Conflicts with British diplomats In early 1939, Burckhardt came into conflict with Gerald Shepherd, the new British Consul-General in Danzig. Shepherd complained that the Jewish community of the Free City was being subjected to increasingly severe persecution, and that Burckhardt's role was limited to making protests. During the
Danzig crisis, Shepherd became convinced that Germany was aiming to start a war with Poland. Burckhardt for his part in his reports to the British delegation at the League of Nations painted Shepherd as a man suffering from mental health problems, and stated that Shephard's personal dislike of Nazism had led to take an unduly grim view of German foreign policy. Contra Shepherd, Burckhardt argued that Hitler did not want a war with Poland, and that his goals were limited to securing the peaceful return of Danzig to Germany. The British Foreign Office and the prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, tended to put more faith in Burckhardt's reports than in Shepherd's. In January 1939, Burckhardt told the British diplomat
Roger Makins that he believed that "Hitler was guided by the prejudices of a middle class Austrian". Burckhardt argued that Hitler as an Austrian was a
Polonophile under the grounds that King
Jan Sobieski of Poland had saved Vienna from a siege by the Ottoman Empire in 1683, and claimed that for this reason Hitler would never attack Poland. Tensions between Germany and Poland exploded into the open in late March 1939 with Poland ordering a partial mobilization in response to threatening German demands that the Free City be allowed to "go home to the
Reich" or else Germany would go to war. On 31 March 1939, Chamberlain announced the famous "guarantee" of Poland, saying in the House of Commons that Britain would to go to war to defend Polish independence, though Chamberlain pointedly excluded the frontiers of Poland from the "guarantee". On 28 April 1939, in a speech to the
Reichstag, Hitler himself for the first time in public demanded Danzig rejoin Germany, saying "Danzig is a German city and wishes to belong to Germany". On 2 May 1939, Burckhardt reported to the League Council that he was "moderately optimistic" that Germany would not go to war, and stated that his major concern was Poland, which he feared would act in a rash manner that would cause a war. During the Danzig crisis, Burckhardt in his reports showed a strong preference for Greiser whom he depicted as a "moderate" Nazi opposed to the "extremist" Nazi Forster. On 20 May 1939, three members of the Danzig SA became engaged a brawl with the chauffeur of the Polish High Commissioner for Danzig in the frontier village of Kalthof (now
Kałdowo, Malbork County), which ended with the chauffeur pulling out his handgun and opening fire, killing one of the SA men, Max Grubnau. At the time, both Greiser and Forster told Burckhardt that the incident was of no importance as both men noted that incidents between Poles and Germans were common in the Free City. The killing of Grubnau later became in the summer of 1939 a major point for German media, which painted the Poles as violently anti-German.
Halifax's peace plan, French support for Danzig's return to Germany On 21 May 1939 during a visit to the League Council in Geneva, Burckhardt met with the British Foreign Secretary
Lord Halifax, who was in Geneva to attend the spring session of the League of Nations. Halifax outlined the British compromise solution to the Danzig crisis under which Danzig would remain a Free City, but would be represented in the German
Reichstag. The British peace plan also called for Germany to take over the task of representing the Free City abroad, but for the rest of the Polish special rights in Danzig, such as control of the customs service, to remain. Halifax asked for Burckhardt to visit both Berlin and Warsaw to present the peace plan as he believed that Burckhardt was a man respected by both the Poles and the Germans. Burckhardt expressed approval of Halifax's peace plan, but stated that the "chauvinism" of Polish public opinion would probably lead to its rejection by Poland. During the same visit to Geneva, Burckhardt met with the French foreign minister
Georges Bonnet, who told him that he favored the immediate return of the Free City to Germany and ordered Burckhardt to work to that end. On his way back to Danzig, Burckhardt stopped by in Warsaw to see Colonel Beck. Burckhardt noted the two autographed photographs of Hitler and Mussolini that were normally displayed on the piano in Beck's house were now gone as Beck stated that he did not consider Hitler and Mussolini to be his friends anymore. Burckhardt was addressed by Beck as if he were giving orders as he asked him to see Hitler to request he restrain Forster and Greiser.
