher
Paul Russell contends that Hume wrote "on almost every central question in the philosophy of religion", and that these writings "are among the most important and influential contributions on this topic." Some modern critics have described Hume's religious views as
agnostic or have described him as a "
Pyrrhonian skeptic". Contemporaries considered him to be an
atheist, or at least un-Christian, enough so that the
Church of Scotland seriously considered bringing charges of infidelity against him. Evidence of his un-Christian beliefs can especially be found in his writings on miracles, in which he attempts to separate
historical method from the narrative accounts of miracles. The fact that contemporaries suspected him of atheism is exemplified by a story Hume liked to tell: The best theologian he ever met, he used to say, was the old Edinburgh fishwife who, having recognized him as Hume the atheist, refused to pull him out of the bog into which he had fallen until he declared he was a Christian and repeated the Lord's prayer. However, in works such as "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm", Hume specifically seems to support the standard religious views of his time and place. This still meant that he could be very critical of the
Catholic Church, dismissing it with the standard
Protestant accusations of superstition and idolatry, Paul Russell (2008) writes that Hume was plainly sceptical about religious belief, although perhaps not to the extent of complete atheism. He suggests that Hume's position is best characterised by the term "
irreligion," while philosopher David O'Connor (2013) argues that Hume's final position was "weakly
deistic". For O'Connor, Hume's "position is deeply ironic. This is because, while inclining towards a weak form of
deism, he seriously doubts that we can ever find a sufficiently favourable balance of evidence to justify accepting any religious position." He adds that Hume "did not believe in the God of standard theism ... but he did not rule out all concepts of deity", and that "ambiguity suited his purposes, and this creates difficulty in definitively pinning down his final position on religion".
Design argument One of the traditional topics of
natural theology is that of the
existence of God, and one of the
a posteriori arguments for this is the
argument from design or the
teleological argument. The argument is that the existence of God can be proved by the design that is obvious in the complexity of the world, which
Encyclopædia Britannica states is "the most popular", because it is: ...the most accessible of the theistic arguments ... which identifies evidences of design in nature, inferring from them a divine designer ... The fact that the universe as a whole is a coherent and efficiently functioning system likewise, in this view, indicates a divine intelligence behind it. In
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume wrote that the design argument seems to depend upon our experience, and its proponents "always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled". The philosopher Louise E. Loeb (2010) notes that Hume is saying that only experience and observation can be our guide to making inferences about the conjunction between events. However, according to Hume: We observe neither God nor other universes, and hence no conjunction involving them. There is no observed conjunction to ground an inference either to extended objects or to God, as unobserved causes. Hume also criticised the argument in his
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). Hume proposes a finite universe with a finite number of particles. Given infinite time, these particles could randomly fall into any arrangement, including our seemingly designed world.The Project Gutenberg E-text of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by David Hume A century later, the idea of order without design was rendered more plausible by Charles Darwin's discovery that the adaptations of the forms of life result from the
natural selection of inherited characteristics. They have also noted that it requires an appeal to inductive inference, as none have observed every part of nature nor examined every possible miracle claim, for instance those in the future. This, in Hume's philosophy, was especially problematic. Little appreciated is the voluminous literature either foreshadowing Hume, in the likes of
Thomas Sherlock or directly responding to and engaging with Hume—from
William Paley, William Adams, John Douglas,
John Leland and
George Campbell, among others. Regarding the latter, it is rumoured that, having read Campbell's Dissertation, Hume remarked that "the Scotch theologue had beaten him." Hume's main argument concerning miracles is that miracles by definition are singular events that differ from the established laws of nature. Such natural laws are codified as a result of past experiences. Therefore, a miracle is a violation of all prior experience and thus incapable on this basis of reasonable belief. However, the probability that something has occurred in contradiction of all past experience should always be judged to be less than the probability that either one's senses have deceived one, or the person recounting the miraculous occurrence is lying or mistaken, Hume would say, all of which he had past experience of. For Hume, this refusal to grant credence does not guarantee correctness. He offers the example of an Indian Prince, who, having grown up in a hot country, refuses to believe that water has frozen. By Hume's lights, this refusal is not wrong and the prince "reasoned justly;" it is presumably only when he has had extensive experience of the freezing of water that he has warrant to believe that the event could occur. So, for Hume, either the miraculous event will become a recurrent event or else it will never be rational to believe it occurred. The connection to religious belief is left unexplained throughout, except for the close of his discussion where Hume notes the reliance of Christianity upon testimony of miraculous occurrences. He makes an ironic remark that anyone who "is moved by faith to assent" to revealed testimony "is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." Hume writes that "All the testimony whichever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision."
