Colleague of Eden at
Schorfheide, Germany, 20 November 1937 By this time, Halifax was becoming increasingly influential in foreign affairs. The following year, Halifax said the provisions of the Pact "were not so frightfully different from those put forward by the Committee of Five [of the League]. But the latter were of respectable parentage: and the Paris ones were too much like the off-the-stage arrangements of nineteenth-century diplomacy". Effectively, although not formally, Halifax was deputy Foreign Secretary to Eden. Halifax was one of the signatories to the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. In general they got on well. In May 1937, when Neville Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin as prime minister, Halifax became
Lord President of the Council, as well as remaining Leader of the House of Lords. In these discussions, Halifax spoke of "possible alterations to the European order which might be destined to come about with the passage of time". Ignoring Eden's reservations, he did not object in principle to Hitler's designs on
Austria, and parts of
Czechoslovakia and
Poland, although he stressed that only peaceful processes of change would be acceptable. in 1938. Note Halifax's artificial left hand, concealed under a black glove. Writing to Baldwin on the subject of the conversation between
Carl Jacob Burckhardt (the League of Nations' Commissioner of
Danzig) and Hitler, Halifax said: "Nationalism and Racialism is a powerful force but I can't feel that it's either unnatural or immoral! I cannot myself doubt that these fellows are genuine haters of Communism, etc.! And I daresay if we were in their position we might feel the same!" In December 1937, Halifax told the Cabinet that "we ought to get on good terms with Germany", as despite the best efforts of Eden and Chamberlain, Britain was still faced with the prospect of war with Germany,
Italy and
Japan. Chamberlain preferred him to the excitable Eden: "I thank God for a steady unruffled Foreign Secretary." Others, especially Churchill, hoped that a strong military alliance with
France would permit a more robust foreign policy towards the dictators. Many shared Churchill's confidence in the large
French Army, although fewer shared his belief that France would be a resilient ally. Chamberlain embraced the policy of appeasement as a moral force for good, as did many others who were deeply opposed to war and defence spending. By comparison, Halifax's policy appears more pragmatic, like that of
Samuel Hoare, coupled to a firm commitment to rearmament, albeit unenthusiastically. All parties recognised the hostility of public opinion to war or military preparations, and the difficulty of acting without a readiness on the part of America or the
Soviet Union to play their part (the
Labour Party opposed rearmament until well after the
Munich Agreement). Nonetheless, Halifax was criticised as an appeaser, along with Chamberlain, Hoare, and twelve others, in the anonymous 1940 book
Guilty Men.
Munich greets British Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain on the steps of the
Berghof, 15 September 1938 during the crisis over Czechoslovakia.
Joachim von Ribbentrop stands on the right. Hitler's
annexation of Austria in March 1938 made Halifax keener on
British rearmament.
Czechoslovakia was clearly next on the agenda, but neither Britain nor France believed they had the military capacity to support her, and in the summer of 1938, Halifax still wanted to urge the Czechoslovaks in private to make concessions to Germany, which was making demands regarding the status of the
Sudeten Germans. Halifax remained in London and did not accompany Chamberlain on his dramatic flights to Germany in the autumn of 1938. This was once seen as a sign of Chamberlain's dominance of his Cabinet. It is now known that Halifax, under Cadogan's influence, persuaded the Cabinet to reject the Godesberg terms. Britain and Germany came close to war until Chamberlain flew to Munich. Chamberlain could hardly afford to lose a second Foreign Secretary, and his dominance of his Cabinet was never so overwhelming again.
After Munich , Halifax, and
Count Ciano at the Opera of Rome, January 1939 After Munich, Halifax (successfully) advised Chamberlain against capitalising on his popularity by calling a snap general election; instead, he urged (in vain) for Chamberlain to widen the
National Coalition by offering jobs not just to Churchill and Eden but also to Labour and Liberal figures. The Foreign Office received intelligence in early April 1939 that Italy was about to
invade Albania. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 April 1939, Halifax rejected these reports. Two days later, Italy invaded Albania; Halifax met Sir
Alexander Cadogan and "decided we can't
do anything to stop it". Although he disliked the Soviet regime, not least because of its
atheism, Halifax was quicker than Chamberlain to realise that Britain should attempt to ally with the Soviets. He told the Foreign Affairs committee: "Soviet Russia is something between that of the unconquerable steamroller and looking on her as entirely useless militarily. We cannot ignore a country with a population of 180,000,000 people." The negotiations (in summer 1939) failed, and the
Soviets signed an agreement with the Germans instead on 23 August. It has been suggested that Halifax should have led the negotiations himself, The Foreign Office confirmed to the US
chargé d'affaires on 8 August 1939 that "the military mission, which had now left Moscow, had been told to make every effort to prolong discussions until 1 October 1939". Halifax disclosed to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 July 1939: "Although the French were in favour of the military conversations commencing, the French Government thought that the military conversations would be spun out over a long time and as long as they were taking place we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp." While Henry Roberts has spoken of Halifax's fellow Foreign Minister (of the Soviet Union),
Maxim Litvinov, as having acute perceptive skills and an ability "to detect major trends in the 1930s and to anticipate the course of events indicates his tremendous understanding of the decade", Halifax had completely misunderstood Hitler. On the contrary, what made Hitler worried was the thought of a joint pact between France, Britain and the Soviet Union to prevent a pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. On 2 August 1939, Hitler asked
Konstantin von Neurath, a former Foreign Minister and career diplomat during the
Weimar Republic, whether the German people would accept such an ideological shift from anti-communism to signing a pact with the Soviet Union. Neurath assured Hitler that he "could do what he liked with the [National Socialist] Party". With Poland now looking likely to be carved up between Germany and the Soviets (as indeed soon took place), the diarist
"Chips" Channon,
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Halifax's junior minister
Rab Butler, who opposed the guarantee, recorded (25 August 1939) that "the barometer of war kept shifting" and that "the Polish guarantee was [Halifax]'s pet scheme and favourite god-child". Halifax remained opposed to any hint of a compromise peace during the
Phoney War.