Heated meeting with Ribbentrop After visiting Warsaw and Berlin, Burckhardt met with Matkins to present his assessment of the Danzig crisis. Burckhardt stated that he trusted Weizsäcker, and that Weizsäcker had told him that Hitler would take no action against Poland until after the annual Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg, which occurred every September. Burckhardt stated that, based upon his contacts in Berlin and Warsaw, he believed that neither side wanted to see the Danzig crisis escalate into war. However, Burckhardt went on to say that the
Sanation military dictatorship in Poland was unpopular, and the
Sanation regime might be overthrown if its prestige was damaged too much in the crisis. Burckhardt depicted the Polish people as the primary problem in the crisis, saying that during his visit to Warsaw he had "detected certain symptoms of Polish imperialism and formed the impression that Polish aims were of a wide scope." The Foreign Office wrote that Burckhardt had strong prejudices against the Poles, but stated it did not affect his "impartiality". Per the request of Colonel Beck, Burkhardt visited Berlin where he met Ribbentrop. The Burckhardt-Ribbentrop meeting was described as "heated" as Ribbentrop tried to bully Burckhardt. Burckhardt was normally described as having an "Alpine" temperament, as he rarely expressed much emotion while looking as imposing as the Alps, and his animated discussion with Ribbentrop was most unusual for him. Burckhardt informed Ribbentrop that, however much he supported Germany's claim to Danzig, that Germany should not invade Poland, as both Britain and France would declare war. Ribbentrop dismissed Burckhardt's concerns and stated that both France and Britain would do nothing if the
Reich attacked Poland as he confidently stated that any French government that declared war on Germany would fall. Ribbentrop told Burckhardt that the Paris correspondent of the
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a Herr Krug von Nidda, had just toured France and reported that the French people were overwhelmingly against war for the defense of Poland.
Final mediations On 3 June 1939, Greiser handed a note to the Polish high commissioner to Danzig, Marian Chodacki, accusing the Polish customs inspectors of "bad behavior" and asked for all of the Polish customs inspectors to leave the Free City forever, a demand that was rejected by the Poles. As usual, Burckhardt, as the High Commissioner, was called upon to mediate the dispute. Later in June 1939, Burckhardt complained that Nazi "extremists" were trying to provoke the Poles, complaining that the "Week of German Culture" launched in the last week of June 1939 was intentionally outrageous. The "Week of German Culture" was intended to emphasise the German character of Danzig and some of the claims made during the Week of German Culture, such as that Danzig had never been the Polish city of
Gdańsk and always been Danzig, were considered highly offensive in Poland. Dr.
Josef Geobbels, the
Reich Minister of Propaganda was the guest of honor for the Week of German Culture. In his speech at the conclusion of the Week of German Culture, Goebbels stated that Danzig would soon "come home to the
Reich" and that: "I have come to fortify you in your resolution. Germany is everywhere that there are Germans. Only the jealousy, the defiance, the stupidity of other nations oppose you. Then again, political frontiers can be displaced for a time. The frontiers which are drawn by language, race and blood are fixed eternally". Burckhardt was relieved that the Poles chose to not make any issue out of Goebbels's provocative speech as Colonel Beck accepted the claim of the
Reich government that Goebbels was expressing his personal views and not those of the German government.
German gun-running In his reports from July 1939, Burckhardt noted that Danzig officials were bringing in arms from Germany in violation of the Treaty of Versailles which had declared the Free City to be a demilitarized zone. However, Burckhardt stated that Forster had assured him that the gun-running was only a defensive measure, as he feared that the Poles would attempt to annex the Free City, and that Hitler did not want war with Poland. On 20 July 1939, Forster, as a part of a deception effort, stated to Burckhardt that the crisis was not that serious, and that Germany was willing to wait for the next two years for Poland to give permission for the Free City to rejoin Germany. As intended, Burckhardt reported this statement to the governments of Poland, France and the United Kingdom, which gave the impression the Danzig crisis was only a minor issue that could be settled sometime over the next two years. The Danzig issue was a pretext for Germany to invade Poland, and the last thing the German government wanted was for Poland to give its assent for Danzig to rejoin Germany. During the Danzig crisis, the negotiations between the Free City and the Poles over the issue of the Polish customs officers overseen by Burckhardt were held in "a tense and violent atmosphere". Polish customs officers were the subject of continuing harassment, insults and violence by the Danzig Nazis, who sought to make it impossible for them to perform their work, making gun-running into Danzig easier and allowing a massive amount of arms and ammunition to be smuggled into the Free City via its harbour in the spring and summer of 1939. On 4 August 1939, Colonel Beck issued a note stating that Poland was willing to go to war if the harassment of Polish customs officers did not cease immediately. Burckhardt in his assessment blamed the Poles for escalating the crisis, as he maintained that Beck's note was unacceptable in making threats of war. Burckhardt continued to take Weizsäcker's word at face value and accepted Weizsäcker's claims that Germany did not want a war and that the harassment of the customs officers was merely a way to pressure Poland to allow Danzig to "go home to the
Reich" peacefully.