As a historian of England , 1754; "Where men are the most sure and arrogant, they are commonly the most mistaken, and have there given reins to passion, without that proper deliberation and suspense, which can alone secure them from the grossest absurdities." —
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, § 9.13 : Conclusion, Pt. 1 (1751) From 1754 to 1762 Hume published
The History of England, a six-volume work which extended (according to its subtitle) "from the
Invasion of Julius Caesar to the
Revolution in 1688". Inspired by
Voltaire's sense of the breadth of history, Hume widened the focus of the field away from merely kings, parliaments, and armies, to literature and science as well. He argued that the quest for liberty was the highest standard for judging the past, and concluded that after considerable fluctuation, England at the time of his writing had achieved "the most entire system of liberty that was ever known amongst mankind". It "must be regarded as an event of cultural importance. In its own day, moreover, it was an innovation, soaring high above its very few predecessors." Hume's
History of England made him famous as a historian before he was ever considered a serious philosopher. In this work, Hume uses history to tell the story of the rise of England and what led to its greatness and the disastrous effects that religious fanaticism had on its progress. For Hume, the history of England's rise may give a template for others who would also like to rise to its current greatness.
Thomas Jefferson banned the
History from the
University of Virginia, feeling that it had "spread universal toryism over the land". By comparison,
Samuel Johnson thought Hume to be "a Tory by chance [...] for he has no principle. If he is anything, he is a
Hobbist." A major concern of Hume's political philosophy is the importance of the rule of law. He also stresses throughout his political essays the importance of moderation in politics, public spirit, and regard to the community. Throughout the period of the American Revolution, Hume had varying views. For instance, in 1768 he encouraged total revolt on the part of the Americans. In 1775 he became certain that a revolution would take place and said that he believed in the American principle and wished the British government would let them be. Hume's influence on some of the
American Founding Fathers can be seen in
Benjamin Franklin's suggestion at the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that no high office in any branch of government should receive a salary, which is a suggestion Hume had made in his emendation of
James Harrington's
The Commonwealth of Oceana. The legacy of religious civil war in 18th-century Scotland, combined with the relatively recent memory of the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite risings, had fostered in Hume a distaste for enthusiasm and factionalism. These appeared to him to threaten the fragile and nascent political and social stability of a country that was deeply politically and religiously divided. Hume thought that society is best governed by a general and impartial system of laws; he is less concerned about the form of government that administers these laws, so long as it does so fairly. However, he also clarified that a republic must produce laws, while "monarchy, when absolute, contains even something repugnant to law". Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious tyranny. However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain's two political parties, the
Whigs and the
Tories, explaining that "my views of
things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of
persons to Tory prejudices".
Jerry Z. Muller argues that Hume's political thoughts have characteristics that later became typical for
American and
British conservatism, which contain more positive views of
capitalism than
conservatism does elsewhere. Neil McArthur writes that Hume believed that we should try to balance our demands for liberty with the need for strong authority, without sacrificing either. He characterises Hume as a "precautionary conservative", whose actions would have been "determined by prudential concerns about the consequences of change, which often demand we ignore our own principles about what is ideal or even legitimate". Hume supported the
liberty of the press, and was sympathetic to democracy, when suitably constrained.
Douglass Adair has argued that Hume was a major inspiration for
James Madison's writings, and the essay "
Federalist No. 10" in particular. Hume offered his view on the best type of society in an essay titled "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth", which lays out what he thought was the best form of government. He hoped that "in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world". He defended a strict
separation of powers,
decentralisation, extending the
franchise to anyone who held property of value and limiting the power of the clergy. The system of the
Swiss militia was proposed as the best form of protection. Elections were to take place on an annual basis and representatives were to be unpaid. The political philosophers
Leo Strauss and
Joseph Cropsey, writing of Hume's thoughts about "the wise statesman", say that he "will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age". Also, if he wishes to improve a constitution, his innovations will take account of the "ancient fabric", in order not to disturb society. In the political analysis of the philosopher
George Holland Sabine, the scepticism of Hume extended to the doctrine of
government by consent. He notes that "allegiance is a habit enforced by education and consequently as much a part of human nature as any other motive." In the 1770s Hume was critical of British policies towards the American colonies and advocated for American independence. He wrote in 1771 that "our union with America...in the nature of things, cannot long subsist." Referring to his essay "
Of the Balance of Trade", the economist
Paul Krugman (2012) has remarked that "David Hume created what I consider the first true economic model." In contrast to Locke, Hume believes that private property is not a natural right. Hume argues it is justified, because resources are limited. Private property would be an unjustified, "idle ceremonial," if all goods were unlimited and available freely. Hume also believed in an unequal distribution of property, because perfect equality would destroy the ideas of thrift and industry. Perfect equality would thus lead to impoverishment. David Hume anticipated modern
monetarism. First, Hume contributed to the theory of
quantity and of interest rate. Hume has been credited with being the first to prove that, on an abstract level, there is no quantifiable amount of
nominal money that a country needs to thrive. Second, Hume has a theory of causation which fits in with the
Chicago-school "
black box" approach. According to Hume, cause and effect are related only through correlation. Hume shared the belief with modern monetarists that changes in the supply of money can affect consumption and investment. Lastly, Hume was a vocal advocate of a stable
private sector, though also having some non-monetarist aspects to his economic philosophy. Having a stated preference for rising prices, for instance, Hume considered
government debt to be a sort of substitute for actual money, referring to such debt as "a kind of paper credit." He also believed in heavy
taxation, believing that it increases effort. == Legacy ==