Churchill as Prime Minister On 8 May 1940, Chamberlain's government survived a motion of no confidence brought about by the deteriorating
military situation in Norway. The government had a nominal majority of 213 in the House: at the end of the "
Norway Debate", they won the vote with a majority of only 81; 33 Conservatives and 8 of their allies voted with the opposition parties, and 60 abstained. Churchill had only grudgingly been appointed
First Lord of the Admiralty. Nevertheless, he mounted a strong and passionate defence of Chamberlain and his government in the debate preceding the vote. Under ordinary circumstances, such a weak vote would not have been politically disastrous, but it was decisive at a time when the Prime Minister was being strongly criticised by both sides of the House and there was a strong desire for national unity. Talking to Churchill after the vote, Chamberlain admitted his dismay and said that he would try for a
coalition government with the Labour and Liberal parties, but Churchill opposed that. At 10.15am the next morning (9 May), Chamberlain met with Halifax and Churchill in the Cabinet Room. Churchill's own account of these events, published eight years later in
The Gathering Storm, the first volume of his
The Second World War, does not tally exactly with contemporary accounts such as Halifax's own diary and
Alexander Cadogan's record of his conversations with Halifax, or accounts given by Chamberlain or by the
Chief Whip David Margesson (whose presence at the meeting Churchill does not mention). Churchill described a battle of wills in which Chamberlain opened the meeting by arguing that Churchill could not command the support of the Labour Party after he had had to defend the government at the Norway Debate, only to be met with a lengthy silence before Halifax, with some hesitation, expressed his own unfitness for the job. Other accounts describe Halifax demurring much more rapidly, and Churchill actively agreeing with him. Churchill also misdates the events of 9 May to the following day, and although his writing assistant
William Deakin accepted responsibility for this error he later confirmed, in an interview in 1989, that Churchill's account was embellished after numerous retellings and was not meant to be taken seriously. The description of Chamberlain attempting to persuade Churchill to agree tacitly to Halifax's appointment as prime minister is also hard to reconcile with Halifax's having expressed his reluctance to do so to Chamberlain at a meeting between the two men on the morning of the 9th. At 4.30pm that afternoon Chamberlain held another meeting, attended by Halifax, Churchill, and the leader and the deputy leader of the opposition Labour Party (
Clement Attlee and
Arthur Greenwood respectively). He asked the Labour leaders if they would agree to serve in a coalition government. They replied that it might be possible but only with a different prime minister and that before they could give an official answer, they would need the approval of Labour's
National Executive Committee, then in
Bournemouth preparing for the annual conference which was to start on the Monday. They were asked to telephone with the result of the consultation by the following afternoon. In his diary entry for 9 May, written up the following morning, Halifax later wrote: The Labour leaders telephoned at 5pm on the 10th to report that the party would take part in a coalition government, although it had to be under the leadership of someone other than Chamberlain. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to
Buckingham Palace to tender his resignation, recommending that
George VI ask Churchill to form a government. Unlike Simon, Hoare and Chamberlain, Halifax was not the object of Labour hatred in May 1940. Dutton argues that he "drew back" because of "inner self-doubt". "Political ambition had never been the most compelling motivation". He had a stomach ache, possibly psychosomatic, at the thought of becoming prime minister, and also probably thought that he could wield more influence as Churchill's deputy. convincing all who were present that Britain must fight on against Hitler whatever the cost. Churchill also obtained the backing of Neville Chamberlain, who was still Conservative Party leader. Churchill told the War Cabinet that there would be no negotiated peace. Halifax had lost. A few weeks later, in July 1940, Halifax rejected German peace offers presented through
the Papal Nuncio in Berne and the
Portuguese and
Finnish prime ministers. Halifax wrote in his memoirs of an occasion during a short holiday in
Yorkshire: == Ambassador to the United States ==