Kehlsteinhaus meeting with Hitler On 10 August 1939, Forster told Burckhardt that Hitler wanted to see him at the
Berghof high up in the Bavarian Alps and that he was not to tell the Poles, the French and the British about the secret invitation. At 9 am the next day, Burckhardt was picked up at Danzig airport in Hitler's personal air plane, a Fokker-Wolff Condor 200 named
Immelmann III. During the flight to
Berchtesgaden, Forster told Burckhardt about his supposed exploits as a "street fighter" before he came to Danzig as he stated that he was not just a high school teacher, but a successful "street fighter". Burckhardt stated that he found Forster's behavior very "strange", as Forster looked and sounded very much like the middle class teacher that he was, and he found Forster's accounts of being a macho "street fighter" hard to believe. On 11 August 1939, Burckhardt held his secret meeting with Hitler. Hitler praised Burckhardt for his work in trying to peacefully resolve the crisis and claimed that the crisis would have been settled had it not been for the Polish "ultimatum" of 4 August 1939, which Hitler claimed had escalated the crisis to a dangerous point. Hitler blamed the crisis on the Polish and French newspapers which had "trumpeted Polish courage", which Hitler told Burckhardt made a diplomatic solution to the Danzig crisis almost impossible. Hitler told Burckhardt that he made "reasonable" offers to resolve the crisis and blamed the Poles for having "definitely ruled out" his peace offers with the "ultimatum". Hitler stated that he was willing to wait for Poland to change its policies towards Danzig, but if the Poles did not, then Poland would be "smashed". When Burckhardt stated that this would mean world war as both France and Britain would declare war on the
Reich, Hitler replied that he was ready for a world war and was quite willing to accept a war where millions would die if that was the price of bringing Danzig back into Germany. During the meeting, Hitler made his famous comment to Burckhardt: "Everything I undertake is directed against Russia. If those in the West are too stupid and too blind to see this, then I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians to beat the West, and then after its defeat, turn with all my concerted force against Russia". Finally, Hitler told Burckhardt that he still wanted a settlement with Britain, and was prepared to "guarantee" the continual existence of the entire British empire in exchange for Britain renouncing the "guarantee" of Poland. The British historian D.C. Watt wrote that Burckhardt's account of his meeting with Hitler on 11 August set on the dramatic vista of the
Kehlsteinhaus was "scored like a Wagnerian opera" as he described Hitler as "angry", "
crescendo", "
fortissimo", "furious", "tapping the table", and engaged in "hysterical laughter". Burckhardt remarked upon Hitler's "femininity" during the secret meeting, as he did not find his "hysterical" behavior to be very masculine. Burckhardt described Hitler as "older and whiter" and as "nervous, pathetic and almost shaken at times", as he stated that Hitler appeared to him like a man very conscious of having turned 50 earlier that year, and troubled by the prospect of growing old. Hitler's primary demand at this summit with Burckhardt was for appointment of a "German-speaking Englishman" as meditator to end the crisis. The particular "German-speaking Englishman" whom Hitler had in mind was Field Marshal Sir
Edmund Ironside. Ironside was a close friend of the military historian General
J. F. C. Fuller, who was also a member of the national executive of the
British Union of Fascists. Fuller had attended the party for Hitler's 50th birthday on 20 April 1939 as a guest of honor, and Hitler knew from talking to Fuller that Ironside shared many of his views, in particular supporting Germany's claim to the Free City. Hitler expected Ironside as a mediator to rule in favor of Germany's claim to Danzig, and for Poland to reject such a ruling, which he believed in turn would cause Britain to renounce the "guarantee" of Poland. After his meeting with Hitler, Burckhardt as expected went on to Geneva where he submitted an extensive account on his meeting at the
Kehlsteinhaus to the "committee of three" at the League of Nations, namely the British, French and Swedish ambassadors to the League. Since it was a mystery in London and Paris as to just what Hitler was planning to do, Burckhardt's account was the subject of intense study in both London and Paris and was submitted to the cabinets of both governments. Burckhardt expressed his own view that the Danzig crisis "could have been settled if the Poles had not sent their ultimatum". The Chamberlain government was taken with Hitler's request for a "German-speaking Englishman" to serve as a mediator to end the crisis, but Ironside's friendship with Fuller, along with rumors that he shared Fuller's fascist politics, led to Ironside being considered an unsuitable mediator. Hitler's purpose of the Berchtesgaden summit was to sow distrust between Warsaw and London as Colonel Beck believed that Burckhardt was serving British interests at the summit as a part of a bid to reach a settlement of the Danzig crisis at the expense of Poland. The meeting at the
Kelhsteinhaus caused much anger in Warsaw, as Burckhardt had not informed Colonel Beck that he was going to meet Hitler in advance. Chodacki had an unpleasant meeting with Burckhardt where he chided him for not telling the Polish government about his summit in Berchtesgaden, as he reminded him that his duties as the League of Nations commissioner required him to be neutral. In response, Burckhardt stated he had "disclosed that he regarded the Polish ultimatum as responsible for the present difficult situation and had told Herr Hitler so". Someone in the Quai d'Orsay leaked an account of the Burckhardt-Hitler meeting to the
Paris Soir newspaper, which caused an international sensation as the version of the meeting published in the
Paris Soir was edited in such a manner as to suggest that Hitler was insane.
Visit of the Schleswig-Holstein On 15 August 1939, Burckhardt was informed that the old German battleship
Schleswig-Holstein would be sailing from the German naval base at Kiel to Danzig for a "friendship visit" later that month, a report that Burckhardt did not see as an escalation of the crisis. He noted that the Poles were unhappy about the prospect of a German battleship weighing its anchors in Danzig harbour, but were willing to accept the
Schleswig-Holstein making its "friendship visit" to Danzig. On 30 August 1939, Forster led a group of Nazis that kicked in the door to Burckhardt's house and told Burckhardt at gunpoint that he had only two hours to leave Danzig or else he would be executed. Forster stated to Burckhart that the swastika would soon fly over Danzig as the Free City was about to "go home to the
Reich in the next day or two, and he already arrested all of the Polish commissioners. Forster assured Burckhardt that despite the way he was pointing his gun at him: "Personally, I have nothing against you". Burckhardt then fled to
Lithuania, and Nazi Germany would subsequently annex Danzig.
Legacy Burckhardt despite his limited powers as the League of Nations high commissioner played a major role in the Danzig crisis. He was well regarded in London and the Chamberlain cabinet always paid close attention to Burckhardt's statements during the crisis. By contrast, Burckhardt was seen as a tool in Berlin by which Britain might be detached from its commitment to defend Poland. The American historian Herbert Levine wrote that Burckhardt was a victim of his colossal ego as he "...seems to have fallen victim to the conceit that he could almost single-handedly stop an Anglo-German conflict". Levine wrote that Burckhardt's anti-Polish views which led him to cast Poland as the aggressor in the Danzig crisis and his repeated statements that "the Nazi regime might yet come to a good end" played a major in the "hesitancy" of British policy during much of the crisis. Following this period as High Commissioner, he returned to his professorship in Geneva for the rest of
World War II (1939–1945). While in that position, he was also active in a leading role in the ICRC, traveling to Germany several times to negotiate for better treatment of civilians and prisoners, in part using the contacts gained during his two years as High Commissioner in Danzig. in August 1941 ==Involvement with Nazism==